Kremlin’s Influence on Moldova: New Masks of Old Faces
Russian influence over Moldova is nothing new, but today we’re witnessing a new phase of this process—where the stakes are no longer just the country’s strategic direction, but its very ability to resist hybrid influence from within. A look at Moldova’s current political landscape makes one thing clear: the Kremlin is not merely preparing for a comeback—it has already positioned its pieces. Pro-Russian forces in Moldova may appear scattered, but they are far from weakened. They are transforming, adapting, changing logos, leaders, and rhetoric—but maintaining the one constant: loyalty to Moscow.
Shor’s Remote Control
Just two years ago, the banning of the Shor Party seemed to mark the end of openly anti-European movements in Moldova. But in reality, it was just a reboot. Despite being under U.S. and EU sanctions, party leader Ilan Shor continues to operate his network from exile in Russia—leveraging Telegram channels, proxy parties, and pseudo-civil initiatives. His main asset is not a political program, but access to Kremlin funds, which—despite formal isolation—continue to seep into Moldova’s electoral system through gray channels, including smuggling, offshore routes, and “humanitarian” aid.
Shor’s influence is not ideological; it’s functional corruption. In Gagauz villages, his representatives arrive not with manifestos, but with food packages and promises of free gas. Through his networks, “volunteers” from Moscow appear in Moldova, along with Russian-signal TVs and churches preaching Moscow’s rhetoric. Notably, Shor was convicted in the infamous “theft of the century” case—the embezzlement of $1 billion from Moldova’s banking system. But that didn’t stop his continued political activity. The only change is that he now operates from Russia.
Dodon’s Comeback or Rebranded Revanchism?
Another Kremlin-backed comeback involves the Socialist Party, led by veteran politician Igor Dodon, who has consistently oscillated between corruption scandals, criminal investigations, and frequent trips to Moscow. His name has been linked to major cases, including treason, illicit enrichment, and the infamous 2019 video where he receives a black bag of cash from local oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. Comments in the video mention “Russian funding,” but no legal conclusion was ever reached—though it left a deep stain on Dodon’s political image.
Plahotniuc, who publicly branded himself as anti-Russian, often acted as a key middleman between pro-Russian politicians and Moldova’s shadow business networks. His control over media, financial flows, and the judiciary created fertile ground for political corruption—welcoming figures like Dodon and Shor. Although Plahotniuc is now abroad, his legacy of institutional vulnerability to hybrid interference remains. However, this may soon change: he was recently arrested in Athens, and Moldova has requested his extradition—a development that could stir up major consequences.
Despite this, Dodon remains active in the media and enjoys some support, especially in the country’s north. The Socialists no longer openly call for rejoining Russia. Instead, their rhetoric speaks of “neutrality,” “defending traditions,” and “rejecting foreign control”—standard Kremlin narratives. Within the party, discussions are already underway to nominate a new candidate with a lower disapproval rating than Dodon, someone with a “technocratic” façade. But no matter who fronts the campaign, the source of instructions will remain Moscow.
Gutsul as a Signal: Regions as Launchpads for Destabilization
Evghenia Gutsul’s rise to power in Gagauzia was no accident. It was a rehearsal for what Russia hopes to achieve at the national level—not only in Moldova. On the surface, she’s a young, energetic political newcomer. In reality, she is a political avatar of Shor and a megaphone for pro-Russian messaging. Gutsul openly maintains ties with Moscow and promotes “federalization as the only solution” for Moldova. Her regular visits to Moscow, participation in events under Rossotrudnichestvo, and likely contacts with Russian intelligence agents have raised serious concerns in both Chișinău and the West.
Following the standard playbook for pro-Russian politicians, regional governance in Gagauzia is already plagued by abuse and opacity, including the dubious use of Russian “humanitarian aid”. There are efforts to establish a parallel information system via Telegram networks and pro-Russian outlets like Gagauzinfo.md and GRT TV. For now, Gutsul presents herself as the “face of resistance to Chișinău”—a role the Kremlin sees as having national potential. The ultimate goal is to fracture Moldova into weakened, semi-autonomous regions.
The Gray Zone of Transnistria: Silent Control
No map of Russian influence in Moldova would be complete without Transnistria—a territory that is officially separated but, in practice, operates as a Russian enclave in the heart of Europe. Its “president” Vadim Krasnoselsky acts as a Kremlin proxy, with every move—from policy to personnel—coordinated with Moscow. His power doesn’t come from elections but from direct Russian support, including pensions and military presence.
Transnistria is a hub of illegal trade, smuggling, and financial schemes—not just for shadow operations, but also for funding influential networks within Moldova. Krasnoselsky is not merely a separatist leader. Transnistria is the Kremlin’s quiet weapon: it doesn’t escalate openly but keeps Moldova in a state of perpetual tension. While its role in Kremlin’s election plans may seem minor, it is strategically significant—a pressure point ready to activate in times of political crisis or instability in Chișinău.
Elections 2025: Engineered Crisis Scenarios
With Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections on the horizon, the Kremlin is not betting on a single candidate but on an entire ecosystem. The goal is not necessarily to win power outright, but to create a political structure capable of blocking any pro-European decisions. Tragically, these elections are unfolding amid public fatigue, inflation, and government disapproval—a ripe environment for populists and pro-Russian technocrats.
There is a real risk of a “hybrid coalition” emerging—possibly including Socialists, remnants of the Shor Party, and new regionalist parties advocating “compromise” using Kremlin tactics. Such a coalition would enable Moscow to paralyze Moldova’s EU integration, block reforms, and steer the country toward “neutrality”—a term that, in the Kremlin’s vocabulary, means political capture.
It is highly likely that tactics used in 2022–2023—mass protests, Telegram-led disinformation campaigns, voter bribery—will be scaled up in 2025.
A Shadow War with Open Consequences
Moldova today is a country under political siege. Outwardly, it may appear stable, but internally, the system is eroding. Its institutions are under fire—not from missiles, but from Telegram bots. Its voters aren’t mobilized, they’re bought. Moscow isn’t trying to win by the rules—it’s rewriting the rules.
If the West doesn’t increase its attention and support now, 2025 could become a breakthrough year for pro-Russian forces. Restoring lost ground afterward will be far more difficult and costly. Moldova may again hear voices in Chișinău praising the “brotherly Russia”, rather than envisioning a European future. We’ve already seen what this led to in Donetsk—and we all know how that ended.