At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Russia tried a method that few expected to see in the 21st century, namely the mass recruitment of prisoners into combat units. Independent investigations have shown that at least 48,000 Russian prisoners were recruited into the Wagner private military company with promises of reduced sentences and corresponding payments. More than 17,000 of them died in combat. In addition, according to Russian media reports, the number of prisoners in colonies has decreased significantly, probably due to the active recruitment of people into the Russian army under the pretext of “voluntary service.”
Over time, Moscow has expanded its “personnel base” beyond its own prison system, and in recent years has stepped up its recruitment of foreigners from countries with difficult economic situations. Ukrainian authorities claim that more than 1,400 citizens from three dozen African countries are already fighting on the side of Russian forces, and many of them were recruited through a network of agents and fake job offers. These offers are often disguised as “work” or “study” opportunities. Young people come to Russia hoping to find opportunities but instead find themselves facing contracts to participate in combat operations.
In 2024–2025, Kenyan authorities confirmed that hundreds of Kenyan citizens may have been recruited to fight on Russia’s side in the war. Recruitment took place through advertisements for jobs abroad: security, construction, “logistics” with the promise of salaries many times higher than the average income in the country. Young men from poor regions, where youth unemployment exceeds 30%, received tickets to Russia, after which they were offered military contracts. Some of them ended up on the front lines, others in training camps, unable to leave the country freely.
At the end of 2024, the South African government launched an investigation following reports of a group of citizens being recruited through private security firms. They were promised jobs outside the combat zone, but once there, they were subjected to military training and sent to Ukraine. Most of those recruited were from socially disadvantaged areas with chronic unemployment. Several people turned to the authorities for help after the death of their colleagues.
According to international investigators, recruitment also took place among citizens of Togo, Cameroon, Senegal, and Mali. In these countries, intermediaries linked to former Wagner structures offered “contract service” as a chance to earn money and send it to their families. Casualties among these groups are particularly high, as they are often used in assault units with minimal training.
However, the geography of Russian recruiters’ activities is not limited to Africa. Cuba is a telling example, where economic crisis, commodity shortages, and extremely low incomes have created fertile ground for recruitment. In 2023–2024, a network was uncovered that recruited Cuban citizens to fight on Russia’s side in the war. They were promised high salaries by Cuban standards, simplified Russian citizenship, and stability that was unavailable in their homeland. Some of those recruited later claimed that they did not realize they would end up directly in the combat zone. Even official condemnation of these schemes by Havana did not completely stop the flow of recruits.
The Iranian factor deserves special attention. Russia tries not to publicize direct mass contracts with Iranian citizens, but there are indirect and documented schemes related to Iranian territory.
Millions of Afghans live in Iran, many of whom do not have legal status, stable jobs, or social guarantees. According to human rights activists and regional investigations, it was among this group that recruitment for participation in the war on the side of Russia took place. People were promised money, legalization, and the opportunity to travel to Russia, after which they signed contracts with Russian military structures.
Russia and Iran have deepened their military cooperation. In this context, there have been cases where Iranian intermediaries or related structures have helped recruit foreigners, including Afghans, for subsequent deployment to Russia. This has allowed Moscow to expand its pool of fighters without directly involving Iranian citizens and reducing political risks.
All these examples fit into a single pattern. The scale of this recruitment is by no means accidental. Russia is purposefully seeking people in places where human life is devalued by economic conditions and where a lack of prospects makes the risk acceptable. From African states to South Asian countries, young people deprived of stable income and prospects perceive promises of a “better life” as a chance to change their fate. Recruitment is conducted unofficially and mostly so secretly that even the governments of the countries where recruitment takes place often learn about it after the fact.
This approach is beneficial to the Kremlin because it reduces pressure on its own population, which, as the target of mobilization, is becoming less and less willing to sacrifice its lives and also provides external “reinforcements” in conditions of chronic personnel shortages on the front lines caused by heavy losses. For the Kremlin, this is a way to maintain the possibility of offensive operations without conducting a new large-scale mobilization in Russia.
Much of what Ukrainian officials say about the fate of these mercenaries is alarming: they are often used as the “first echelon” of assaults and “cannon fodder,” especially in the most dangerous areas of the front line. This approach leads to high mortality rates among those who were lured by promises of quick riches or career advancement but found themselves involved in the conflict without a clear understanding of the consequences.
Moreover, dozens of foreigners are now in Ukrainian captivity or missing. Their governments are already expressing concern, and international human rights organizations are warning about violations of the rights of recruited individuals and the risks associated with their exploitation.
The consequences of Russia’s “international” strategy described above extend far beyond Ukraine. It poses a whole range of risks for Europe. Firstly, the intensification of crises and instability in poor countries, partly caused by economic problems and wars, stimulates migration to Europe in search of better opportunities, which increases pressure on the EU’s social systems. Second, there is the return of surviving mercenaries, people with combat experience, combat and psychological trauma, and often without legal status, who can bring radical experiences and trauma to migrant communities in Europe, creating challenges for rehabilitation and integration. And thirdly, the active practice of using economically vulnerable groups as a global source of “cannon fodder” for war undermines international law and may provoke similar practices in other regions of the world, creating the risk of new global unrest. Furthermore, attempts to exploit poverty and unemployment for war push vulnerable groups toward radical ideologies.
Russia’s recruitment of mercenaries is a strategy that reflects the structural crisis of the Russian military machine. The longer the war continues and the higher the losses, the wider the geography of the search for “disposable” soldiers becomes. Russia’s war against Ukraine is thus turning into a global socio-political phenomenon, representing not only a clash of armies, but also the exploitation of poverty, where the economic despair of millions of people is being used as a tool of geopolitics. For Europe, understanding this logic is not a matter of abstract morality, but of its own security and stability in a world where the boundaries of war increasingly extend far beyond the front lines.