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Dubai “wallet”: how a Lukashenko ally evades EU sanctions through Lithuanian ventures

Lithuanian real estate empire

In 2020, Puiki Investicija (“Great Investment”), a little-known real estate firm with minimal staff and profits, undertook an ambitious Klaipeda development project. Questions arose in the local city council about the source of its funding, with suspicions pointing to Belarusian money.

The company, owned by Mohammed Ahmad Salem Khalifa Alzaraim Alsuwaidi through two UK-registered firms, acquired around 150 properties, including townhouse complexes and apartment blocks in Vilnius. Investigations later uncovered Alsuwaidi’s ties to Chevtsov, a key figure in Lukashenko’s financial network.

Belarusian-Venezuelan connection

Chevtsov’s role as a Lukashenko “wallet” began during Belarus’s “Venezuelan period” in the late 2000s, marked by a close alliance with Hugo Chávez.

In 2007, the Belarusian Council of Ministers established Belzarubezhstroy, a construction firm chaired by Chevtsov, to secure over $1 billion in Venezuelan contracts for housing, factories, and infrastructure. Alsuwaidi joined as a 39% stakeholder in 2009 and, in 2008, acquired stakes in shareholders of Chevtsov’s CJSC Trastbank, effectively gaining control.

Alsuwaidi also established PSGT Middle East General Trading in Dubai to act as an intermediary, handling Belarusian machinery shipments to Venezuela. This dual role – co-owner and middleman – allowed Alsuwaidi to profit from both sides of these deals.

UAE ventures and labor controversies

Alsuwaidi and Chevtsov also collaborated in the UAE through Future Metro Technical Contracting LLC, involved in projects like Dubai International Airport and the Royal Atlantis Resort. The company faced lawsuits for labor rights violations, highlighting ethical concerns in their operations.

Proxies in Lithuania

Chevtsov, added to EU and Swiss sanctions lists in August 2024 for monopolizing Belarus’s holographic industry, used loyal associates to maintain influence abroad. Two Belarusian businessmen acted as his proxies in Lithuania:

  • Alexander Gribovsky: A long-time Chevtsov associate since the 1990s, Gribovsky worked at Infobank and served on Puiki Investicija’s board. Since 2010, he has headed the Belarusian office of Alsuwaidi’s PSGT, linking him to the Venezuelan projects.
  • Vital Bandaryk: Former general director of Belzarubezhstroy (2012–2020) and a board member of Chevtsov’s Bank Rashenne, Bandaryk also served as a director at Puiki Investicija and represented Alsuwaidi in overseas projects, including in Ecuador.

In August 2025, after media scrutiny, Puiki Investicija restructured, dissolving its board and removing Gribovsky, Bandaryk, and Alsuwaidi from official roles, though Alsuwaidi remains the ultimate beneficial owner.

Denials and evasion

When contacted, Bandaryk denied knowing Chevtsov, but a lawyer representing him and Gribovsky later admitted past business ties, claiming they were terminated and denying any nominee roles or links to Puiki Investicija. Chevtsov and Alsuwaidi also denied current business connections, with Alsuwaidi dismissing ties to Bank Rashenne as outdated.

Puiki Investicija’s law firm insisted the company operated lawfully and had no connection to Chevtsov. Other involved entities, like Future Metro and RSI Middle East, denied ties to Alsuwaidi or Chevtsov, with some threatening legal action.

Sanctions evasion mechanism

This network illustrates how Lukashenko’s allies evade sanctions: Chevtsov funnels influence through Alsuwaidi, who uses foreign entities, including UK firms and Lithuanian companies, to obscure ownership. Proxies like Gribovsky and Bandaryk manage operations, allowing sanctioned individuals to profit indirectly. A Lithuanian Seimas member has promised consequences following BIC’s findings, signaling potential action to close such loopholes.