There is a steady trend in Europe toward the growing popularity of far-right parties and movements. This also applies to the political landscape in Spain, where the nationalist-conservative and right-wing radical party Vox, founded in 2013, is gaining popularity.
Recent polls show that support for Vox is growing steadily. As of 2025, the party is gaining about 17.4% of the vote, which is its best result in recent years.
The reasons for this rise in popularity are the same as across Europe: dissatisfaction among part of the population with economic instability, unemployment, and cultural and migration concerns. In such conditions, soft conservatism has ceased to satisfy society’s demands. Voters are looking for forces that promise decisive measures, a clear “national identity,” security, and cultural “purity.”
Vox and its allies are not random fringe groups, but an organized political force. In many regions of Spain, they were part of regional coalitions, including with more moderate right-wing parties. However, in the summer of 2024, the party left the coalitions after a conflict over migration policy in five key autonomous regions.
Nevertheless, this political maneuver was not a renunciation of ambition, but rather a demonstration of ideological “principles” and an attempt to turn the crisis into a tool for consolidating support.
It is noteworthy that Vox has long since expanded beyond Spain. The party is an active participant in trans-European far-right alliances.
In June 2024, a new political group called Patriots for Europe (PfE) was officially formed in the European Parliament, bringing together several national conservative and far-right parties from different countries, including Vox. In February 2025, at a summit in Madrid, PfE openly announced its programmatic demands regarding nationalism, Euroscepticism, anti-immigration and anti-globalization policies, as well as the protection of “traditional values.”
PfE leaders have proclaimed a slogan that literally copies the American “MEGA” – “Make Europe Great Again.” This looks like an attempt to create a united ideological front capable of influencing EU policy, rather than simply fighting for a place in national parliaments.
In this sense, Vox and its allies seek to change the balance of power at the European level, undermine the current architecture of international institutions, weaken integration, and focus attention on “traditional values,” national sovereignty, anti-immigration policies, and cultural conservatism.
The rise of far-right sentiment in Spain and Europe is part of a general shift toward radicalization, increased nationalism, and nostalgia for the past. But it is important to understand that in this context, the role of so-called “soft power” and hybrid instruments of external influence, particularly from Russia, cannot be ruled out.
Open sources indicate that many far-right and populist parties in Europe have maintained contacts with Russian authorities for decades. Although there is little direct and confirmed public evidence that Vox or PfE receive funding from the Russian Federation, the very willingness of the far right in Europe to cooperate with pro-Russian forces, spread corresponding rhetoric, and participate in transnational far-right networks speaks to Russian influence.
Thus, the major summit of the far right held in Madrid at the end of November 2025, organized by one of the more radical organizations on the right, Alianza por la Paz y la Libertad (APF), was clearly dominated by pro-Russian rhetoric. Its participants justified the war, and speeches were made that echoed Moscow’s propaganda messages.
The summit was attended by representatives of the Russian “brotherhood” close to Russian oligarchs under sanctions, as well as ideologues close to neo-Eurasianism, whose ideology historically resonates with Russia’s imperial ambitions. We are talking about a very specific oligarch, Konstantin Malofeev, who for the past decade has acted as a “bridge” between the Kremlin system and the European (and sometimes international) far right. Malofeev is not just a Russian businessman. He presents himself as a supporter of an “Orthodox,” conservative, anti-liberal agenda, which he seeks to spread beyond Russia. His media projects, in particular Tsargrad TV and related media and analytical platforms, are positioned as an alternative to the “decaying West,” which, according to Malofeev, is responsible for the moral and cultural decline of society.
One of the key and well-documented manifestations of this activity was the international congress of far-right and neo-Nazi movements, which took place in September 2025 at the Mariinsky Palace in St. Petersburg. Malofeev was the initiator and organizer. The meeting was attended by neo-Nazis and right-wing radicals from Italy, Germany, Greece, Serbia, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, and a number of other countries. Among the guests were representatives of Spanish far-right movements, in particular members of the extreme right-wing organization Democracia Nacional (Spanish Falangists).
This gives reason to believe that the “brotherhood” between Russian right-wing movements and European far-right groups is an organized network with funding, media platforms, regular events, and the exchange of ideology and contacts. According to investigative journalists, the key “coordinator” of the network is Malofeev himself. At the same time, the ideological profile promoted by the Russian oligarch largely coincides with that offered by the European far right: conservatism, “traditional” values, opposition to globalization, anti-liberalism, anti-migration rhetoric, and criticism of liberal Western institutions.
The growing influence of far-right movements in Spain and Europe, as well as their involvement in transnational networks, creates a dangerous set of interconnected threats. It is already becoming clear that such structures are capable of acting as a kind of “Trojan horse,” undermining European stability from within. First and foremost, the strengthening of the far right’s position is leading to increasing polarization of society and heightened social tensions. Studies show that the active presence of radical right-wing groups in the political arena, especially during elections, sharply increases the level of public aggression, contributes to the radicalization of rhetoric, and “normalizes” hate speech. In such conditions, social divisions deepen and society’s ability to reach consensus declines. Voters begin to perceive political struggle not as a competition between rival programs, but as a confrontation between “us” and “them,” which threatens the foundations of social cohesion.
Another aspect of the danger is the undermining of trust in democratic institutions. Far-right movements, relying on rhetoric about a “return to strong national sovereignty” and “traditional values,” promote anti-immigration, anti-multicultural, and Eurosceptic slogans. This discursive strategy deliberately undermines citizens’ trust in European governance mechanisms, minority rights institutions, and the very principles of liberal democracy. Demagoguery about the “degradation of Europe” and the “dictatorship of the Brussels bureaucracy” can create fertile ground for disappointment in democratic processes and increased demand for authoritarian models of governance.
The third threat is the use of external forces, primarily Russia, to influence internal processes in EU countries. When far-right parties or individual representatives of movements come into contact with pro-Russian structures, participate in related events, or broadcast ideologies that benefit Moscow, they become part of external information and political strategies. In conditions of economic instability, migration crises, and growing social anxiety, this model of interaction turns the far right into a potential instrument of external interference. This is precisely where the “Trojan horse” effect comes into play. The far right, formally operating from within the EU’s political systems, can in fact defend the interests of an external player seeking to weaken European integrity.
Finally, the combination of these factors poses a direct threat to the stability of the European Union as a political project. If the rise in popularity of far-right movements continues, if their transnational coordination strengthens, and if the influence of external partners increases, the EU will face growing difficulties. The fragmentation of the political space, the rise of nationalist tendencies, and competition between member states could all lead to a weakening of the union’s structures, an increase in internal conflicts, and a decline in Europe’s ability to act as a unified whole.
In these processes, one cannot ignore the fact that some members of the far right are already demonstrating a willingness to cooperate with pro-Russian structures, spread pro-Russian rhetoric, and participate in events that justify the war or seek to overturn the Western order. In a context where Russia is clearly acting through hybrid instruments—information campaigns, support for pro-Russian forces, ideological alliances—such connections transform far-right movements not only into a springboard for ideas, but also into a potential “Trojan horse.”