SVR embraces disinformation as official policy
The Kremlin’s disinformation machinery is nothing new in Europe’s political landscape. For years, Russia has relied on state outlets and covert networks to spread fabricated narratives, deny responsibility, and discredit democratic processes. What is new, however, is the role of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR.
Once confined to the shadows, the agency has started issuing official press statements designed to lend an air of authority to baseless conspiracy theories. This public turn represents a shift in Moscow’s tactics. Rather than limiting itself to behind-the-scenes manipulation, Russian intelligence now acts as an overt player in information warfare, amplifying lies in the open and signaling to allies and adversaries alike that disinformation is part of its official toolbox.
Moldova Under Pressure
The September 28 parliamentary elections in Moldova offered the most striking example. President Maia Sandu and her pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity won a decisive majority, securing Moldova’s pro-EU course. Yet the victory came against the backdrop of a massive pro-Russian disinformation campaign, coordinated across media, online platforms, and activist networks.
For the first time, the SVR weighed in directly. In an official statement, it claimed NATO troops were massing in Romania and Odesa, allegedly preparing to occupy Moldova after the elections or to intervene during Transnistria’s vote in November. No such intervention materialised, but the statement exemplified how Moscow uses official channels to breathe life into falsehoods that covert actors spread in parallel.
Serbia’s Protests Smeared
The SVR has also targeted Serbia, where protests erupted last December following a tragic railway station collapse in Novi Sad that killed 16 people. Demonstrators blamed corruption and government negligence. Moscow’s response was to frame the protests as an EU-engineered “Maidan” — recycling its long-standing narrative that Western institutions orchestrate uprisings in countries with unfriendly governments.
By casting popular discontent as a foreign plot, Russia not only shields allied leaders from accountability but also undermines citizens’ trust in grassroots mobilisation.
Georgia in Moscow’s Sights
Georgia has faced similar tactics. Ahead of its October 2024 elections, the SVR accused the United States of plotting a coup in Tbilisi. More recently, it alleged that the EU was funding student protests, smearing civil society groups such as Georgian Youth for Europe.
These narratives mirror Russia’s broader goal: portraying pro-democracy activism as Western interference rather than legitimate civic engagement. The claims collapsed under scrutiny — no coup took place, and the EU had not offered the alleged funding — yet the repetition ensures that suspicion lingers, particularly in societies where Russia maintains influence.
The New Strategy
The decision of the SVR to publish these narratives openly signals a strategic change. Disinformation is no longer laundered exclusively through proxies, fringe outlets, or anonymous Telegram channels. Instead, Russia’s spy agency has become an official megaphone for propaganda, erasing the line between covert influence and state policy.
As SVR chief Sergey Naryshkin continues to make increasingly implausible statements — from alleging Western sabotage of the Sputnik V vaccine to framing Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” — it is clear that Russian intelligence is no longer hiding its hand. The agency is now a full-fledged player in the information domain, openly crafting and disseminating narratives that aim to destabilise neighbours, weaken the EU, and delegitimise democratic processes.
The European Response
Europe’s resilience will depend not only on exposing these lies but also on reinforcing the credibility of national campaigns that inform citizens and protect democratic institutions. Moscow’s new strategy makes one thing certain: disinformation has moved out of the shadows — and the fight against it must adapt accordingly.