The Czech Republic’s October elections have not only turned into an internal political upheaval, but their outcome already requires rethinking the immediate future of common European policy.
The victory of the ANO party and the almost immediate signing of a coalition agreement with right-wing and euroskeptic partners opens the way to government, which in a number of issues will purposefully distance itself from the current pro-European line of Prague and seek political closeness with Budapest and Bratislava. And it is important to see these processes not as an episode of local Czech practice, but as a factor that could reinforce fragmentation within the EU.
The ANO party won about a third of the vote, which put it at the top of the parliamentary list and gave it 80 seats in the 200-seat Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic.
The result is good, making the party a major force but still leaving it without a single-party majority.
The strict arithmetic of parliament forced ANO leader Andrei Babiš to look for partners, and the choice fell on two small but principled in revising European approaches to power – «Freedom and direct democracy» (SPD) and «Motorists for themselves» (Motoristé).
SPD advocates holding a referendum on the Czech exit from the EU. Also, the party’s electoral campaign was built on criticism of migration. In turn, the «Motorists» party criticizes the EU’s plans to phase out internal combustion engines.
A coalition was formed in early November, and the three parties won a total of 108 out of 200 seats in the lower house. The key political significance of the new configuration is not only in terms of the number of mandates, but also in terms of the coalition’s programme.
The agreement signed on November 3 and the leaders’ public statements state that the EU «does not have the right to impose on member states decisions that undermine their internal sovereignty», as well as the intention of criticizing the «green» package and taking a tougher stance on migration. In the foreign policy section, the item on «strengthening ties with Slovakia, Hungary and Poland» is clearly highlighted as a priority.
This combination of domestic populist economic agenda (social payments, tax cuts) and a return to the national priority in matters of sovereignty is already perceived by Brussels circles as a signal about the possible formation of a bloc of states prone to euro-skepticism.
What should Europe fear in the coming months? The first effect could be institutional vulnerability of a unified position on external challenges. The Czech Republic has traditionally been one of the most active supporters of aid to Ukraine among Central European countries.
The new coalition openly questions the scale and nature of this assistance, promising “diplomatic steps” to end the war and limit military support. Their vision coincides with the interests of Budapest, which has long used its veto power and blocking mechanisms in the EU to defend its economic and political priorities.
The coordinated behavior of Prague and Budapest, reinforced by contacts with Slovakia, could lead to a series of delays and blockages in the EU Council on key initiatives, from sanctions and aid packages to climate regulations.
The second effect may be ideological and symbolic in nature. The return to politics of a strong populist leader (Babiš was Prime Minister of the Czech Republic from 2017 to 2021), who unites both moderate populist and radical right-wing forces in a coalition, creates an effect of legitimisation for similar projects in other EU countries.
When one of the Central European states declares its intention not to “strengthen” integration and at the same time demands a reduction in commitments to “green” standards, this sends a signal both to business (about a shift in investment priorities) and to citizens (about the possibility of an alternative economic course). Such shifts can reinforce political polarization.
However, the new coalition’s capabilities are clearly limited by a number of objective factors. First, within the EU, decisions on most important issues are made either by a qualified majority or require broad consensus among large members.
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia will not be able to radically change the rules of the game on their own. Second, the economic interests of the countries are intertwined.
The Czech economy is deeply integrated into European supply chains and depends on the inflow of investment and loans, where Brussels and major European institutions play an important role.
A sharp distancing from the EU could lead to costs that political elites will be forced to take into account. Finally, the president, the Senate, the judicial system, and European control mechanisms, as an internal institutional system of checks and balances, are capable of slowing down or adjusting the most drastic initiatives.
On the other hand, real coordination between Prague, Budapest, and Bratislava on issues that are “sensitive” for Brussels seems unlikely without the consent of Warsaw and other major players.
But even partial coordination, such as agreed “delays” in decision-making, active diplomacy against additional aid packages for Ukraine or pressure on climate regulations, will have a “friction” effect, slowing down the EU’s response and complicating the formation of a unified line in times of crisis. For external participants, this means that each decision in Brussels will require more political capital and time.
What should Europe do? First and foremost, it should not dramatize the situation, but neither should it underestimate it.
Practical steps should be taken to intensify bilateral diplomacy with the new Czech authorities in narrow but critical areas (energy, defense, industry), strengthening economic instruments that encourage compliance with common standards, and preparing “plan Bs” for coordinating aid and sanctions if the agreement between allied countries begins to systematically block decisions.
At the same time, it is important to remember that Czech domestic politics has its own peculiarities. Populist promises often collide with the reality of budget constraints and international commitments, and this provides room for maneuver within the state itself.
The result is simple and quite painful. The results of the elections in the Czech Republic and the predicted strengthening of contacts with Hungary and Slovakia do not create an instant “anti-EU” movement, but they do increase the number of “friction points” and the chance of slowing down the adoption of strategic decisions by the community.
Brussels will have to work not only with mechanisms of pressure, but also with levers of positive influence: economic, institutional, and diplomatic, in order to avoid political disagreement escalating into a long-term split.
For Europe, this is a test of practical flexibility in its ability to maintain coordination and principles without losing the ability to engage in constructive dialogue with new management teams in the heart of Central Europe.
