The Kremlin has an established playbook for war and its consequences, but developments beyond its control threaten the regime’s grasp. Russian opposition politicians are saying that if the latest offensive in Donbas fails, as past attempts have, Vladimir Putin may be ready to end the war or at least call a ceasefire before the end of the year. But before suggesting Moscow is ready for peace, it is important to understand what Putin’s “ideal war” scenario looks like and how achievable it is.
Because peace, as it’s understood in the West, and peace, as it’s understood by the Russian regime, are not the same thing. For now, only one thing is clear to military analysts: the Kremlin is again seeking a “decisive breakthrough” on the Donbas front, just as it did at the end of May, when it bet on a summer offensive and failed to win a decisive breakthrough.
The authors of the opposition Re-Russia project assert that the next two months will see the end of the battle for Donbas — where Russia controls about 70% of the territory but not the Ukrainian “fortress belt” of Donetsk region — and maybe the culmination of the four-year war.
Recognizing that Russian losses are huge and disproportionate to the modest gains at the front, they nevertheless note the chance of a successful and decisive campaign thanks to the manpower reserves of the Russian command and the depletion of the Ukrainian Army.
The pro-Kremlin media has been asserting since the spring that plans to breach Ukrainian lines are likely to succeed by the year’s end. Captured Russian officers say they were told that the offensive marked “one last push” to victory, Ukraine says. If the anticipated breakthrough does not happen (and Russian forces are making heavy weather of their advance), talk of a pause in the war will resurface. Levada Center polling shows that two-thirds of Russians would prefer immediate peace talks, while those supporting continuing hostilities fell to 27% from 41% a year earlier.
But at that point, the course of events would be determined by Putin, and that will again run up against his vision of the ideal war, the model he seems unable to abandon and to pursue at any cost.
First, the most comfortable type of war for Putin is a truly “special operation” conducted by an expeditionary force. Such a war can be continued indefinitely without causing significant damage to the economy while simultaneously justifying both the need to rally round the leader and to impose political repression.
Second, there is a possibility of suspending the war and restarting it. This is determined not only by the situation at the front, but also by the need to resolve the regime’s internal political problems. The same applies to the degree of popular involvement in the war, which is “ideally” manipulated to contribute to bolstering regime stability.
This leads to the third point — the existence of some kind of agreement which, of itself, or at least in one of its interpretations, contains terms unfavorable to Ukraine. This might suspend the fighting but would allow the Kremlin to resume the conflict at a moment of its choosing. Kyiv would be accused of “breaking the peace,” signaling a resumption of new and more vigorous Russian aggression. Will Russians continue to accept this is a mere expeditionary war, given the staggering cost? Some 30% of Russians say the conflict has affected them a lot or quite a lot — will they continue to “ignore” the war as before? Meanwhile, Ukrainian drone strikes aimed at fuel output are bringing the reality of the war into daily life despite the Kremlin’s wishes.
Though the current level of repression and the submissiveness of most Russians make a revolution highly unlikely, the Kremlin fears even concealed dissatisfaction if the population is drawn too abruptly into the war with no time to adapt to the change in their daily life. The previous mobilization of 2022 resulted in a large outflow of the working-age population rather than an increase in those willing to fight, and it is clear that the Kremlin is doing its best to avoid a repeat.