Today it has become clear that the international containment system is going through a crisis, because of the massive modernization of Russian nuclear arsenals, in particular the recent tests by Russia of nuclear charge carriers «Sarmat», «Poseidon», «Beehive», a reversal of the treaty architecture and geopolitical upheavals have created preconditions for a new, dangerous nuclear arms race.
This is recorded by leading analytical centers. Thus, the Stockholm International Institute for Research on Peace (SIPRI) directly calls 2025 the beginning of a new phase of the arms race, and «Nuclear Notebook» gives detailed estimates of the growth and modernization of Russian forces.
This reality poses the challenge for Europe not just to enhance its defense capabilities, but to rethink the role of the European nuclear powers – France and the United Kingdom – in the context of ensuring collective security in the face of Russia’s nuclear threat.
The current political background is clear and at the same time worrisome. The breakdown and weakening of bilateral control mechanisms, the change in the foreign-policy focus of the allies, as well as the rhetoric of escalation around Ukraine increase the pressure on Europe as a zone where the probability of an incident or miscalculation increases.
SIPRI analysts note that the era of reductions in arsenals may come to an end, which means that there will be more nuclear weapons holders, more tests and exercises, and, unfortunately, a higher probability of errors. In such circumstances, the two nuclear-armed European powers – the United Kingdom and France – were at the center of both a practical and symbolic response.
Their arsenals are indeed much smaller than those of Russia or the US in terms of warheads, but they continue to play a critical role in the structure of European deterrence. Thus, it is estimated that France now has about 290 active nuclear warheads, and some 80 obsolete ones in the queue for dismantling, giving a total nuclear stockpile of about 370. While almost all of the 290 are considered to be deployed and readily available.
As for the UK, its strategic nuclear power is based on four submarines of the class «Wengard», each of which is armed with American ballistic missiles «Trident» II D5. Britain has about 225 nuclear warheads in its stockpile, of which approximately 120 are permanently on standby.
The UK is also planning to upgrade. The «Wengard» class boats will be gradually replaced by four more modern «Dreadnought» class submarines, which are being built at Barrow-in-Furness, which will prolong its strategic sustainability for decades to come. For its part, France maintains a fully independent nuclear policy and relies on two components: naval – four submarines class «Triumph», armed M51 – ballistic missiles, and air – attack aircraft «Rafal» airfield and sea-based, carrying ASMP-A cruise nuclear missiles. Plus, they are actively investing in infrastructure upgrades, including the creation of new bases and the development of hypersonic missile carriers, making France’s nuclear component more flexible and technological.
All these steps – the modernization of submarines, the renewal of missile systems, the development of the air nuclear component – not only enhance their strategic power, but also serve as a powerful political signal: without a renewed, modern nuclear component, European security may be vulnerable. However, there is a large gap between intentions and reality. Both countries operate in the logic of «minimum sufficient» deterrence.
Their arsenals are designed not to win a nuclear war, but to guarantee unacceptable damage to a potential aggressor.
But the «minimum» also defines limitations: relatively small number of charges, dependence of London on US supply components of missiles «Trident», political centralization of decisions (especially in France), and economic costs. The lack of scale makes European nuclear deterrence effective in exercises and declarations, but vulnerable to multipolar escalation scenarios.
The response of London and Paris was not only a modernization of their own strategic forces, but also a new, closer coordination of actions. In 2025, for the first time in years, the leaders of the two countries formally underlined their intention to deepen nuclear policy cooperation by agreeing to establish a joint structure to coordinate key policies, planning and capacity development.
For Britain and France, traditionally emphasizing the autonomy of their arsenals, this is a non-trivial step, since their willingness to «coordinate independent means» was a political signal to both European partners and potential opponents that Western European nuclear powers are forming a more coherent front on strategic deterrence.
However, the new mechanisms of cooperation are not intended to replace the transatlantic guarantees of the US, which remain the foundation of European security, But they help reduce the risks of a strategic vacuum in the face of possible US policy fluctuations, and make the European containment component more resilient.
The socio-political impact within Europe is complex. The strengthening of military programs inevitably leads to a reallocation of budgets from social to defense. In many countries, the pressure on governments is growing because civil society is concerned about militarization and elites are worried about the need to invest in an industrial base, air defense, ammunition, and logistics.
European initiatives on joint procurement and defence integration are getting a new meaning, namely that it is a way to reduce the cost of modernization and create a conventional cushion that will reduce the likelihood of recourse to nuclear experimentation in a crisis.What are the biggest risks? First, the erosion of the arms control regime is already eroding the foundations of strategic stability.
The termination of key treaties, mutual limitation of inspections, dismantling of transparency in military programs and increase of arsenals without external control create conditions for an endless spiral of «mutual modernizations». In such an environment, any technological innovation or test can be perceived as an attempt to gain a unilateral advantage that only accelerates the race. In addition, the lack of communication channels between major powers increases the likelihood of misinterpretations and emergencies where even a small incident can escalate into a large-scale crisis.
Second, there is an increased risk of political fragmentation within Europe.
Against the background of the growing role of France and Great Britain as «nuclear leaders» will begin to increase pressure on other EU and NATO states both in terms of increasing defense spending and participating in joint nuclear-political initiatives. But not all countries are ready for accelerated militarization or the transformation of their own defense doctrine.
This could create tension between the Eastern European states that require maximum reinforcement and their Western European partners, which tend to hold a more restrained line. In the long run, such a gap risks weakening Europe’s overall ability to develop a coherent strategy and a united front on collective security issues.Third, the rapid development of technology is shaping a new, poorly predicted arms race. Hypersonic carriers, advanced missile defense systems, cyber weapons, electronic warfare – all these not only increase the destructive potential of modern weapons, but also undermine conventional concepts of strategic deterrence. The ability to strike a fast, hard-to-trace blow or to disable communications and command even before a conflict erupts dramatically increases uncertainty. Uncertainty, in turn, pushes states to take preventive action.
Managing crises in this technology-rich environment is much more difficult, because traditional doctrines can become outdated faster than governments have time to adapt military and political response mechanisms.
What can be predicted? The most likely scenario is «continued modernization and coordination». London and Paris will maintain their arsenals, strengthen bilateral formats, and simultaneously stimulate the development of European conventional forces. This reduces the likelihood of an immediate nuclear escalation, but ensures long-term high costs and political tensions.
An escalation scenario by the major powers is less likely, but possible, if diplomatic channels continue to deplete. The optimistic option suggests active international diplomacy to restore transparency and new control treaties. For Europe, the conclusion is that security will be determined not so much by the number of charges as by the degree of political and technological cooperation.
Britain and France can and, in fact, have already begun to play the role of a «European nuclear shield», but they are not able to completely replace the global guarantee of the US.
Therefore, Europe’s security strategy must combine three elements: modernization of nuclear facilities where necessary; accelerated development of cooperative conventional capabilities and industrial autonomy; and, perhaps most importantly, Diplomatic renewal of verification regimes and de-escalation mechanisms. Only such a multi-layered approach can reduce the likelihood that a new nuclear arms race will turn the continent into an arena of permanent risk.