Hungarian-Russian cooperation in the energy sector is not a coincidence—it reflects a deepening political and economic dependence of Hungary’s leadership on Russian interests. At the heart of this relationship is not just geopolitical alignment, but a network of influence that implicates top officials in Viktor Orbán’s government, notably Hungary’s Interior Minister, Sándor Pintér.
Pintér, who held a senior role in the Hungarian police from 1993 to 1996 and has maintained close ties to Orbán, is alleged to have received bribes from Russian business elites to advance Kremlin interests in Hungary. Reports suggest that around 1994, he received a substantial payment from Russian sources—money allegedly used to finance the electoral campaign of Fidesz (FIDESZ-MPP), which ultimately brought Orbán to power in 1998.
Since then, Pintér has wielded significant influence over Hungary’s energy sector, appointing loyalists to supervisory boards of key energy enterprises. Major strategic decisions are often made only after consultations with Moscow.
A prime example is the 2014 agreement between Hungary and Russia’s Rosatom to expand the Paks Nuclear Power Plant with two additional third-generation VVER-1200 reactors. The €12.5 billion deal, awarded without a public tender, violated EU transparency standards and is being financed largely by a Russian loan—further deepening Hungary’s energy dependence on the Kremlin. Many experts and politicians raised concerns over potential corruption and foreign influence at the time.
To complicate matters, parts of the Paks II agreement were classified for 30 years, and site preparation began in 2020—before Rosatom even had the required permits. Despite mounting concerns, in August 2022, Hungary granted Rosatom the license to proceed. When the European Commission attempted to investigate the opaque deal, it was met with resistance from Budapest, which dismissed the inquiry as politically motivated.
In 2023, Orbán personally blocked the potential replacement of Rosatom with France’s Framatome, despite legal and political pressure. This decision contravened both Hungarian and EU law.
Scandal followed. In 2024, Russian authorities arrested two senior executives from Orgenergostroy, a Rosatom subcontractor—Gennady Sakharov and Elgudji Kokosadze—on large-scale bribery charges. Sakharov reportedly accepted a bribe of 32.6 million rubles. The scandal threatens to delay construction or trigger changes in contractors. Both men confessed in January 2025, with Sakharov held in pre-trial detention and Kokosadze under house arrest. They each face up to 15 years in prison.
The fallout continued in February 2025 when opposition MP Ákos Hadházy revealed that an internal wall at the Paks II site had collapsed. The greater concern involved the southern wall’s structural tilt and water infiltration—posing potential risks not only to the construction site but also to the existing Paks I plant.
The Hungarian Nuclear Energy Authority ordered a halt to construction and launched an investigation, but this was kept from both the public and visiting MPs. Only after independent media obtained official documents did the truth emerge. In a subsequent parliamentary session—where ruling party MPs were absent and journalists were barred—opposition lawmaker Antal Csárdi highlighted both the concealment of the incident and the authority’s prior warnings about site safety.
Concerns over the Paks II project have also been raised internationally. Mycle Schneider, editor of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report (WNISR), called attention to Hungary’s growing vulnerability—both financially and in terms of nuclear safety.
But energy is not the only domain in which Russia maintains influence over Hungary. In 2020, a long-term gas contract with Gazprom, worth $4.5 billion, significantly expanded Moscow’s leverage over Budapest.
These links extend beyond policy to direct political coordination. Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, often described as Orbán’s key conduit to Vladimir Putin, regularly holds phone calls with Russian officials and travels to Moscow under the guise of energy diplomacy. Discussions reportedly include not just economic matters, but issues related to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.
Furthermore, Tigran Haribyan, the deputy Russian ambassador to Hungary and reportedly a Russian intelligence operative, acts as a direct channel to the Orbán administration. He is known to deliver pre-approved talking points to Antal Rogán, head of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office and a close Orbán ally. Haribyan also maintains ties with the editor-in-chief of Magyar Nemzet, a pro-government media outlet.
In sum, Hungary’s energy policy has become a case study in state capture—where national infrastructure projects are used as instruments of geopolitical influence and personal enrichment. The deepening ties between Orbán’s government and Moscow, shielded by secrecy and aided by systemic corruption, threaten not only EU unity but the democratic integrity of Hungary itself.