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Spanish chemicals for Russian weapons

The customs services of the member countries of the European Union have difficulties in strictly observing the EU sanctions imposed against Russia, in connection with which, part of the products, which are prohibited to be exported to the Russian Federation, still «slips through the borders of United Europe until Putin’s dictatorship, falling directly on enterprises of the military-industrial complex of Russia.
Thus, the Spanish police and the European Office for the Prevention of Abuse and Fraud (OLAF) conducted a joint investigation in which they came to the Oleinikov family. A citizen of the Kingdom of Spain, Maria Oleinikova (born in Russia), together with her son Vyacheslav and daughter Irina, ran several gastronomic firms, the most popular of which was the Cavina Vinoteca wine bar in Barcelona. Among other things, the Oleinikov family also owned the Spanish company Complexe Sancu, which exported wines, beers, ciders and liqueurs to Russia. However, as it turned out, the specified company supplied the Russian Federation not only with alcoholic beverages, but also with chemical products, which was a violation of European Union sanctions imposed after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops. On October 15, 2024, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Spain intercepted 13 tons of chemicals intended for supply to the Russian Federation in the port of Barcelona.

As a result of the investigation, nine people were charged by the Spanish police. It is known that they created a network of intermediary companies in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and other countries to bypass EU sanctions and import sanctioned chemicals into Russia.
As it turns out, the Oleinikov family doesn’t just have business in Spain. It also owns a controlling stake in Russian chemical company Catrosa Reactiv, which received at least 36 batches that included a minimum of 15 sanctioned chemicals from Spain between 2022 and 2024. Moreover, at least one batch came directly from the mentioned company Complexe Sancu, which is registered on M. Oleynikova and her children. Most of the other deliveries were made by a Spanish company called Scharlab S.L, which is headquartered in Barcelona, with – subsidiaries in Italy and the Philippines. Scharlab SL is owned by Werner Scharlau –, a German who lives in Spain and was arrested by Spanish police in February 2025.

It is important to highlight the fact that chemicals imported by Russia from Spain were supplied to enterprises connected with the Russian military-industrial complex. For example, a container intercepted in the port of Barcelona contained many tubs with the inscription NMP. It is about N-Methyl-2-pyrrolidone, which is used in the petrochemical, polymer and pharmaceutical industries, for example, in the manufacture of electronic products, paints, adhesives and sealants. In recent years, NMP consumption has been growing worldwide due to its use in the manufacture of lithium-ion batteries and during the production of microcircuits. Also, this substance is actively used in the Russian military industry in the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles, drones, batteries for nuclear submarines and top-secret deep-sea stations (such as «Losharik»). On April 8, 2022, the EU added NMP to the list of goods prohibited for sale in the Russian Federation.

It should be noted that the annual need of Russian military industry enterprises for NMP is about 6 thousand tons and it can be covered only by imports. N-methylpyrrolidone is included in the list of industrial products critically needed for the Russian Federation for the period 2024-2026. Russia’s significant need for NMR imports is also confirmed by public procurement data made by 2022.
For example, previously NMP permanently bought the Russian plant «Uralelement» from Western countries, which is part of the state corporation «Tactical missile weapons» and the concern «MPO-Hydroprylad». This plant is a strategic enterprise of the Military Industry of the Russian Federation, which works in the field of development and production of chemical current sources of electrochemical systems. It is also known that this plant produced lithium-ion batteries and batteries for the №40056 military unit, which belongs to the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. It was the latter that was engaged in the development of the deep-sea station AS-12 «Losharik».

Another buyer of NMR in the West before the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine was the Arzamas research and production enterprise «Temp-Avia», which is also part of the corporation «Tactical Missile Weapons». This enterprise manufactures electronics for Russian military aircraft, missile systems and drones. In the spring of 2023, the director of «Temp-Avia» Yuriy Isaev publicly stated that due to the war, production loading increased many times.
Also, among the official buyers of NMR until 2022 is the «Central Design and Technology Bureau of Polymer Materials with experimental production», which supplied N-methylpyrrolidone to the Votkin Plant – to the manufacturer of intercontinental ballistic missiles «Topol-M».
The purchase of NMR in the West was constantly carried out by the «Litkarin Optical Glass Plant (part of the » Schwabe«holding of the » Rostec«corporation), which, among other things, manufactures night vision goggles and devices for special equipment. The consumer of NMR is also the Semen Petrova Plastics Institute «(part of the Rostec» corporation), most of whose products are used for the needs of the All-Russian Research Institute of Aviation Materials of Kurchatov University, which has recently been engaged in drones.
Overall, approximately half of all government purchases of N-methylpyrrolidone in Russia by 2022 were from companies that were linked to the Russian military industry in one way or another. However, the largest volumes of NMR were supplied to the state-owned company «Bashneft», which was the first in Russia to use N-methylpyrrolidone instead of phenol to purify petroleum oils, which in turn are used to lubricate parts of turbines, compressors and aircraft engines. Thus, the lack of Western supplies of NMP became an urgent problem both for the Russian oil refining industry and for enterprises of the military industry of the Russian Federation.
From the markings on the tubs intercepted by the Spanish police in the port of Barcelona, it was possible to determine the manufacturer of the detained batch of NMR, which turned out to be the Chinese chemical company BYN. The container with tubs of N-methylpyrrolidone was sent from the Chinese port of Qingdao in June 2024, and arrived in Singapore in July, from where it left for Barcelona.

In addition, Spanish law enforcement officers said that the cargo detained in the port of Barcelona contained, in addition to NMR, nerve-paralytic poisonous substances intended for the manufacture of the special agent «Novachok», which the Russian special services use to eliminate opponents of the Putin regime. Police and customs officers also mentioned the presence of nitric acid and acetone used in the production of explosives in the container.
At the same time, we are talking about only one detained cargo, while the Russian chemical company Catrosa Reactiv received at least 36 batches from Spain during the three years of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which contained at least 15 names of sanctioned chemicals!
The conclusion that can be drawn from all of the above is that the customs services and law enforcement agencies of the EU member states should be more meticulous so that the Russian aggressor state does not have the opportunity to circumvent the sanctions. For example, a scheme where an exporter indicates false destinations in customs documents – such as Armenia or Kyrgyzstan (to hide the fact that batches of products are actually going to Russia) – is common knowledge for employees of relevant EU departments. However, Putin’s Russia manages to continue importing products from the European Union, which it desperately needs for the further implementation of its aggressive foreign policy.