Norwegian authorities and international experts have exposed yet another attempt by Russian intelligence services to infiltrate Scandinavian academia. Under the guise of scientific discussions about the future of the Arctic, Kremlin agents attempted to manipulate public opinion and gather intelligence. This incident highlights the growing threat of Moscow’s hybrid operations, especially in regions of strategic importance such as Northern Europe.
The Arctic region has long been an arena for geopolitical confrontation. Norway, as a member of NATO and a key supplier of energy to Europe, is at the epicenter of Russia’s interests. According to the annual report of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (Etterretningstjenesten) published in February 2024, Moscow has stepped up its efforts to gather information on politics, energy, and military developments in the High North. Russian operations here combine cyberattacks, espionage, and “soft power” — influence through cultural, scientific, and expert platforms.
Recent incidents confirm this trend. In August 2025, the Norwegian Security Service (PST) accused pro-Russian hackers of taking control of a hydroelectric power plant in Bremanger, resulting in an uncontrolled release of water for four hours. And in 2022–2023, Norway expelled more than 15 Russian diplomats suspected of recruiting and gathering technology under diplomatic cover. These cases illustrate how Russia uses “illegals” — agents with false identities — for long-term infiltration into society.
The key figure in the latest scandal is Artem Kureev, a Russian propagandist who has been blacklisted by the EU and the US for spreading disinformation. For more than ten years, Kureev worked for the Russian special services: he organized “tours” for foreign journalists to the occupied territories of Ukraine, built pro-Russian networks in Europe, and created “expert” forums to promote Kremlin narratives.
Under the fictitious name Kureev, he infiltrated the preparations for the international event “Arctic 2050” at Nord University in Bodo. This event, dedicated to the sustainable development of the Arctic, attracted scientists, politicians, and experts from Europe and North America. The agent used the platform to promote ideas about “peaceful cooperation” with Russia, minimizing sanctions, and criticizing NATO — typical Kremlin talking points.
The exposure was made possible thanks to the coordinated efforts of Norwegian intelligence services. Nord University promptly removed Kureev from the organizing committee, and Norwegian authorities stepped up checks on participants in similar forums. According to the PST, such operations are aimed at undermining trust in institutions, increasing polarization, and gathering intelligence on technologies (such as renewable energy or military developments). In 2025, the PST recorded a 30% increase in such attempts compared to 2023.
The Norwegian government responded quickly: Foreign Minister Anniken Huitfeldt emphasized that “we will not allow Russian agents to operate under cover.” Universities have introduced additional checks for foreign conference participants, and NATO is discussing joint measures to protect the academic space.
The exposure in Norway is not an isolated incident, but part of the Kremlin’s global strategy. From cyberattacks on infrastructure to manipulation in universities, Russia seeks to sow chaos and fear. For scientists and politicians, this is a signal: academic freedom should not be a loophole for spies.