The arrests may relate to economic pressures, such as U.S. sanctions on Serbia’s NIS oil company due to its Russian majority stake
In late September 2025, Serbian police executed two significant arrest operations targeting activities linked to Russian interests, raising questions about President Aleksandar Vučić’s motives. EUalive’s partner Beta agency offers an analysis.
The arrests, involving alleged Russian paramilitary training camps and actions inciting hate in France and Germany, appear to be less a calculated move against Moscow and more a response to external pressure, as Vučić seeks to maintain Serbia’s delicate balance between East and West.
The arrest operations
On 26 September, Serbian authorities detained Lazar Popović and Savo Stevanović, accused of organizing and funding Russian paramilitary camps in Loznica. These camps, active between July and September 2025, reportedly trained over 150 Moldovan and Romanian nationals to destabilize Moldova ahead of its 28 September general election. The training focused on resisting Moldovan police during potential post-election riots, particularly if pro-Russian forces lost.
Moldova’s authorities, after conducting 250 raids and arresting 74 suspects on 22 September, revealed that many had trained in Serbia, prompting Belgrade’s response. The camps were linked to the Serbia-Russia Friendship Society, with figures like Milivoje Miletić and Zoran Mirković implicated.
Three days later, on 29 September, Serbian police arrested 11 individuals from Velika Plana and Belgrade, suspected of carrying out racist acts in Paris and Berlin for a foreign intelligence service, likely Russian. Between April and September 2025, these individuals allegedly targeted Jewish and Muslim sites in Paris, defacing synagogues and leaving pigs’ heads outside mosques, and placed symbolic “skeletons” with messages at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate.
French authorities had flagged Serbian-linked vehicles in the Paris incidents, suggesting an intent to exploit France’s large Jewish and Muslim communities to sow division.
Vučić’s motives
While these arrests might suggest a pivot against Russia, they likely reflect Vučić’s need to appease Western critics. The operations followed public disclosures by Moldova and France, which exposed Serbia’s role in hosting Russian activities. Vučić downplayed the camps’ significance, noting that foreign services operate in Serbia but acting only when “combat training” was evident. This timing suggests the arrests were a face-saving measure rather than a proactive stance against Moscow.
Vučić’s public rhetoric further illustrates this balancing act. In an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, he criticized Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) for accusing Serbia of supplying ammunition to Ukraine, calling it “the most insulting statement” against his country. Yet, Russia has supported Vučić’s regime, with the SVR recently alleging an EU-orchestrated “Maidan” plot to topple his government, a narrative that bolsters Vučić’s domestic claims of Western interference.
This duality underscores Serbia’s complex position, maintaining ties with Moscow while signalling cooperation to the West.
Geopolitical tightrope
The arrests coincide with Serbia’s broader geopolitical maneuvering. On 29 September, a conference titled “BRICS – Serbia Among Friends,” organized by Vučić’s ally Aleksandar Vulin, highlighted Serbia’s flirtation with the BRICS bloc, particularly Russia and China. Vulin argued that joining BRICS aligns with Serbia’s sovereignty, contrasting it with the EU’s demands. The event, attended by Russian and Chinese ambassadors, aimed to appeal to Vučić’s pro-Russian voter base amid domestic unrest and EU criticism over Serbia’s response to protests.
That same day, Vučić met Russian Ambassador Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko and attended a Chinese National Day celebration, signalling continued engagement with both powers. However, the absence of the usual “ironclad friendship” rhetoric with China suggests a cautious approach as Serbia navigates Western scrutiny.
Strategic implications
The arrests may also relate to economic pressures, such as U.S. sanctions on Serbia’s NIS oil company due to its Russian majority stake. While some speculate the arrests pressure Moscow to resolve the NIS issue, they more likely reflect Vučić’s need to deflect Western criticism while preserving ties with Russia and China. The question remains whether the arrested individuals will face significant consequences or be quietly released once attention fades, a tactic Vučić has employed before.