Since World War II, Europe’s security has essentially been “outsourced” to the United States within the broader framework of NATO, relegating European countries to a position of total subordination to the external line dictated by Washington. The Trump administration has changed all this. And now, amid the potential collapse of the US protective umbrella, the European Parliament is revisiting an issue that it first addressed more than 70 years ago: the prospect of a European common defence plan independent of US foreign policy.
The European Defence Community (EDC), also known as the Pleven Plan, remains to this day the most ambitious attempt that Europe ever made toward military integration, notwithstanding its ultimate failure. Its trajectory reveals how many of the institutional obstacles that thwarted its success in the 1950s still persist and continue to hamper European efforts toward collective defence.
Churchill to Pleven: Path to the EDC
The idea of European common defence grew out of the post-WWII Soviet threat and a series of major geopolitical shifts, namely the Berlin Crisis and rapid decolonization. The April 1949 creation of the North Atlantic Treaty further disrupted the balance. While it provided a sense of security for Western Europe, it also highlighted a growing discontent among European nations over the strategic dominance exercised by the United States on the continent. Globally, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 made it more urgent than ever for Europe to reconsider its defensive arrangements and pursue a form of military autonomy.
It was in this climate that the first concrete signals emerged of a possible European common defence policy. Though the EDC is generally credited to French Prime Minister René Pleven, the earliest political expression of such intent came in August 1950, when Winston Churchill addressed the Council of Europe. He proposed a continental defence system that would include Germany, provided it functioned “in full cooperation with the United States and Canada.”
This proposal, while reaffirming NATO’s centrality, clearly reflected a will to construct a European defence capability with autonomous foundations, with the rearmament of Germany integrated under a European command.
A few months later, on 24th October 1950, René Pleven addressed the Assemblée Nationale, launching what would become the foundation of the European Defence Community. The timing of this speech – immediately following the signing of the ECSC treaty – reflected the ambition to extend European integration into the field of defence and security. Three key themes were stressed in his address to the French Parliament: 1) a single command; 2) the need for matching common institutions; and 3) the need to pool human and material resources.
Pleven’s speech was initially met with broad approval from across the French political spectrum, and the proposal received a generally favorable reception from the newly founded ECSC members, as well as from the United States and the United Kingdom. The latter, while supportive of European integration in principle, expressed some reservations regarding the role Germany would play within the prospective EDC.
The speech emphasised that the creation of a European common army would require a gradual process, involving a transitional phase during which the national armed forces would remain under NATO command. Pleven made it clear from the outset that the EDC was to remain subordinate to the Atlantic Pact, from which it would draw its strategic directives for the defence of the continent.
The Pleven speech would be followed, in February 1951, by the opening of the Paris Conference. The project that was gradually taking shape increasingly resembled a NATO rival, guided by France, and in some measure aimed at emancipating itself from the direct control exerted by the United States on the continent.
Yet the final version of the document that realized Pleven’s ambitions, the Treaty of Paris of 27 May 1952, paradoxically contained an explicit clause reaffirming the bond with Washington, set out in Article 5 of the Treaty: “The Community shall cooperate closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” In practice, European defence would indeed be autonomous, but by no means independent from NATO. This subordination becomes even more evident when analyzing the hierarchical structure of the command chain. Operations approved by the EDC institutions would have fallen under the full authority of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
Internal Institutions of the EDC
At the institutional level, the Treaty of Paris provided for the establishment within the EDC of four bodies, extensively regulated, whose structure closely resembles that of the current institutions of the European Union:
- Council of Ministers: Functioning as a legislative body, its role was to politically harmonze the efforts of the alliance. It would have been composed of ministers from the member states, with a rotating presidency every three months. While partly analogous in function to the Assembly, the Council of Ministers would have held a predominant role in determining the political direction of the Commissariat.
- Common Assembly: A consultative organ of the EDC, responsible for defining expenditure frameworks and overseeing the work of the Community. Conceived as a forum for discussion among the representatives of the member states, its functioning would have resembled that of a parliamentary system, with the power to pass a motion of censure against the Commissariat.
- Commissariat of the European Defence Community: Serving as the executive organ of the EDC, it would have had responsibilities for organization and operational coordination. It was to be led by a president elected from among the nine commissioners, who would have directed the Community’s activities and represented it on the international stage.
- Court of Justice: This institution was to be based on a binding jurisdictional code applicable to all Community members. Its role was to ensure compliance with the Treaty of Paris, acting as the legal guarantor of any acts adopted by the other organs that might be flawed. The Court would have been composed of seven judges and two Advocates-General, appointed by the member states.
Military Organization of the EDC
The EDC’s operations would have relied on the establishment of a common defence fund, financed through contributions from the member states. At the head of this system would have been a European Defence Minister, elected by the member countries, tasked with receiving and executing the directives issued in Strasbourg, and with representing the Community.
From a strictly military perspective, the armed forces of the participating states would have been integrated at Community level starting from basic units – platoons and companies – eliminating any reference to their original national identities. Armament, logistics, and supply would have been governed by directives from the Council of Ministers and implemented at Community level, with the aim of creating a fully standardized army.
Generally speaking, all military forces engaged in extra-European theatres of operation were explicitly excluded from the scope of the EDC. For such missions, full responsibility would have fallen to the respective member state. This principle would have applied equally to national naval forces when deployed beyond the European context. It was also specified that internal security forces – such as police and gendarmerie – would have remained under the full control of the member states.
Regarding the deployment of EDC military forces, they would have been activated whenever the European units were confronted with threats or emergencies within their area of competence requiring immediate assistance. Numerous treaty provisions referred to commitments in former colonial territories, reaffirming a certain flexibility in withdrawing those troops assigned to the Community to be redeployed as national forces, provided this was authorized by both the Commissariat and the Council.
The establishment of European armed forces would have included both conscripted personnel and long-term professional volunteers. These forces would have been fully integrated, equipped with a common uniform, and organized according to types defined in a dedicated Military Protocol, modifications to which would have required unanimous consent from the member states.
The contingents forming these units would have been determined by the member states, ensuring the creation of homogeneous European-status formations, specialized according to the specific defence needs of each territory. A total of approximately 13,000 men was estimated, distributed across a European total of 40 divisions, organized according to regimental schemes set out in subsequent agreements. The EDC’s air units would have been formed in the same way, with air squadrons structured under a standardized framework.
Although the EDC was formally conceived as a European project, the operational command of its armed forces was intrinsically tied to NATO. Once declared ready for deployment, the European forces would have been placed at the disposal of the NATO Supreme Commander, who would have exercised full powers and responsibilities over them, as outlined in his mandate.
In essence, though European in composition, the forces would have been operationally directed by an Atlantic authority.
The Supreme Commander would not only have had the authority to supervise the organization, equipment, and training of the European troops, but also the right to submit specific requests to the Community regarding the composition and deployment of the forces, requests that the EDC would have been obliged to implement according to the terms of the Treaty.
Military Production in Europe
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the Treaty of Paris – one that can serve as a source of inspiration even today – pertains to the regulation and domestic production of military equipment, including various provisions concerning scientific research at the Community level and the export of European military material abroad.
From the Treaty, it is evident that the Commissariat was to play a central role in shaping the military structure of the EDC. It would have been responsible for notifying the Council of any critical issues within the European production chain, particularly those relating to the procurement of raw materials, organized collegially among all states and distributed equitably in financial terms. Furthermore, the Commissariat would have operated as the sole regulatory authority over European military production: all decisions by individual member states concerning the manufacture, export, and licensed transfer of any equipment produced in Europe would have passed through the Commissariat. In the event of infractions, the Court would have had the power to impose significant penalties on the responsible country.
Regarding scientific research, the Commissariat was expected to direct Community-wide military research, with research programmes financed at the European level across all member states, exclusively relating to military supplies intended for the EDC. Notably, the Treaty includes the potential development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons within its scope of permissible research projects, although such programs would have been subject to specific oversight by the Commissariat. This suggests the theoretical possibility of a European nuclear deterrent, most likely under French leadership.
After more than a year of negotiations and compromises, the delegations composed of the Foreign Ministers of France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy signed the final Treaty on 27th May 1952.
The Legislative Demise of the EDC
The most significant point of interest in the troubled story of the EDC is undoubtedly the failed national ratifications of the Treaty.
As noted at the outset, even today there remains a widespread reluctance among the public to relinquish elements of national sovereignty in matters of defence. This sentiment was already present in European political circles during the preparatory phases leading up to the Treaty’s signing. Resistance came predominantly from parties located at the ideological extremes, a trend particularly evident in Germany, France, and Italy.
Criticism was articulated along two distinct lines: on the Left, the Pleven Plan was denounced as yet another instrument serving US imperialist interests, often accompanied by the opposition of pacifist movements; on the Right, there was a firm rejection of the prospect of ceding sovereignty to a supranational entity perceived as inadequately representative of national interests.
Between 1952 and 1955 – the year that marked the project’s ultimate demise – a vibrant and multifaceted political debate unfolded within each of the six member states, focused precisely on the parliamentary ratification of the Treaty. In the parliaments of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany, the Treaty was ratified with an average approval rate of around 70%, reflecting a solid political will in favour of European military integration.
The case of France, however, was fundamentally different and, ultimately, decisive. On 30 August 1954, the Assemblée Nationale rejected the ratification with a majority vote against the Treaty. Support stood at just 42%, thwarted by a cross-party alliance of opposing political forces, including Gaullists, Communists, and Nationalists. It is important to recall that France was at the time mired in the crisis of the Fourth Republic, with a highly fragmented political system that severely undermined the stability and effectiveness of the government.
France’s rejection triggered a domino effect in Italy, where – despite the ratification bill having already been tabled – parliamentary proceedings were obstructed by the same ideological opposition. The Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Socialists (PSI), and the Nationalists of the Italian Social Movement (MSI) all opposed the project. On 22 June 1955, the Italian government officially withdrew the ratification bill, thereby sealing the definitive end of the European Defence Community.
Lessons Learned
Although the Pleven Plan ultimately proved a political failure, it is worth noting that during the Cold War years, Europe attempted to fill the void through various initiatives, including the Fouchet Plan, albeit a project strongly characterised by France’s ambition to position itself as the undisputed leader of the continent.
Transposing this discourse to the present day, it is evident that the international context differs markedly from that of the 1950s. Nonetheless, in light of recent developments within NATO – particularly the United States’ increasing tendency to scale back its military engagement in Europe in favour of a pivot toward the Asian theatre – Europe, now more politically cohesive than ever before, should seize the opportunity presented by the partial US disengagement to assert a truly autonomous strategic capability.
While some progress in this direction is indeed underway, and although the EDC model has once again become a topic of reflection, the European political discourse reveals a persistent uncertainty and a conspicuous lack of clarity in rearmament programs.
Europe’s structural subordination to NATO remains an incontrovertible reality. Looking back at the political missteps of the six founding states, it becomes clear that, despite a steadfast desire for military emancipation, the European Union continues to face profound political obstacles in establishing a genuine collective defence union particularly today, when reconciling the divergent strategic interests of 27 member states, each with its own sensitivities and priorities, proves especially challenging.
What appears fundamentally lacking in the pursuit of a fully realized European project is a strong political leadership and a shared sense of belonging to the Union. These crucial elements have, over the past decades, been gradually sacrificed in favor of a mere numerical balancing of member states at the expense of a unifying political vision.