When the 2015-2016 Frontex and UNHCR routes to Europe saw a flood of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and other countries, many expected that the situation would stabilize over time. However, a diametrically opposed phenomenon of European perceptions of migration soon emerged, generating not only political polarization, but also social tensions.
The heterogeneous perception of migration today has a significant impact on the lives of EU countries. What the implications are and why it takes more than just regulating flows to solve the problem.
According to official data of Eurostat, in 2022 the number of immigrants in the EU countries reached about 5.1 million.
Already in 2023 about 27 million people are living in the EU. EU residents were not EU citizens, which is about 6% of the total EU population. In the same year, the total number of first residence permits issued to non-EU citizens was over 3.7 million.
Thus, migration has long ceased to be a «coming» challenge, becoming a prominent part of the demographic, economic and social reality of Europe.
At the same time, the tasks of integration, distribution of resources and social adaptation have proved to be unequal according to regions and countries. Social adaptation has been uneven across regions and countries.
Perceptions of migration within the EU vary greatly. The RFBerlin study shows that the proportion of Europeans who believe that «immigrants make the country better» has decreased from 36.6% in 2020 to 35.7% in 2023.
Some countries (Iceland, Sweden, Ireland) have the best performance, while others (Greece, Hungary, Slovakia) have the lowest. Another report states that 38% of Europeans think they are not well informed about immigration and integration, while almost 70% agree that the integration of migrants is an important contribution, but differ widely in assessing whether it has been successful.
It is also noted that about a third of respondents consider migration to the EU «more of a problem» than an opportunity, and only about a quarter – vice versa.
These data reflect not just the difference «for» and «against», but the spread across countries, social groups and time periods. Thus, in countries with a high proportion of new migrants and limited resources, the perception is often negative. In countries with more stable integration and high living standards, the perception is more positive.
And here media and politics play the role of amplifiers, both positive and negative representations.
How is this heterogeneity reflected in European society and politics? Negative attitudes towards migration are becoming a «hot» topic for populist movements.
The report of the European Council on Foreign Relations notes that in a number of countries (Netherlands, Austria, France, Germany) a significant part of the right-wing electorate sees migration as the main issue, while in the EU it is not the first. The result is a vicious circle. Strong public concern – harsh political rhetoric – increasing polarization – declining confidence in state institutions, especially if decisions are perceived as imposed from above.
The low level of integration and the varying pace at which migrants adapt create local tensions. For example, Eurofound data show that the division by nationality/ethnicity is perceived by EU citizens as the most significant factor of social tension (compared to classic socio-economic fault lines).
When part of the population believes that immigrants receive more benefits or compete in the labor market, and others see migration as a contribution to the economy, there are perceptual conflicts, which puts pressure on society.
Heterogeneity in society complicates the formulation and implementation of common policies. For example, the EU has adopted a number of initiatives on migrants and refugees, but resistance from individual countries and public mistrust are hampering their implementation. In such conditions, polarization processes occur.
On the one hand, border control and measures to reduce illegal migration are being strengthened; on the other hand, there is a lack of attention to integration and creating conditions for social adaptation. At the same time, the institutional response often lags behind the rate of change in public sentiment, creating a sense of gap between politics and citizens’ expectations.
The heterogeneity of migration perceptions poses several specific risks for the future of the European Union.
The threats of a common EU position are manifested in the fact that different countries perceive migration differently. This puts pressure on responsibility-sharing mechanisms, the essence of which is that recipient countries require support and others see more risk. Such asymmetry reduces the willingness to make collective decisions.
Present in society is the erosion of trust in democratic institutions. If citizens believe that the migration policy is imposed or does not reflect their opinion, they are inclined to distrust and refuse to participate in programs, as well as support of «alternative» movements.
When migration is perceived as a burden rather than an opportunity, groups with low levels of education or in regions with high unemployment suffer, a «us vs. them» division is created, which undermines social harmony and leads to deepening social stratification.
The economic and demographic consequences of poor integration of migrants are missed opportunities to mitigate demographic decline and labour shortages. The EU officially notes that migrants can fill shortages in certain occupations.
In the media and public sphere, the debate on migration often becomes emotional and antagonistic rather than constructive. This reinforces the «toxicity» of these and encourages radical political positions and polarization of public discourse.
These risks can be overcome, but a comprehensive approach is required that takes into account not only the regulation of numbers, but also perception, communication and local practices. Lack of public awareness is one reason for mistrust. If people think they «know nothing» about migrants, they tend to perceive the topic as a threat. Improving transparency, presenting real data on integration are important tasks.
The development of programs to adapt migrants at local level will actively promote integration, because successful integration is not only language proficiency, but participation in economic and social life. Practices that allow migrants to contribute (jobs, taxes, social networks) improve their perception in society.
Here it is important not only to help migrants, but also to work with the local population – reduce fears, strengthen interaction of «new» and «old» citizens.
Because EU countries and regions differ in demographics, economics, and historical experience, universal measures work worse than adapted approaches. Adaptation programmes should be differentiated and take into account local differences.
Migration does not take place in a vacuum. Its perception is closely intertwined with economic cycles, the state of the labor market, housing policy and infrastructural opportunities. In countries where the economy is growing and there is a shortage of labor force. For example, in Germany, the Netherlands or the Czech Republic, migrant inflows are often seen as an economic resource that can offset demographic decline and support pension systems.
But where unemployment remains high or the housing market overheats, migration is perceived primarily as additional pressure on limited resources. Research by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) shows that the perception of migrants is directly related to access to social benefits and the level of trust in public institutions. If people are confident that the system allocates resources fairly, their fears diminish. On the contrary, in countries where people feel social vulnerability, whether it be rising prices, housing shortages or unstable employment, migration becomes a convenient «scapegoat», a symbol of competition for survival.
Thus, effective migration policies are not possible without alignment with economic and social priorities. It should be part of a single course where integration measures are combined with investments in infrastructure, the labor market and education.
Otherwise, any even rational solution in the field of migration will be perceived through the lens of domestic problems not as a tool for development, but as a threat to the usual order.
The uneven perception of migration is not just a statistical fact, but one of the key factors that can either undermine or strengthen the European socio-political system.
If migration is perceived in a fragmented way, political responses become fragmented, social tensions increase, and opportunities for integration and growth are lost.
With the EU facing demographic decline, changes in the labor market, and growing geopolitical instability, well-managed migration could become a resource. But this requires not only a policy of «entry-exit», but also a policy of perception of communication and cohesion. Otherwise, Europe risks becoming a hostage to internal fractures and losing the chance for migration to play its positive role rather than become a catalyst of social tension.
