President Maia Sandu’s pro-European Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) faces a resurgent opposition in the September 28 vote, and evidence of Kremlin meddling is everywhere. The result won’t just determine who will form a government, but whether a small state can withstand Russia’s hybrid warfare — and what that means for European security.
In April, Moldova’s parliament voted to hold early elections, a move described by Speaker Igor Grosu as crucial to determining whether the country will advance toward integration with the European Union or fall under Kremlin influence. The vote asks Moldovans to make a broad choice between Europe, as represented by the EU, or Eurasia, as represented by Russia.
Either we throw away everything we’ve achieved on our path to modernization and EU integration, or we move forward toward peace and development, he said. The vote comes just a year after Sandu narrowly won a referendum on EU membership, a result that underscored Moldova’s deep internal divisions and the destabilizing impact of Russian influence operations and vote-buying.
Moldova faces genuine internal challenges. Nearly a third of voters remain undecided — a reflection of deep societal grievances that make the outcome highly volatile. A significant segment of the electorate, particularly those leaning toward pro-Eurasian parties, feel alienated by the pro-European establishment.
Critics argue PAS and its allies are technocratic, disconnected, and put too much emphasis on long-term reforms instead of addressing daily economic hardships. Poverty has risen by more than eight points to 34% since Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine began. Moldova has accepted the greatest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita in the world, while energy and food prices have soared in what was already one of Europe’s poorest nations.
Populist pro-Russian parties have much to work with, especially in rural areas where poverty is most concentrated. They have often been more effective communicators and are backed by budgets for repairs to sidewalks, donations to schools, or direct vote-buying — all of which resonate in a country where poverty is widespread.
The pro-European parties suffer from a shortage of charismatic leaders, weak alliances, and recurring internal disputes, hindering their ability to broaden their appeal. While the EU this year approved a €1.9bn aid package up to 2027, it will take time before any benefits are felt. Progress toward EU integration and tangible improvements in living standards has been slower than promised, with voters’ frustrations increasingly directed at Sandu.
When EU policy goals or hopes of better living standards have stalled, she has struggled to connect with voters and shown little inclination to build links with other pro-European groupings.
The first major poll of the official campaign period suggested a coalition will be inevitable after September 28. The ruling PAS currently has 63 of the 101 parliamentary seats but has slumped in the polls since the 2021 vote.
The iData Barometer poll, published in August, suggested four groups will enter the next parliament: PAS on 33.8% (down about 20% on 2021), the pro-Russian Patriotic Bloc led by former president Igor Dodon on 30.1%, while Our Party and the Alternative Bloc are on smaller shares of the vote. Former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, who came close to defeating Sandu in the 2024 presidential race, heads a coalition of three parties aimed at eroding PAS’s majority. The Patriotic Bloc is made up of the Socialists, Communists, Heart of Moldova, and Future of Moldova.
It is difficult to predict what will happen, not least because coalition logic is far from transparent in Moldova. Alliances are often driven by short-term survival and backroom bargains rather than ideological proximity, meaning parties nominally committed to European integration may still fall vulnerable to Moscow’s leverage.
And Kremlin interference is already evident in the campaign. Sandu has warned that Russia has €100m to spend on buying votes and financing allied groups in an operation coordinated from a single command point in Moscow. In one notorious example from last year, the Kremlin openly sought to buy the population of an entire Moldovan region.
Interference activities include:
- Vote-buying networks fueled by cryptocurrency
- Paid protests and street agitation
- Cyberattacks on Moldova’s digital infrastructure
- Influence campaigns using social media, church networks, and online influencers
Moldovan police have already fined more than 25,000 people for participating in illegal financing schemes, and authorities have warned about Taito, a Telegram-linked app allegedly used to distribute illicit payments. These fines are issued as administrative sanctions by police, without the need for a court ruling.
Ilan Șor, a fugitive oligarch based in Moscow, is a key player in attempts to swing the election. His network is reported to have paid protesters up to $3,000 to join anti-government rallies and launched A7A5, a ruble-based cryptocurrency stablecoin designed to launder Russian funds and cash them out through black-market exchanges in Turkey, the UAE, and Lebanon. The money is then recycled into Moldovan politics, evading sanctions.
Moldova’s police and intelligence services have requested the blocking of 443 TikTok channels, which together had more than 1.2 million followers and 4.5 million views. Often disguised as grassroots voices, the accounts were used to promote Kremlin-backed blocs.
The Russian-linked Social Design Agency has also been implicated in operations such as “Doppelgänger,” which creates fake European media sites to push pro-Russian stories.
These tactics are intended to erode trust, amplify polarization, and destabilize Moldova well beyond election day as part of what experts describe as a “strategy of chaos.”
And the effects spread beyond the country’s borders. With nearly 250,000 Moldovans eligible to vote from abroad, the diaspora is both a crucial constituency and a target of Moscow’s efforts. In 2024, diaspora voters strongly supported Sandu — a pattern the Kremlin now seeks to disrupt.
National Security Adviser Stanislav Secrieru has warned of a renewed blitz against Moldovans overseas to discourage participation and nudge those who vote toward Kremlin-backed “centrist” projects promoted through Russian-backed disinformation campaigns.
The tools deployed — cryptocurrencies, synthetic media, diaspora manipulation, and covert financing — mirror interference strategies seen in Ukraine, the Balkans, and EU states.
The election outcome will carry weight far beyond Chișinău. If Russia can bend Moldova to its will, it will embolden similar campaigns elsewhere. Conversely, if Moldova resists, it will show that even small, vulnerable states can withstand Moscow’s playbook with the right support.