Europe is undergoing what is perhaps the most significant shift in foreign policy priorities in decades. Since the end of 2022–2025, EU countries have been directing more and more resources towards defence and external border management, and not only in those countries that are directly threatened by military action. The growth of military budgets and the expansion of the powers of border agencies are accompanied by a decline in attention to traditional ‘soft’ diplomacy: mediators, development programmes, cultural and humanitarian work, which for many years has been a key instrument of EU influence abroad.
Over the past few years, the total defence spending of EU countries has grown impressively. In 2024, it increased by 9.4% and reached the highest global level ever recorded by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Political rhetoric in European capitals now often boils down to ‘security first,’ and cutting social or foreign policy programmes for the sake of rearmament is considered an acceptable sacrifice. This is accompanied by major initiatives at the level of the European Commission and international rating agencies, which forecast hundreds of billions of euros of investment in the defence industry and joint projects. In parallel with military restructuring, institutional militarisation of the approach to borders is also intensifying. In its strategic documents, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) notes an expansion in the range of risks – from migration and transnational crime to hybrid threats – and justifies the need for more “intelligent” and increasingly resource-intensive border management. In practice, this means increased funding for the agency, new surveillance technologies and deeper cooperation with third countries to curb migration flows.
This transformation is not without consequences for diplomacy. Firstly, significant resources and political attention are shifting from long-term programmes (development, post-conflict reconstruction, support for justice institutions) to projects with rapid effects, such as military procurement and the development of border control infrastructure.
Secondly, the mechanism of ‘external outsourcing’ of borders, whereby the EU negotiates with third countries on the reception, control or detention of migrants, creates tension with international norms and undermines the Union’s reputation as a defender of human rights. Humanitarian organisations are increasingly recording violations in the implementation of such agreements; this results in reputational damage and complicates the EU’s negotiating position in the regions.
Political fragmentation amplifies the effect. EU member states have different ideas about priorities, and this difference is reflected in specific policy measures. Eastern flank countries such as Poland and Lithuania insist on maximum border tightening and expanded NATO presence, viewing security primarily through the prism of military deterrence. They support the construction of physical barriers at borders and increased defence procurement.
Mediterranean states, including Italy and Spain, on the other hand, are demanding assistance in controlling migration and calling for a more comprehensive approach: investment in migrants’ countries of origin, humanitarian programmes and agreements on legal entry routes. This division is also evident in attitudes towards migration pacts. Scandinavian and Baltic countries advocate stricter procedures, while Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland emphasise the need to combine control with the protection of refugees’ rights.
These different visions complicate the formation of a unified external line. For example, in relations with North Africa, some EU countries are in favour of concluding tough readmission agreements and tightening controls on the departure of migrants, while others fear that such agreements undermine long-term cooperation with partners due to criticism in the field of human rights.
A similar picture can be seen in the Middle East, where Member States have different views on the scale and nature of European involvement in mediation.
Experts note that the loss of the ability to consistently promote political and economic arguments reduces the EU’s influence in regions from the Middle East to Africa. Partners no longer perceive the Union as a unified entity with clear goals, and competitors, from Turkey to China and the Persian Gulf countries, are eager to fill the diplomatic and economic niches that arise.
The consequences are already visible. In the short term, strengthening defence readiness pays political dividends – governments demonstrate determination and citizens see measures ‘to protect’ them. But in the medium term, the price is the loss of soft power leverage.
When diplomacy narrows, the EU loses the opportunity to participate in mediation or in long-term institution-building projects where results come years later and are not visible as an immediate ‘contribution to security.’ This creates a vacuum that is filled by other players – regional powers, private military companies and countries willing to offer instant, albeit ambiguous, solutions.
What are the possible scenarios for European diplomacy? The first is militarisation and external outsourcing of borders, accompanied by a relative decline in the EU’s diplomatic capital. This option would exacerbate geopolitical fragmentation and call into question the EU’s role as a neutral arbiter in global crises.
The second is integrative and consists of the EU learning to combine strengthened defence with new forms of diplomacy, ‘hybrid’ instruments, where military, economic and diplomatic measures go hand in hand. This will require political will and budget reallocation to restore human and institutional resources to the diplomatic corps.
The third scenario is the worst. Internal disagreements will lead to individual states acting bilaterally, strengthening regional alliances to the detriment of pan-European initiatives. Secondly, it is crucial to integrate human rights and legal safeguards into migration policy.
This means clear mechanisms for monitoring operations at external borders, transparency in agreements with third countries, mandatory standards for the treatment of migrants, and regular independent audits. Such a policy not only reduces the risk of violations, but also helps the EU maintain its international credibility, especially in regions where human rights rhetoric is perceived as a key element of trust. If Europe continues to prioritise operational successes while ignoring their legal and humanitarian consequences, its reputational costs will inevitably rise and its diplomatic position will weaken. Finally, mechanisms for rapid coordination between defence and diplomacy need to be established.
The idea is that every major security initiative should be accompanied by a comprehensive diplomatic package: investment in infrastructure reconstruction in partner countries, economic stimulus programmes, support for public administration reforms, and initiatives to increase the resilience of local communities. Such a combination would allow the EU not only to respond to threats, but also to address their root causes. It would help avoid the imbalance whereby military measures create short-term stability but do not lead to long-term strengthening of relations.
For Europe to maintain its status as a global player, it needs to rethink security not as the opposite of diplomacy, but as its continuation and a tool for sustainable influence.
Europe faces a choice: to continue on a course where borders and tanks drown out the voices of ambassadors, or to try to synthesise tough defence and soft diplomacy.
Without the latter, the EU risks losing not only its moral capital but also its real ability to influence the world order, and history shows that soft power is much more difficult to rebuild than military arsenals.