With limited resources, Kyiv is leveraging homegrown drones to impose asymmetric costs on Russia’s oil industry. As Ukraine’s targeted drone campaign continues to cripple Russia’s oil refining infrastructure, Belarus has emerged as a critical supplier, quadrupling its gasoline exports to Moscow in September to alleviate acute domestic fuel shortages.
This surge underscores the tangible impact of Kyiv’s strategy to disrupt the Kremlin’s energy lifeline, which funds its war machine and sustains its economy, forcing Russia to lean on its closest ally for relief.
Ukraine’s escalating assault on Russia’s refining backbone
Since early 2024, Ukraine has mounted a relentless offensive against Russia’s energy sector, shifting from sporadic strikes to a sustained, coordinated barrage of long-range drones aimed at refineries, storage depots, and export terminals. The campaign, which intensified dramatically in August 2025, represents a “two-pronged” approach: choking off refined fuel supplies for the Russian military and civilian economy while slashing revenues from petroleum exports.
By targeting processing facilities deep inside Russia – some over 1,400 kilometers from the front lines – Kyiv seeks to exploit vulnerabilities in Moscow’s air defences and repair capabilities, hampered by Western sanctions that limit access to specialized equipment.
The results have been devastating. According to open-source analysis and Russian media reports, Ukraine struck at least 21 of Russia’s 38 major refineries between January and September 2025, surpassing the total hits for all of 2024 by 48%.
Facilities like the Salavat petrochemical complex in Bashkortostan, the Ryazan refinery near Moscow, and the Volgograd plant in the south have been repeatedly targeted, sparking massive fires and forcing partial or full shutdowns.
These attacks disrupted up to 17% of Russia’s refining capacity—around 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd)—with some assessments putting offline capacity as high as 38% at peak disruption in September.
Economists like Vladislav Inozemtsev have praised the tactic as “hitting the nail on the head,” noting that refineries are costlier and harder to replace than other targets like drone factories, given Russia’s isolation from global supply chains.
The U.S. has bolstered this effort by providing intelligence on deep-strike targets, including pipelines and power plants, further enabling Ukraine’s domestic drone production to overwhelm Russian defences.
Ripple effects: fuel rationing and economic strain in Russia
The strikes have triggered Russia’s worst fuel crisis in decades, manifesting in long queues at petrol stations, garage closures, and regional rationing – such as five-gallon limits in annexed Crimea.
At least 10 refineries have suspended operations since August, slashing national gasoline and diesel output by 6% in August and 18% in September, according to industry estimates.
Prices have spiked, with temporary freezes imposed in multiple regions, while diesel exports hit their lowest levels since 2020.
To stem the bleeding, Moscow extended its partial ban on gasoline exports through the end of 2025 and introduced curbs on diesel shipments, prioritizing domestic needs over lucrative sales to allies like India and China.
The shortages exacerbate inflation in transport, agriculture, and construction – sectors vital to Russia’s wartime economy – while straining the budget with subsidies and repairs that could widen the deficit.
Although crude oil exports remain largely unaffected, the refined products market – key for military logistics – has been thrown into disarray, with gasoline production data classified since May 2024 to mask the damage.
Belarus emerges as Russia’s emergency supplier
Enter Belarus, whose rail-transported gasoline exports to Russia surged fourfold month-on-month in September, reaching 49,000 metric tons (about 14,500 bpd), per industry sources cited by Reuters.
Diesel deliveries followed at 33,000 tons, providing a vital bridge as Russian refineries limp back online—or fail to.
This isn’t the first time: Moscow ramped up imports from Minsk in 2024 for similar reasons, and the trend accelerated amid the 2025 crisis.
Belarus’s two main refineries – Naftan and Mozyr – boast a combined annual capacity of 24 million tons (roughly 480,000 bpd), though they typically operate at about 9 million tons (180,000 bpd) due to feedstock constraints and maintenance.
Fed primarily by Russian crude via the Druzhba pipeline, these facilities have pivoted to prioritize Moscow’s needs, even as Belarus’s own transshipments through Russian ports for global exports dipped nearly 40% year-on-year to 1.17 million tons from January to September, reflecting reduced throughput.
Gasoline transit for re-export via Russian ports rose modestly by 1% to 140,000 tons in September, but the focus has clearly shifted inward.
Under a 2021 cooperation pact, Belarus has relied on Russian ports for transshipment since losing Baltic access due to sanctions, deepening the Minsk-Moscow energy symbiosis.
Belarus treads carefully: while Russia pays under $1,000 per ton, higher prices from buyers in China, India, and Africa (up to $1,900 per ton) tempt diversion – though the Kremlin’s desperation has so far secured supplies.
For Russia, reliance on Belarus offers short-term respite but highlights systemic fragility. Minsk’s limited output – barely enough to plug a fraction of the gap – cannot sustain indefinite imports, especially if Ukrainian strikes extend to shared pipelines like Druzhba.