The EU’s renewed focus on the Black Sea has created an opportunity for Romania, Turkey and Ukraine to shape a stronger defense against Russia. In May, the European Commission launched its first strategy for the Black Sea in response to the war in Ukraine. One of the three pillars of the new policy framework, alongside measures to improve transport and data networks, and environmental solutions, is the establishment of a European Union (EU) “Black Sea Maritime Security Hub.”
The goal is to strengthen cooperation, building on already successful initiatives like the Bulgarian-Romanian-Turkish coalition for demining. The proposed base would improve information exchange, broaden coastguard cooperation, provide European Maritime Safety Agency early-warning services to partners such as Ukraine, and oversee surveillance of critical maritime infrastructure, such as submarine cables, pipelines, and wind energy operations, the commission said.
Although the EU said the new base must be established quickly, “and with a sense of priority due to the Russian war of aggression,” a roadmap is yet to be published. In the meantime, the threat to the region is more severe than ever. With US engagement uncertain, allies must stop the Black Sea from becoming a Russian lake. The planned base could be a maritime security powerhouse and help strengthen regional cooperation between the EU and NATO in this key region.
And it’s vital it doesn’t become yet another EU institution with substantial responsibilities on paper but limited impact on the ground. Romania’s President Nicușor Dan said his country, as a leading advocate for a stronger Euro-Atlantic presence in the region, is ready to host the new facility. And placing it alongside the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, soon to be the largest NATO base in Europe, makes sense from a geostrategic perspective. Romania and Turkey are bound by a strategic partnership, and have already cooperated in regional security initiatives such as the demining coalition, so Bucharest should take the lead in calling for Turkey to be included as an associate member of the proposed EU base.
Romania could also tell the European Commission that the mandate should go beyond the monitoring and intelligence sharing currently proposed. Including Ukraine, for example, would not only signal the EU’s commitment to Kyiv joining the bloc but would also enable its naval warfare innovations, intelligence information, and lessons from the war with Russia to be integrated into the collective knowledge of the Euro-Atlantic defense community. Keeping the Romanians in the lead, the Turks engaged, and the Ukrainians supported could set the pattern for an integrated EU-NATO regional security community for the Black Sea. Rather than just another EU institution, the proposed base would then be a vital component in the deterrence of an increasingly aggressive Russia.