Today, amid the active transformation of the international security system, space communications have finally moved beyond purely civilian applications. The practical experience of using low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations in modern conflicts has clearly demonstrated that high-speed internet with minimal signal latency has become a key element of “digital independence,” military logistics, and strategic influence.
In early February 2026, the American company SpaceX, at Ukraine’s request, blocked access to Starlink terminals used by Russian units in occupied territories. For Moscow, this step became a significant infrastructure blow that vividly demonstrated the critical dependence of a modern army on commercial LEO communication systems. The response to the problem was an accelerated transition to the practical deployment of Russia’s own Rassvet project, developed by the private company Bureau 1440, part of IKS Holding. On 23 March 2026, a Soyuz-2.1b launch vehicle from the Plesetsk cosmodrome placed the first batch of sixteen serial satellites into orbit, followed by a second similar launch on 19–20 July. These events marked the transition from laboratory testing to the formation of a Russian independent dual-use space constellation intended not only for import substitution in the civilian telecommunications sector but also for a fundamental shift in the military-political balance in Eastern Europe and the Arctic region.
The engineering concept of Rassvet is based on deploying a constellation of satellites in low Earth orbits at an altitude of approximately 500–600 kilometers — significantly higher than Starlink’s orbital shells. Unlike traditional geostationary satellites, this provides minimal ping (the time in milliseconds for a signal to travel from a user’s device to a server and back), which is critical for the operation of modern digital systems and real-time command and control. During test trials conducted in 2023–2024, the operability of basic communication protocols, inter-satellite laser links, and the 5G NTN standard was confirmed. A fundamental feature of the Rassvet communication system is the use of laser channels, which enable data transmission from satellite to satellite in orbit at speeds of up to ten gigabits per second over distances exceeding two hundred kilometers. This eliminates the system’s dependence on ground gateway stations in a specific region and makes it resilient to external infrastructure constraints.
Relatively compact ground user terminals weighing up to fifteen kilograms are designed to operate in harsh climatic conditions and provide a throughput of up to one gigabit per second with a signal latency of about seventy milliseconds. The build-up of the satellite constellation envisages the launch of hundreds of spacecrafts to achieve continuous coverage of key regions by 2027, followed by expansion of the constellation to the level of a global network by the 2030s.
Rassvet’s entry into the stage of global coverage creates a whole range of challenges for European states in the areas of information, economic, and military security. In the context of Russia’s hybrid confrontation, an independent LEO system provides the opportunity to exert strategic influence on the European Union and NATO countries in several directions.
Unlike traditional geostationary broadcasting satellites, whose channels can be easily blocked by European regulators at the level of ground gateway stations, an LEO system with laser-based traffic distribution can broadcast “unfiltered” content and maintaining secure communications for pro-Russian structures directly inside Europe, bypassing local telecommunications infrastructure.
At the same time, Moscow gains a tool for displacing European operators such as Eutelsat and SES from regions of the Global South. Historically, European states have promoted their influence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America through digital initiatives and infrastructure assistance. By offering internet access via the Rassvet system on favorable or subsidized terms, Russia can significantly weaken the positions of traditional European operators. Moreover, routing internet traffic from developing countries through the Russian satellite system provides opportunities to analyze metadata and conduct intelligence in regions where the strategic interests of Moscow and Brussels intersect.
From a military perspective, sovereign LEO internet performs the role of a “central nervous system” for modern armed forces. Rassvet is intended to provide communications resistant to electronic warfare for troop control in areas bordering NATO, including the Baltics, the Arctic, and the Mediterranean basin. Minimal signal latency when transmitting data allows real-time coordination of autonomous and unmanned systems over long distances, creating a tangible threat to the coastal and maritime critical infrastructure of EU countries. Vladimir Putin’s public statement in June 2026 about the existence of Russia’s own Starlink analogue capable of coordinating the actions of heavy unmanned aerial vehicles finally replaced the commercial context of the project with a military one. The installation of Rassvet terminals on strike UAVs of the Geran type and on cruise missiles opens possibilities for real-time route adjustment and video transmission even under conditions of complete suppression of ground channels by electronic warfare means.
Finally, the mass launch of Russian spacecraft into low orbits generates spatial and frequency risks. High traffic density in orbital shells complicates the deployment of prospective European programs such as IRIS², while the need for regular avoidance maneuvers to prevent collisions forces European companies to expend the resources of their satellites. In parallel, Russia gains the opportunity to exploit the geographic advantage of short Arctic routes, offering international corporations the lowest latency for data transmission between Europe and Asia, which can serve as an argument in economic negotiations.
However, an analysis of Rassvet’s technological base reveals the project’s “weak link” — its growing dependence on the Chinese space sector. Due to strict sanctions restrictions and an acute shortage of domestically produced radiation-hardened microelectronics, Russian developers are forced to rely on components and solutions from the PRC. This trend, referred to by analysts as the “sinization” (Chinization) of Russian military space, on the one hand allows Western embargoes to be circumvented, but on the other places the long-term sustainability of the sovereign Rassvet in dependence on Beijing’s political will. An additional bottleneck remains Russia’s shortage of Soyuz launch vehicles, whose launch rate does not yet allow for the rapid replenishment of the orbital constellation.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin regards Rassvet as a crucial element of strategic deterrence. Dmitry Medvedev’s statement in October 2026 that any attempts at the physical or electronic blocking of the satellites would be regarded as an act of destruction of military infrastructure and would entail a full-scale space war clearly indicates the project’s status. Rassvet has not yet reached the scale of Starlink, yet it fully reflects the current logic of Russian foreign policy, in which dual-use technological projects are transformed into an instrument of coercive blackmail and outer space becomes yet another arena of hybrid confrontation with the West.
For Europe, the question is acute and boils down to whether it will manage to strengthen its own satellite resilience, develop alternatives such as IRIS², and create countermeasures before the Russian constellation reaches “critical mass.” According to several experts, the window of opportunity is largely closing in 2027–2028.
