In the last decade, the Romanian government has centered its Black Sea security policy on the country’s strategic partnership with the United States. However, since President Trump was elected for a second term, US interest in Europe has drastically diminished. Romania’s new president, Nicușor Dan, needs to update his playbook for the Black Sea to take this new reality into account. This updated playbook should include strengthening partnerships with non-US allies, increasing EU support for regional initiatives, and developing a robust national armaments program.
The Black Sea as a Contested Environment
Although the start of the Russian Federation’s full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022 led to Romania and Bulgaria hosting NATO battle groups that have increased overall readiness, the Black Sea remains a vulnerable part of the European security architecture. Given Turkey’s resistance toward the internationalization of the Black Sea, there is still no permanent allied military presence in the region, only a rotational one, which creates weaknesses. Moreover, Turkey closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits in 2022 as a result of the Ukraine war, prohibiting the passage of vessels of the warring parties under the Montreux Convention. As a consequence, military exercises in the region have stopped. This has severely affected training under the NATO umbrella, as allied ships cannot join the exercises while the straits are closed.
With peace in Ukraine looking increasingly elusive and Moscow’s surrender of Crimea highly unlikely, the Black Sea is set to remain a contested region on the European continent. In addition to the Russian Federation’s militarization in the Black Sea, China is becoming increasingly present in the regional landscape. One example is Beijing’s construction of the Black Sea’s largest port, in Anaklia, a product of its strategic partnership signed with Georgia in 2023. Through such investments in critical regional infrastructure, China is expanding its soft power while conducting an opaque foreign policy towards the region and continuing to enable the Russian Federation’s war machine in Ukraine.
Failure of Romania’s Allies to Act
For NATO’s eastern flank, the Black Sea is marked by numerous threats and vulnerabilities. While the Baltic Sea became a veritable NATO lake with the addition of Finland and Sweden to the transatlantic alliance, the same cannot be said for the southern half of the flank, where the Black Sea remains a playground for the biggest threat to European security – the Russian Federation. This asymmetry between the flanks was accentuated after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2016, NATO established an “enhanced forward” presence in the northern half of the flank, encompassing the Baltic Sea, while the military presence in the southern half was set at a lower, “tailored forward” level. This decision was informed by both the need to reconcile Turkey’s views against a robust NATO presence in the region and the perception that NATO’s increased presence in the Black Sea would lead to an escalation in hostility with Moscow. Thus, as the Eastern flank has strengthened over the past decade, the Black Sea has remained its “soft underbelly.”
To counter the effects of Russia’s hybrid warfare and China’s investments in the Black Sea region, the Romanian government has historically banked on US involvement. The authorities in Bucharest were quick to salute the adoption of the Black Sea Security Act by the United States’ Congress in 2023, a bipartisan bill aimed at strengthening US engagement in the Black Sea by authorizing the US National Security Council to direct an inter-agency strategy for this key region. However, to this day, the United States still has not published a clear strategy for the Black Sea, despite Congress’ request. Also, the bipartisan bill has not, as Romanians expected, brought more US ships to the Black Sea. Moreover, as rumors about the Trump administration’s decision to reduce the number of US troops in Europe continue, the allied presence in the region may further be weakened. The regional defense plans voted at the NATO Summit in Vilnius in 2023 will also become harder to implement if US disengagement from Eastern Europe becomes a reality.
In response to the deteriorating security environment in the EU’s vicinity, the European Commission published its first Strategic Approach to the Black Sea in May 2025. While this new policy announced several positive developments, it remains unclear how they will be funded. The communique discusses measures such as the creation of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub and improving connectivity between regional partners through joint development projects funded through Global Gateway. However, the question remains: how will this strategic approach be financed? Without adequate funding and a comprehensive action plan, the EU’s strategy risks becoming as obsolete as the US Black Sea Security Act.
Romania’s New Playbook
Securing the Black Sea is a national priority for Romania, and one of the most pressing diplomatic dilemmas that Bucharest is trying to resolve as part of the European security architecture emerging from Ukraine war. The newly elected president of Romania, who is set to steer the adoption of a new national defense concept and strategy in the coming months, will need to consolidate its playbook to ensure Black Sea security even in the face of a potential US withdrawal from the region.
An updated Black Sea playbook must start at home. Romania should transform itself from a bystander to a leader that projects power in the region, especially as Moscow’s operations have become increasingly hostile. Russia’s toolbox in the Black Sea has ranged from the militarization of the waterway to interference in elections. Having spent only 2.26% of its GDP on defense in 2024, Romania needs to increase its defense spending to strengthen capabilities like high-tech intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and early-warning systems. The Romanian Navy has suffered from a serious lack of investment over the last decade, resulting in a low operational capacity. This trend must be reversed through consistent investments and a rapid increase of defense spending.
Nicușor Dan, the Romanian president, committed to back NATO’s emerging 5% spending goal in his first week in office. This is a promising sign.
At the EU level, Romania must become an advocate for turning the recently launched strategic approach into a robust and adequately funded plan of action, with clear commitments on how EU bodies will monitor the implementation of the ambitious goals stated in the recently published EU strategic approach.
Next, Romania should continue to work with its neighbors to ensure regional security. The Bulgarian-Romanian-Turkish task group for de-mining the Black Sea, established in 2024, shows that such cooperation is possible. This format should be enlarged to share intelligence on common threats and even participate in joint exercises to increase interoperability between NATO’s Black Sea allies. This format may also serve as a means to quickly integrate Ukraine’s recent naval experience and enhance readiness with other like-minded nations, such as Moldova, that are crucial for regional security.
Furthermore, in lieu of over-reliance on Washington, the Romanian government should direct its diplomacy towards bringing the United Kingdom – the greatest European naval power – closer to the Black Sea region. Romania should insist that coalition members commit to engaging in serious monitoring activities not only on the ground in Ukraine but also in the Black Sea.
As US attention shifts away from the European theater under Trump’s leadership, Romania finds itself at a critical juncture where waiting for external solutions is no longer a viable option. President Dan has the opportunity to redefine Romania’s role in the Black Sea region from a passive observer to an active regional leader. Still, this transformation requires bold action across multiple fronts: spending more on advanced defense capabilities, bridging the differences between neighbors to form a solid regional alliance, and securing the attention of new investors in Black Sea security. With Russia’s militarization of the Black Sea and China’s growing infrastructure investments, these steps must be implemented swiftly.