Unrest Across Central and Southeastern Europe Signals a Deepening Crisis of Democracy.
Protests that erupted across Serbia, Slovakia, Greece, North Macedonia and Hungary in late 2024—and in some cases continue to this day—have become a stark indicator of long-simmering and unresolved social and economic tensions. More than isolated outbursts, these movements reflect a deeper malaise: a systemic crisis at the heart of the region’s political architecture. Efforts to undermine democratic institutions, coupled with entrenched political corruption, have brought tens of thousands to the streets, many of them young people. Common grievances—corruption, lack of transparency, creeping authoritarianism and political indifference toward civil society—have formed the backbone of this new wave of dissent.
In Serbia, the protests were sparked by a deadly collapse of a bus station canopy in the city of Novi Sad on 1 November 2024, which claimed 16 lives and injured dozens more. The structure had been built by a major Chinese state-owned company, and both media and opposition quickly raised questions about corruption, substandard safety protocols, and the Serbian government’s failure to exercise oversight. What followed was the largest wave of demonstrations in Serbia since the early 2000s. Students blocked roads in symbolic protest, bearing slogans such as “Serbia, stop” and “Corruption kills.” In a move that drew widespread criticism, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin publicly thanked Russian intelligence services for assisting in quelling the protests—describing their role as shielding the country from “colour revolutions.” The exact nature of this assistance remains unclear.
In Slovakia, demonstrations began in autumn 2024, shortly after Prime Minister Robert Fico visited Moscow and announced an end to military aid for Ukraine, alongside reforms that would weaken the country’s anti-corruption prosecution office. The visit was widely seen as a pivot towards Moscow and a betrayal of European values. In response, tens of thousands of Slovaks took to the streets in over 20 cities—including the capital, Bratislava—between January and March this year. Chants of “Slovakia is Europe” rang out, as protesters demanded Fico’s resignation and a return to a pro-European trajectory.
In Greece, February 2025 saw mass protests on the anniversary of the 2023 Tempi train disaster, in which 57 people—mostly students—were killed. The tragedy has become a symbol of systemic government negligence and impunity. Activists and opposition parties accused the government of concealing evidence, mismanaging the investigation and attempting to downplay the scale of the disaster. In March, a coalition of opposition forces—including PASOK, SYRIZA, New Left, Course of Freedom and several independent MPs—called a vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The motion failed, leaving the government in place but further galvanising public anger.
In Hungary, the first major protest against government propaganda in state media took place in October 2024, when thousands gathered outside the headquarters of MTVA, the state broadcaster. Organised by the opposition party TISZA and its leader Péter Magyar, demonstrators called for the dismissal of MTVA’s leadership and a restoration of media independence. Protesters decried what they described as a propaganda machine that silences dissent and amplifies government messaging, while denying opposition voices any airtime. Demands for press freedom and greater media pluralism quickly gained traction. Throughout 2025, waves of protests continued, driven by growing frustration with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s increasingly authoritarian rule. In June, around 15,000 people rallied in Budapest against legislation allowing the government to block media outlets and NGOs under laws modelled after Russia’s “foreign agent” framework. Critics warned of Orwellian surveillance laws targeting protesters. Hungary continues to rank among the worst EU member states for media freedom and corruption, with watchdogs accusing the Orbán regime of systemic capture of state institutions.
In North Macedonia, mass protests erupted in March 2025 after a deadly nightclub fire in the city of Kočani claimed 59 lives. Demonstrators blamed endemic corruption for the tragedy, holding signs that read: “Killing our youth means killing our future” and “We’re not dying in accidents, we’re dying from corruption.” The incident became a tragic emblem of widespread disillusionment and decay in state oversight.
Taken together, these protests mark the culmination of deepening civic frustration across a region grappling with democratic backsliding, opaque governance, and elite impunity. While each country’s grievances may be rooted in distinct local contexts, a common thread runs through them all: a growing demand for justice, transparency, and the rule of law. These mass movements are not simply calls for reform—they are warnings. The democratic crisis engulfing Central and Southeastern Europe is far from over.