In December 2025, the US administration officially published a new National Security Strategy (NSS), the content of which came as a shock to European politicians. The document declares a clear reorientation of American priorities, with the Indo-Pacific region being declared the main theater of global competition, while Europe formally remains only an “important” partner, but no longer a key center of American strategic attention. This change in security strategy logic sets a new vector for the distribution of resources, expectations, and Washington’s political behavior toward its European allies.
Analysis shows that the new US strategy is based on a combination of three factors. These are the desire for economic “reformatting” of strategic supply chains and technological leadership; a political commitment to more pragmatic diplomacy; and the desire to concentrate military capabilities where Washington sees the greatest systemic threat – off the coast of China. This is the subject of analytical studies by leading think tanks from Brookings to Chatham House, which point out that diplomatic politeness towards Europe coexists with tough messages about “burden sharing” and reducing automatic security guarantees.
In Paris, the document was called a “tough clarification” of transatlantic expectations. Officials and experts unequivocally stated that if the US intends to redistribute its efforts, Europe must urgently “take on” a significant share of defense obligations. This requirement already represents a political shock for countries with limited defense budgets and for established cooperation chains within the EU and NATO.
In practice, this will lead to increased pressure on European budgets and accelerate joint rearmament programs. If Washington reduces its permanent military presence and operational commitments, Europe will face the need to rapidly increase spending on weapons, modernize its arsenals, and create mobile forces capable of replacing American expeditionary contingents. In addition, technological and industrial restructuring will be necessary. The EU will be forced to increase its autonomy in critical chains (microchips, rare earth materials, energy), otherwise its dependence on external suppliers will become a vulnerability. Ultimately, EU countries will face a choice between deepening strategic autonomy and risking fragmentation of their foreign policy positions. Analysts warn that without clear coordination, Europe risks splitting into agreeing and “hedging” states that will build relations with the US, China, and Russia simultaneously.
What does the US “withdrawal” from Europe mean in practice? It is important to distinguish between two concepts here: actual ‘withdrawal’ (complete cessation of presence and renunciation of commitments) and “shifting focus,” i.e., reducing readiness for rapid intervention, reducing military bases and personnel, and reorienting toward other regions. A real “withdrawal” in the classic sense seems unlikely, as domestic political forces in the US, including Congress, are still inclined to support transatlantic security. But even a partial withdrawal would have a series of consequences that could prove to be long-lasting.
The first consequence is a reduction in deterrence. NATO’s eastern flank, the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine (in the event of continued aggression from Moscow) will then find themselves having to build up their forces independently. Military experts warn that creating a real deterrent requires not only money but also time for procurement, training, logistics, and supply development. The second consequence will be diplomatic instability. With the reduction of American influence on the continent, there will be more room for maneuver for authoritarian players. They may more actively promote energy, economic, and political influence issues as levers for dividing European policy. And the third consequence is the strengthening of “Eurocentrism” in Brussels’ policy. The long-term effect may manifest itself in the acceleration of EU strategic autonomy projects, but also in increased internal competition between European capitals for resources and foreign policy initiatives.
The socio-political consequences for European countries themselves must also be taken into account. Increased military spending and economic restructuring will inevitably spark heated public debate on who pays for security, what sacrifices are acceptable for strategic independence, and whether increased sovereignty could lead to a retreat from liberal democratic norms in favor of “hardline” policies. In this context, there is a growing risk of populism, with political forces promising quick answers and economic guarantees receiving an additional stimulus for development, especially in countries with vulnerable economies and high levels of public distrust of elites.
Finally, a complete US withdrawal from Europe would be detrimental to the existing collective security system and would likely lead to a regional arms race, a redistribution of spheres of influence, and a deterioration of the situation in areas of potential tension. A more realistic scenario of a “shift in focus” already poses many risks today, including increased internal friction within the EU, rising military spending and social tensions, and increased competition among global players for European markets and influence. Nevertheless, it is precisely this scenario that gives Europe a chance to initiate genuine strategic autonomy, build more sustainable supply chains, and create strong European defense institutions. But this opportunity comes at a high price—in terms of time, resources, and political will.
The conclusion is simple but harsh. Europe now faces a choice: either accept the challenge and invest in its own security and unity, or wait until the strategic vacuum is filled by those who do not share European values. This choice will determine not only the balance of power, but also the future of the continent’s democratic architecture.