Under conditions of international isolation — intensified after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine — Russia has been actively seeking alternative ways to influence European politics in order to promote its interests. Having failed in its attempts to “befriend” the EU at the official level, Moscow has increasingly turned to behind-the-scenes financial schemes, political lobbying, and proxy structures. Russian money now flows into Europe not directly, but through complex networks of shell companies, fictitious investment projects, and “friendly” jurisdictions — such as Cyprus, Serbia, and Hungary.
The goal is clear: to weaken the unity of the European Union, undermine sanctions policy, shape pro-Russian narratives, and promote political forces in EU countries that are loyal to Moscow.
Cyprus has long been mentioned in EU financial intelligence reports as a “convenient entry point” not only for “shadow” money from around the world but also for Russian capital whose origins are difficult to trace. One such case is the Cypriot company Normeston Trading Ltd — an unremarkable structure at first glance, engaged in real estate and logistics investments.
In reality, as investigative journalists from Greece, Hungary, and Ukraine have discovered, the company serves as a link in a chain for laundering and distributing Russian funds among political and media structures acting in the Kremlin’s interests. Large transfers from Russia were funneled through Normeston Trading’s Cypriot accounts, then redirected via Serbian and Hungarian banks to funds, political parties, and NGOs opposing European integration, anti-Russian sanctions, and aid to Ukraine — and, more broadly, advocating for the normalization of relations with Moscow.
Hungary occupies a special place in these financial schemes, becoming one of the main destinations for such transfers. The government of Viktor Orbán, despite the country’s EU and NATO membership, has long demonstrated a uniquely Russia-friendly stance. According to leaks published by Direct36 and Der Spiegel, businessman Lázár, linked to Orbán’s circle, received over €12 million from offshore entities connected to Normeston Trading. These funds were used, among other things, to promote nationalist agendas, anti-migration campaigns, Eurosceptic rhetoric, and anti-NATO statements in the media — all of which align with Russian interests and undermine the EU’s political unity from within.
Serbia also plays an important role in spreading pro-Russian influence. Its banks and companies are used for transferring funds with minimal oversight. For example, the Serbian company Vetroelektrane Balkana, involved in renewable energy investments, appears in documents as the recipient of large transfers later channeled to organizations linked to far-right and populist parties in the Czech Republic, France, and Slovakia.
Russia’s presence in the Balkans is also expanding. In autumn 2022, RT Balkan, a regional branch of the Russian state television network, began broadcasting from Belgrade. According to Serbian journalists, its funding comes through the Cypriot BelMedia Trust, backed by entities affiliated with Gazprom. RT Balkan’s content almost entirely mirrors the rhetoric of Russian state media — from blaming NATO for provoking war to accusing the EU of double standards.
In Greece and Cyprus — countries with traditionally friendly attitudes toward Russia — Moscow has relied not only on investments but also on close church and cultural ties. Since 2022, these relationships have taken on a distinctly political character. According to the Greek prosecutor’s office, in 2023 around €5 million, routed through accounts in Athens and Limassol, was directed to parties openly advocating for lifting sanctions against Russia, recognizing Crimea as Russian, and ending arms supplies to Ukraine. Among them were Greek Solution (Elliniki Lysi) and the ultra-conservative LAOS. Funding was channeled through ostensibly charitable foundations, religious organizations, and cultural societies.
In 2023, Robert Fico — a politician known for his pro-Russian rhetoric — won elections in Slovakia. Investigations revealed that his campaign received extensive support on social media through anonymous ad accounts registered in Serbia and Hungary. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s League remains under suspicion of having ties to Russian entities. In France, Marine Le Pen has yet to fully repay a loan taken from a Russian bank in 2014, keeping her party under close watch by European intelligence services.
All of the above clearly illustrates Russia’s actions aimed at undermining European solidarity. Pursuing far-reaching goals, the Kremlin systematically uses financial tools to influence key EU decisions, expecting favorable outcomes for itself. Thanks to loyal politicians in Hungary, Slovakia, and other countries, dozens of sanction initiatives have been blocked or watered down over the past two years.
The issue of support for Ukraine shows how Russian influence has become a major source of internal conflict within the EU: states whose elites receive Russian money refuse to send arms or slow down European defense programs. Moreover, through Kremlin-funded media and social networks, the public is fed narratives about being “tired of the war,” the need to “negotiate,” and the importance of “not provoking Russia.”
Thus, Europe faces not just a corruption problem, but a systemic threat to its political integrity. Russia is waging a “hybrid war” against European unity — slowly but steadily eroding trust in democratic institutions, buying political loyalty, and reshaping public opinion to serve its interests. And while European regulators and law enforcement limit themselves to local investigations, the influence network continues to operate. Each time another Russia-friendly party receives “assistance” from a Serbian or Cypriot bank, it is one more step toward decisions in Brussels being made not in Europe’s interest, but under Moscow’s influence.