Though their landscape is picturesque, the Baltic states are not built for defense. Lakes and swamps provide some benefit, but there are no mountains, jungles, or Rhine-sized rivers to stop an invader. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can be Holland, but not Switzerland.
Hence, the Baltic states want to build the “Baltic Defense Line” to stave off a Russian attack. Announced in January 2024, the idea is that by working together, three small nations can overcome their numerical and geographical weaknesses versus their giant and aggressive neighbor.
Estonia plans to build 600 bunkers along its 300-km border with Russia. Latvia is emplacing dragon’s teeth. Lithuania announced a plan to build a multi-layer border defense system stretching up to 50 km from the frontier. Directly on the border would be the first layer — 5 km in depth — comprising a wide anti-tank ditch, backed up by dragon’s teeth, minefields, strongpoints, and trenches. The second layer would include trenches as well as bridges wired for demolition, with a third layer studded by trees ready to be felled into obstacles, plus more trenches and wired bridges.
Fixed fortifications are often derided, yet in reality, they are a sensible and cost-effective idea for weaker nations. They increase the survivability and lethality of friendly troops, impede enemy mobility and logistics, and allow the defender to economize on manpower and resources. As the early days of the Ukraine war showed, it does not take much to derail and disrupt Russian armored columns. For the Baltic states not to build fixed defenses would be negligent.
However, fortifications can also become an albatross. The most infamous example is the Maginot Line, now synonymous with how static defenses can turn into a trap. Yet the concept was sound: the Maginot defenses freed up French mechanized forces to counterattack elsewhere. The true failure lay in poor French leadership, not the forts themselves.
It is not that the Baltic Defense Line is Maginot 2.0, but fortifications often gain prestige that distorts their tactical value. After the Six-Day War, Israel built the Bar-Lev Line. When Egypt struck in 1973, thinly manned forts quickly fell, reserves were too weak to counterattack, and the fortifications provided little beyond symbolic value.
All of which means that the Baltic Defense Line will be useful for limited missions: slowing a Russian offensive, repelling minor raids, and providing some deterrence. But the true backbone of defense will be mobile reserves and airpower capable of blocking spearheads and ejecting invaders from Baltic soil.
The question is whether NATO is prepared. The Baltic militaries are small: Estonia has fewer than 8,000 active-duty personnel and about 230,000 reservists better suited for defense than counterattack. Counteroffensive power will have to come from larger NATO allies.
Currently, NATO maintains four battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, totaling only a few thousand troops. Germany is adding a permanent armored brigade in Lithuania. But if Russia launched an offensive on the scale of Ukraine, these NATO forces would be little more than a tripwire.
Ultimately, the issue is how quickly NATO can mobilize a fully equipped force to rescue the Baltic states — particularly if the US, under isolationist pressures, does not participate. It is uncertain whether Europe alone could field sufficient strength in time.
An even darker prospect is that Europe may lack weapons, manpower, and public support, leading to a dangerous temptation to rely on fortifications as a substitute for strategy.
The French hoped the Maginot Line would save them. NATO cannot afford to make the same mistake.