London, February 2026. The heads of the UK’s largest banks are preparing for a historic step in financial policy: the first coordinated meeting to discuss the creation of a national payments system, an alternative to the international payment networks Visa and Mastercard. The meeting, chaired by Barclays UK CEO Wim Maru, is scheduled for February 19. This step is being hailed as a key milestone in strengthening the country’s economic sovereignty.
The idea of creating a national payments infrastructure has been discussed in the UK for several years. There have been long discussions within the government about the need for the country to have its own mechanism for cashless payments and not be completely dependent on foreign providers. It has been noted that the existing structure relies too heavily on third-party networks, access to which is limited.
Today, British consumers and businesses almost universally use Visa and Mastercard, platforms that process approximately 95% of all transactions in the country. This dominant role of international networks has become both an advantage for fast payments and a strategic vulnerability for the British economy.
Geopolitical events of the past year have transformed the need for a national payments system from theoretical discussions into a working project, known under the working title “DeliveryCo.” The main reason for this increased activity was growing concerns among some British banking executives that the administration of US President Donald Trump could use control over payment systems as a tool of influence by restricting access to American payment networks in the event of an escalation of international conflict or political pressure.
A warning from a banking executive, hinting at a complete shutdown of non-cash transfers in the absence of a domestic equivalent, was quoted in the Guardian: “If Visa and Mastercard are shut down, it will take us back to the 1950s.”
The UK’s decision to seriously consider creating its own national payment system is driven by a combination of factors at the intersection of security, economics, and geopolitics.
First and foremost, this is a matter of strategic vulnerability. The British economy is deeply integrated into the global financial architecture, yet its card payment infrastructure relies almost entirely on international networks, primarily Visa and Mastercard. Their dominance means that a critical segment of the national financial system is effectively controlled by external private corporations operating in the jurisdiction of another state. In the context of growing geopolitical instability and the active use of sanctions in international politics, this dependence is perceived as a potential lever of pressure. Even if such a scenario remains hypothetical, the very possibility of restricting access to the payment infrastructure poses a risk to sovereignty.
Financial stability should be considered a second factor, as the modern British economy has virtually abandoned cash payments. Today, cashless transactions dominate retail, services, e-commerce, and everyday transactions. Cards and digital transfers have become the basic form of economic participation. In such a system, any large-scale disruption to international payment networks—whether a political decision, a cyberattack, or a technological disaster—can instantly paralyze trade, transport, online services, and supply chains. In this context, the national system is viewed as a backup system, a mechanism ensuring the continuity of payments even in the face of external shocks. This is not only about technological redundancy but also about ensuring that the state is able to maintain the functioning of its economy in an autonomous mode.
Finally, competition and development play a significant role. The long-term dominance of two global players has created a stable market structure, where innovation and pricing policies largely depend on the strategies of these corporations. British experts and representatives of the fintech community have repeatedly pointed out that this model limits the potential of internal developments and hinders the implementation of alternative solutions, including those based on open banking and the integration of banking APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) with digital platforms. The creation of a national system could stimulate the development of domestic technological solutions, increase competition, and reduce transaction costs for businesses and consumers.
Thus, the initiative to create a national payment infrastructure, “DeliveryCo,” is not an isolated technological project but a comprehensive response to a range of challenges. It reflects a desire to minimize external risks, strengthen financial stability, and simultaneously re-energize the internal dynamics of the payments market. At the same time, the developers have already considered models that maintain compatibility with international networks and adapt new technologies for cross-border payments.
Britain is not the only major economy where discussions about national payment systems have become the subject of serious public and political debate. In the European Union, calls for the creation of its own independent payment infrastructure as part of a “digital sovereignty” strategy have intensified in recent years. The European Central Bank emphasizes that dependence on external card schemes is becoming not only an economic but also a political risk. ECB President Christine Lagarde stated that Europe is “overly dependent on external payment solution providers” and must ensure strategic autonomy in the payments sector, as control over key financial infrastructure outside the EU makes the Union vulnerable in the face of geopolitical tensions.
The digital euro project is also being considered in this context. According to ECB Executive Board member Fabio Panetta, Europeans should have access to digital payments “based on European infrastructure and managed in Europe.” The digital euro is conceived as a complement to cash and, at the same time, as an element of a native EU payment system, capable of reducing dependence on non-European providers and strengthening the EU’s financial stability.
European Parliament leaders have openly spoken about the need for their own infrastructure, summing up their vision as a project comparable to creating a “European Airbus” in the payments sector: a large-scale, sovereign, and technologically independent solution.
National payment systems around the world have been created for similar reasons. For example, India’s RuPay was developed by the National Payments Corporation of India to reduce transaction costs and reduce dependence on foreign networks, and now holds a significant share of the local market.
It’s important to remember that creating a national payment system for the UK, while potentially beneficial, comes with significant risks. The development and implementation of a national payment infrastructure will require tens of millions of pounds in initial investment, the creation of a technologically sophisticated cybersecurity system, and extensive integration with banking and trading platforms. Similar projects in Europe, including the European Payments Initiative (EPI), have repeatedly encountered difficulties in coordination between participants and integration challenges.
Building trust among businesses and citizens will be an equally complex task. For the system to be viable, it must be widely adopted by retailers, banks, and end users. Furthermore, the question of international compatibility remains, as the UK remains a global financial center, and the new system must ensure seamless cross-border transactions. The real impact of the reform will largely depend on how successfully sovereignty is reconciled with openness to the global economy.
In the coming years, not only the technical implementation of the project will be crucial, but also its socio-political perception: will a national payment system reduce the UK’s strategic vulnerability, or will it become yet another costly experiment in the era of digital financial transformation.