Russia and corruption remain the main obstacles to Montenegro’s accession to the European Union. Although Russia is gradually losing its influence in the Western Balkans, the Kremlin has no intention of simply accepting this. Moscow is making every effort to continue interfering in the internal affairs of countries in the region. It uses a variety of tools and methods: economic levers of influence (in Croatia), energy dependence (in Serbia), financing separatist projects (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and exploiting religious issues (in Montenegro).
The most radical attempt came in the autumn of 2016, when Russian intelligence services sought to carry out a coup d’état in Montenegro. The goal was to remove Prime Minister Milo Đukanović (leader of the Democratic Party of Socialists) from power and bring to office political forces in Podgorica that would reject the country’s accession to NATO. The coup was scheduled for 16 October 2016, the day of parliamentary elections. However, Montenegrin law enforcement uncovered and neutralized the plot, and by February 2017, the authorities publicly confirmed the involvement of Russian operatives.
According to the investigation, the plan involved about 500 people divided into three groups. One group was to storm parliament, another to blend into the opposition rally crowd, and the third to block police forces. At the appointed moment, the second group would provoke unrest, the first would open fire on the crowd, and the third would eliminate Prime Minister Đukanović.
The alleged coup leaders included Bratislav Dikić, head of the Serbian Patriotic Movement, police colonel and former commander of the Serbian gendarmerie; Saša Sinđelić, leader of the “Serbian Wolves” movement; Russian national Eduard Shishmakov, a former deputy military attaché in Poland (expelled by Warsaw on suspicion of espionage); Vladimir Popov, a Russian citizen; and Nemanja Ristić, leader of the Serbian “Zavetnici” movement. Other participants were citizens of Serbia, Montenegro, and Russia. Sinđelić admitted in court that he received direct orders from GRU officer Shishmakov, who coordinated the entire operation.
The operation proved unsuccessful for Moscow: Đukanović’s party and its allies won the 2016 elections, and in June 2017 Montenegro joined NATO as its 29th member. Moreover, in July 2017, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee officially held Russia responsible for orchestrating the attempted coup.
Nevertheless, Moscow continues to seek influence in Montenegro, primarily through the religious sphere. Statistics show that 76% of the population identifies as Christian, with 72% belonging to Orthodoxy. About 400,000 out of Montenegro’s 642,000 people (62%) are members of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), which is strongly influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The ROC is under Kremlin control and heavily involved in Russian intelligence operations abroad. This means that two-thirds of Montenegro’s population could potentially fall under ROC influence.
It should be noted that Montenegro also has the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (MOC), which has declared itself autocephalous but is not recognized by other Orthodox Churches and is formally considered non-canonical. The MOC enjoys support from a significant portion of the political establishment and patriotic citizens. Since 2024, with state backing, the MOC (which now has around 150,000 followers, or 23% of the population) has been seeking a tomos of autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The situation remains complicated, however, as SOC support is stable and relations between the Serbian and Montenegrin churches remain tense.
Another major obstacle on Montenegro’s EU path is corruption. In May 2025, anti-corruption organizations expressed deep concern over a cooperation agreement in tourism and real estate signed between Montenegro and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While Podgorica’s desire to attract foreign investment is understandable, the terms of this deal could jeopardize Montenegro’s accession process, particularly regarding public procurement.
Article 2.4 of the agreement stipulates that contracts, programs, and follow-up arrangements with UAE investors are exempt from public procurement, tender, and competition laws in both countries. This effectively allows direct contracting without competitive bidding, undermining transparency and equal treatment. If enforced, Montenegro’s national legislation would directly conflict with EU procurement law and the EU–Montenegro Association Agreement. The European Commission has already emphasized that such exemptions for the UAE violate EU rules ensuring fair competition and transparency in public procurement.
This is particularly concerning given that the European Commission’s 2024 report recognized Montenegro’s significant progress in aligning its procurement systems with EU standards, highlighting improvements in e-procurement. Adoption and ratification of the UAE deal could erase this progress.
As EU institutions in Brussels stress, public procurement is highly vulnerable to corruption. Weak anti-corruption mechanisms in Montenegro only amplify existing risks. By allowing exemptions for the UAE, Podgorica creates opportunities for favoritism and misuse of public funds, undermining public trust and EU principles of good governance and accountability.
For this reason, anti-corruption groups have urged Montenegro’s parliament to review the agreement with the UAE and ensure that any international commitments are consistent with the country’s constitution and do not endanger its EU obligations. This is especially important in light of President Jakov Milatović’s ambitious declaration that Montenegro aims to join the EU by 2028, before the end of the current European Commission’s mandate under Ursula von der Leyen.