The Russian state machine is increasingly using intelligence agents, cover-ups in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media projects and «freelancers» networks to influence international structures and destroy the effectiveness of surveillance missions and human rights protection. It is not just a piecemeal operation – it is a tactical complex where NGOs and international missions become a field for political manipulation and espionage.
Major government investigations confirm the scale of the threat. In September 2024, the US Department of Justice announced a major operation to remove domains associated with campaigns of «malicious foreign influence». The continued seizure of 32 Internet domains used in campaigns organized by the Russian government to exert harmful influence abroad was announced in a colloquial speech called «doubles», in violation of US anti-money laundering laws and trademark criminal law. According to the sworn statement, the Russian companies «Agency of Social Design» (SDA), «Structure National Technologies» (Structura) and ANO «Dialogue», operating under the direction and control of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, in particular, the then first deputy chief, and now head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kirienko, used these domains to secretly distribute Russian government propaganda with the aim of reducing international support for Ukraine, Strengthening pro-Russian policies and interests, as well as influencing voters in elections in the US and other countries, including the 2024 US presidential election.
This fact is an illustration of how digital infrastructure is used to disguise powerful operations. At the same time, the US Ministry of Finance (OFAC) and other agencies have expanded sanctions against networks and entities involved in such campaigns, recognizing the systemic nature of the problems.
At the same time, journalists and OSINT investigations increasingly point to the direct involvement of elements of Russian intelligence, GRU and FSB in operations under the cover of non-profit organizations (NPOs), charities and media. The work of Bellingcat and partners demonstrates where «illegals» and operatives used diplomatic or civilian cover to gather information and recruit – from lobbying to organizing sabotage. These publications often give «caught» revelations by linking open data on travel, bank transfers and connections between organizations.
Thus, in July this year, the EU Council decision number 2025/1443 applied sanctions against the organization Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) – a Moscow «think-tank», described as «working closely with GRU, receiving financial support» for disinformation operations, the influence and disruption of democratic processes in the EU. The decision states that CGE «received financial backing from GRU» to run websites, fakes and information campaigns.
The EU document also states that the EGC and other entities «planned, directed, participated in or facilitated the coordinated use of information manipulation and intervention» in the member states of the Union. In other words, it is even officially recognized that the NGO structures worked not as purely civic initiatives, but as part of a hybrid strategy. This is a striking example of an NGO front that actually works for the special services.
The practical effect is to block and discredit missions. Examples are not hypothetical. In July 2024, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported that in the Russian-controlled territory of the Donetsk region, their employee, Vadim Golda, was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment on espionage charges: the Russian prosecutor In 2021, Golda collected information about industrial facilities in the Donetsk region, «which was then used to target missile strikes».
Earlier, in September 2022, the «court» in the occupied part of the Luhansk region handed down a sentence to two members of the OSCE mission. Maxim Petrov and Dmitry Shabanov, were sentenced to 13 years for «treason/ espionage». OSCE called these processes «pure political production». These accusations and arrests were used by Russia to declare that international missions are «unsafe», «tainted with espionage», thus creating an excuse for withdrawing or limiting the work of observers. As a result, the mission is either forced to leave the region (or country) or work with minimal staff, limited mandate and increased risk. This effect reduces the effectiveness of monitoring human rights and peace agreements, as the key component, the presence of independent observers, is weakened.
The mechanisms for infiltrating Russian intelligence services and pro-Krislavsky structures into non-governmental organizations and international missions represent a whole set of coordinated actions aimed at gathering intelligence, influencing the agenda and undermining the credibility of the institutions. One of the key tools becomes recruitment and subsequent «legalization» of operatives through NKOs-coverings. Charities, research centers and cultural initiatives create a convenient screen for establishing contacts, gathering information and promoting pro-Russian narratives. Such organizations, as the Bellingcat and European Council investigations have shown, are often directly linked to state structures, including the GRU and the FSB, although they formally operate under the banner of «humanitarian cooperation» or «development of dialogue».
The use of international platforms and forums is equally important. Participation of representatives of pro-Krislavsky NGOs in consultations and activities of the UN, OSCE and other institutions gives them access to internal documents, official information and communication channels. Through such platforms, influence is exerted on the wording of resolutions, spread of Moscow-friendly interpretations of conflicts and creation of the illusion of «alternative points of view» representing Russian interests as a position of «part of the international community».
The third area is disinformation and discrediting of international missions. Through fake media, imitating the independent press or human rights platforms, and fictitious NGOs are spreading narratives aimed at undermining the credibility of observers and international institutions. These resources accuse the missions of «espionage», «bias» or «working for the West», which undermines their authority and creates a political cover to restrict their access to Russia’s controlled territories.
This set of tools is complemented by legal and administrative pressure. Russian authorities and their proxies resort to arrests, accusations of espionage or «foreign interference», as well as changes in national rules that complicate the activities of international organizations and NGOs. This practice makes the work of observers dangerous and unpredictable, forcing them to act in a mode of constant response rather than systematic monitoring.
The combination of these methods creates a sustainable strategy where civic diplomacy becomes an instrument of public policy. As a result, international missions lose effectiveness, independent human rights structures are forced to close down activities, and the information field is filled with dubious sources serving the interests of the Kremlin.
Today, the Russian strategy is a systemic threat to the institutional neutrality of NGOs. Relying on intelligence services and covert NGOs, it is not limited to gathering intelligence; its aim is broader – to change the agenda of international institutions, weaken control mechanisms and turn NGOs into instruments of Russian political influence.