The exposure of a spy network operating from the building of the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the European Union in Brussels was one of the most serious counterintelligence operations in recent years and has once again raised the issue of the stability and security of EU institutions. The joint operation by the Belgian State Security Service (VSSE/Sûreté de l’État) and the counterintelligence services of several EU countries, dubbed Opération Guimard, showed that the European Union remains not only a political and economic center, but also one of the key targets of interest for global intelligence services.
According to the investigation, starting in 2021–2022, there was effectively a parallel “operational core” in the Hungarian representative office building at 11 Rue Guimard, which used diplomatic immunity and the mission’s infrastructure to coordinate intelligence activities. This structure operated on a permanent basis and gained access to sensitive EU information. The main focus of the spy network was the internal “kitchen” of EU decision-making: sanctions policy, energy negotiations, aid to Ukraine, and discussions on the expansion of the Union. The most high-profile episode was the transfer in 2024 of a complete set of documents on the discussion of the 14th package of sanctions against Russia a few days before its official approval at the level of foreign ministers. Such a leak allowed third parties to adapt their political and economic steps in advance, negating the effect of European decisions.
The investigation established that the network consisted of 7-9 people, with only three having official diplomatic status. The rest operated under the cover of consultants and technical specialists. This type of structure is typical of modern intelligence operations, in which a formally low level of access is compensated for by flexibility, lower visibility, and the ability to circumvent standard control mechanisms. Fourteen proven cases of the transfer of secret and confidential EU documents outside the representative office building have been recorded, indicating well-organized logistics and the necessary connections.
The investigation established that the ultimate beneficiary of the information obtained was the intelligence service of one of the Middle Eastern countries. The name of the country has not been officially disclosed, but European media outlets are actively discussing the possibility that it was Iran. If this is confirmed, the leak of information from Brussels will take on not only intra-European but also global significance.
The Hungarian government’s reaction has been extremely restrained. Official Budapest has declared its willingness to cooperate with the investigation, stressing that individual employees will be held accountable if they exceed their authority, while rejecting any attempts to question Hungary’s loyalty to the European Union. Nevertheless, the facts indicate the seriousness of the situation. Two employees have already been stripped of their diplomatic immunity and have left Belgium, three others are under house arrest in Brussels, and the embassy building is under increased surveillance by the Belgian special services.
It is telling that this scandal is not an isolated incident. This is not the first time that the European Parliament and EU structures have found themselves at the center of espionage revelations. In 2022-2023, Brussels was rocked by the so-called “Chinese spy scandal” when it emerged that agents of influence linked to Beijing were operating under the cover of non-governmental organizations and think tanks, attempting to influence decisions and shape an agenda favorable to China. Earlier, European intelligence services had repeatedly pointed to the activity of Russian intelligence networks, which used diplomatic cover and contacts with individual politicians to obtain information about sanctions, defense initiatives, and EU energy policy. In this context, the “Hungarian case” only confirms the systemic problem that the European Parliament remains one of the main targets of intelligence activities in the world.
The consequences of Opération Guimard go far beyond the criminal case itself. The leak of confidential information does not promote trust between EU member states, weakens the Union’s negotiating position on fundamental issues, and forces European institutions to tighten access to information. This, in turn, leads to a decline in transparency and an increase in secrecy, which contradicts the very principles of European integration. Experts are already calling this the most serious blow to internal trust in the EU since the Chinese espionage scandal.
The story of the Hungarian representation in Brussels demonstrates how blurred the lines between diplomacy, alliance, and intelligence are becoming in the context of global political turbulence. Until the EU develops a unified and effective mechanism for counterintelligence protection of its structures, such scandals will continue to recur, each time causing increasingly significant damage to both the security and political integrity of the European Union.