Western sanctions, imposed on Russia in late February 2022 after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, affected banks and individual accounts and became the basis for freezing part of the Russian Central Bank’s international reserves. In March 2022, the Finance Minister of the Russian Federation announced that Western countries had blocked approximately half of the Bank’s international reserves – about $300 billion. of $640 billion.
In September 2023, the REPO (Russian Elites, Proxies and Oligarchs) task force, established in 2022 by a number of countries to search for and seize Russia-related property under sanctions, estimated the value of Russia’s frozen sovereign assets at around $280 billion.
In December of the same year, with reference to a report by the European Commission (EC). According to her, Western countries, primarily members of the G7 (Group of Seven) and the European Union, have frozen about €260 billion. (around $280 billion) assets of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in the form of cash and securities.
The largest volume of such assets is €191 billion. ($208 billion.) is blocked at the international site of Euroclear in Belgium.
A lot of Russian money has been deposited in France, which has frozen about €19 billion. (about $21 billion). Germany is responsible for approximately €210 million. Non-EU countries Switzerland and the UK announced a freeze on sovereign assets of the Russian Federation in the amount of 7.7 billion. Swiss francs ($8.8 billion) and £13.7 billion. ($15.6 billion) respectively.
The picture shows that a significant part of Russian assets are accumulated in European financial structures, and this is seen as a powerful lever of pressure on Moscow and a potential source of aid to Ukraine, but the reality has not been so straightforward. These assets themselves have become a tool of political manipulation and a factor that erodes the EU’stability to develop unified, coordinated policies.
The fair idea of confiscating or using proceeds from frozen assets to compensate Ukraine for damage has been severely hampered by the legislative and international legal framework in practice.
The European Parliament and related studies raise a whole set of problems: immunity of sovereign assets, the risk of judicial claims, the need to work out a «legally solid» mechanism that will not give Russia and its supporters legal leverage against the EU. It is these legal doubts that are used as an argument by opponents of radical solutions and turn the question into an endless technical and political debate.
Today, according to estimates by European analysts, the volume of immobilized assets in Russia is more than $330 billion. Funds of this size and importance are becoming the subject of political bargaining – and it is already happening.
The open debate about whether to issue «collateralized loans» or allocate revenues for military aid often remains at the level of talk. Even in cases where the EU or Parliament formally expresses support for relief schemes, individual countries raise procedural and moral hurdles by questioning unity of vote. Public discord, ranging from hesitation about the allocation of funds to questions about what expenses are acceptable, turns a financial resource into a tool by which interested players within the bloc can blackmail or negotiate concessions.
The Kremlin is exercising its influence not only through direct countersanctions, but also in its ability to exploit the weaknesses of European governance. Slow, fragmented reaction, legal disputes, and public conflicts in European capitals give Moscow a strategic advantage: time and space for diversions, information campaigns, and diplomatic manoeuvres.
While Europe discusses the legal framework and income distribution, Russia wins in two dimensions. It preserves economic and political resources for the response, while simultaneously using intra-Yugoslavian contradictions as evidence that the West «cannot» act in a uniform way. This effect is less noticeable, but more profound, because it breaks trust between partners and reduces the constraining power of collective policy. Analysts clearly indicate that frozen assets gave Moscow a «time calculator», that is, the opportunity to wait for political fatigue and disagreements in the EU.
In the European debate about the potential use of Russian assets, fears of precedent, of undermining confidence in financial markets, and of risks to the euro and European institutions ring out not only as legal concerns, but also as a tool for political influence.
Representatives of financial institutions and some capitals, in particular Brussels, emphasize that the confiscation of sovereign reserves can affect the reputation of jurisdictions and the willingness of foreign states to hold assets in European structures. These arguments effectively affect the less involved countries and those who worry about the long-term economic consequences, which again shifts the discussion from a legal to a political one, and thus amplifies the destructive effect of the presence of «frozen money».
In fact, this is reflected in the slowdown of decisions on large-scale credit programs, in the variety of interpretations of who and under what conditions to transfer funds, and in conflicts over how to avoid legal risks. Recent summits and negotiations have shown that even under political pressure from the allies and Ukraine’s requests, issues of distribution of «frozen revenues» are often blocked for technical or procedural reasons.
These pauses are not a neutral effect, but a field for political maneuvering, where the side that knows how to stall wins, and in this case Russia.
Frozen Russian assets are a huge resource, but they have also become a factor of disruption. Instead of strengthening unity, they serve as a means of internal trade, create legal traps and provide opportunities for external intervention.
The consequences of this are not only financial shortfalls for those in need, but also mounting mistrust among capitals, a reduction in the effectiveness of sanctions and defense policies, and increased vulnerability to Russian maneuvers. If collective institutions do not work out a clear, legally sustainable mechanism and reduce the scope for intra-European blackmail, the «frozen» billions may forever remain an instrument that destroys rather than unites European politics.
Europe is faced with the choice of either turning frozen reserves into a structured, transparent mechanism for assistance, minimizing legal and institutional risks, or admitting that this money has already become a weapon against the EU’s ability to act in concert.
In political terms, a solution means not only the need for legal changes, but also the strengthening of intra-community trust. Without this, any legal innovation will be undermined by political bargaining and the already visible external exploitation.