Should Prague join the “sceptic camp” led by Budapest and Bratislava, it could tilt the balance against enlargement momentum. Traditionally, Czechia has been among the bloc’s most active champions of bringing in new members from both the Western Balkans and the Eastern Neighbourhood, often pushing above its weight in EU diplomacy: indicatively, Prague has been a driving force within the so-called ‘’Friends of the Western Balkans’’ group, one of the few capitals producing detailed non-papers on accession methodology, and a reliable partner pressing more hesitant governments, particularly in Western Europe, to keep enlargement high on the EU’s agenda.
It is also worth pointing that the country has not sharply differentiated its stance between the Western Balkans and Ukraine & Moldova, being supportive of the accession prospects of both tracks. That consistency has given Prague diplomatic credentials as a bridge between sceptical and supportive EU member states.
In his first tenure in power (2017-2021), Babiš presented himself as a pragmatist centrist. Since then, he has changed course by joining the Eurosceptic camp and positioning himself to the radical right of the political spectrum, portraying himself as a ‘’defender of national sovereignty’’ in the fashion of Hungary’s Orbán and Slovakia’s Fico. He also co-founded the far-right ‘’Patriots for Europe’’ group in the European Parliament in 2024, alongside Hungary’s Fidesz and Austria’s FPÖ.
His rhetoric opposing the EU’s climate agenda, migration policy, and military aid to Ukraine places him firmly in the populist-sovereigntist bloc forming within the Council. In a similar manner, in his return to power, his stance on EU enlargement could reflect his broader foreign policy orientation: cautious at best and obstructive at worst. Even though he has not explicitly opposed Western Balkan accession, he has already voiced scepticism regarding Ukraine’s membership and has repeatedly opposed EU aid to Kyiv and Czechia’s own military support to Ukraine. The fiscal and budgetary implications of an enlarged EU add another layer. The European Commission’s most recrnt survey. (Eurobarometer, September 2025) reveals that the population from both net-contributor and net-recipient member states, including the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Estonia, and Czechia identified the budgetary consequences of enlargement as one of their chief concerns.
All candidate countries would be net beneficiaries of the EU budget, receiving more than they contribute. With Czechia’s GDP per capita now around 95% of the EU average, the country is likely to be upgraded from net-recipient to potential net-contributor status in the coming decade, especially in an enlarged EU.
Even though the fiscal impact would be gradual, these budgetary debates are sensitive and offer fertile ground for politicisation in the short-term, particularly by radical-right forces. Opposing the costs associated with admitting economically weaker states is a recurring theme among radical-right parties in net-contributor countries. Populists like Babiš could easily frame it as “we pay more so poorer countries can join”. Similar rhetoric has already surfaced in Western Europe and may find new traction in Central Europe as well.
In other words, the consequences extend far beyond Czech domestic politics. Enlargement decisions ultimately depend on political will within the Council, not only on progress in candidate countries, especially when it comes to recent accession bidders like Ukraine and Moldova. Should Prague join the informal “sceptic camp” led by Budapest and Bratislava, it could tilt the balance against enlargement momentum at a delicate juncture, just as the EU debates its next Multiannual Financial Framework and a potential enlargement of 30+ members. Such an outcome would be particularly damaging given Czechia’s previous role in lobbying for enlargement to more hesitant capitals like Paris or The Hague. Losing that voice would narrow the pro-enlargement coalition precisely when strategic cohesion is most needed.
Of course, given ANO’s lack of a parliamentary majority, much will hinge on the coalition talks that began this week and which parties Babiš decides to join forces with: opting for the support from parties like the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party would likely harden Prague’s line across several files determined at an EU level, including migration, climate, Ukraine aid, and ultimately enlargement.
By contrast, a coalition including more moderate forces such as the Christian-Democratic People’s Party (KDU-CSL) or the Mayors and Independents (STAN) could temper that stance, especially if he loses a key ally at an EU Council if Orbán were to lose ground in Hungary’s elections next April. Meanwhile, Czechia’s centrist President, Petr Pavel, has warned that he will not tolerate a cabinet comprised of ministers who openly challenge the country’s pro-Western orientation, adding another constraining factor to a Eurosceptic U-turn.
Nevertheless, even a more lukewarm rather than hostile stance towards Ukraine and EU enlargement, would have disproportionate symbolic costs. It would not only deprive the bloc of one of the few enlargement enthusiasts but would also signal that enlargement fatigue phenomena are no longer confined to Western Europe but spreading eastward.
At a moment when Europe faces renewed geopolitical competition, political fragmentation, and external pressure, the EU cannot afford to lose one of its most active advocates in Prague.