For decades after the end of the Cold War, European states assumed that large-scale military operations on the continent were virtually impossible. Military budgets were cut, armies were reduced, and defence strategies increasingly focused on participation in peacekeeping operations and the fight against terrorism.
However, the war in Ukraine has radically changed the strategic thinking of European politicians and the military. Today, the European Union and NATO are increasingly talking about ‘high-intensity warfare,’ a scenario that until recently seemed purely theoretical. In 2025, EU leaders agreed on a political goal to strengthen Europe’s defence capabilities by 2030. This task was enshrined in the EU’s new defence readiness strategy, which provides for a large-scale expansion of military capabilities and the mobilisation of additional investment in defence. According to estimates by European institutions, total investment in the defence sector could reach €800 billion in the coming years.
This scale of preparation is explained by a shift in threat assessment. Many European strategic documents view the primary scenario for a potential major conflict as a confrontation between Russia and NATO countries, primarily on the alliance’s eastern flank, in the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe.
One of the most notable changes has been the transformation of Germany’s defence policy. After decades of cautious defence policy, Berlin has embarked on a major rearmament of its armed forces, a process that Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called ‘Zeitenwende’ (‘turning point’). Germany’s military budget for 2024-2025 has reached approximately €90 billion, making it the largest in the European Union. At the same time, the country is strengthening its military presence on NATO’s eastern flank and participating in the creation of new defence structures for the alliance.
France also plays a key role in shaping the new European security architecture. Its armed forces remain among the most powerful on the continent, and the presence of its own nuclear arsenal makes Paris a central element of the European strategic deterrence system. The French government plans to increase its defence budget to €64 billion by 2027, almost double the level of the mid-2010s.
To gain a clearer understanding of the defence capabilities of European countries, it is important to compare their military capabilities: the size of their armies, the scale of their reserves and the size of their defence budgets. These indicators demonstrate how different the defence models are in the leading European countries and in the countries on NATO’s eastern and northern flanks.
Germany and France remain the key military centres of the European Union. Germany has approximately 181,000 active military personnel and about 34,000 reservists. France has about 204,000 military personnel and approximately 38,000 reservists.
A completely different approach to defence has developed in the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Their regular armies are significantly smaller in number, but the states in the region actively compensate for this factor through a system of reserves and territorial defence. For example, the Estonian army has about 7,500 military personnel, but the trained reserve reaches about 41,000 people. The Baltic states also allocate a significantly larger share of their national economies to defence than most European countries. Lithuania spends about 4% of its GDP on military needs, Latvia about 3.7%, and Estonia about 3.4%. In percentage terms, these figures are among the highest in NATO.
The Scandinavian countries demonstrate a unique model of defence. This region has developed a concept of relatively small professional armies supported by large, well-trained reserves. Finland is the most striking example. With an army of approximately 24,000 personnel, the country has a reserve of more than 230,000 military personnel, which is the largest mobilisation resource in Europe. After joining NATO in 2024, Sweden began a fundamental rearmament programme dating back to the Cold War. The country’s military budget is around €12-13 billion and continues to grow, and the government has announced plans to increase defence spending to 3-3.5% of GDP. Norway and Denmark are also strengthening their defence capabilities. Norway is focusing on protecting the Arctic region and developing high-tech weapons, while Denmark is actively modernising its fleet and air defence systems in the Baltic region.
Despite the massive increase in military spending, many analysts believe that Europe is not yet ready for a prolonged, high-intensity conflict. This assessment is confirmed not only by expert studies, but also by the conclusions drawn from major military exercises and war games in recent years.
One of the most revealing was the Quadriga series of manoeuvres conducted by Germany since 2024. The 2025 exercises involved more than 8,000 military personnel from 14 countries, as well as about 1,800 pieces of equipment, 40 ships and 20 aircraft. The main objective of the manoeuvres was to practise the transfer of troops and equipment from Germany to NATO’s eastern flank, primarily to Lithuania. Following the exercises, the German command acknowledged that Germany was effectively becoming the alliance’s key logistics hub in the event of a major conflict in Europe. However, it was precisely the logistics component that became one of the main problem areas.
Military exercises have shown that the transfer of large quantities of equipment and personnel requires much more complex coordination of civilian infrastructure, railways, ports, motorways and storage centres. As part of individual Bundeswehr logistics manoeuvres, such as Reliable Supporter 2024, the system of so-called Convoy Support Centres was tested for the first time. These are special supply and service points for troop convoys, which are designed to provide passing units with fuel, equipment repairs and medical assistance. Another problem identified during the exercises was the need to digitise logistics processes. During tests of new supply management systems, the German military noted that even at the stage of planning the transfer of forces, it is necessary to coordinate the movement of hundreds of pieces of equipment and thousands of tonnes of cargo daily. For example, as part of experiments with the YARDED logistics management system, a situation was simulated in which more than 500 pieces of equipment and about 2,500 tonnes of military cargo had to pass through Germany every day as part of NATO’s Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Transfer (RSOM) process.
Transport infrastructure remains another vulnerability. The transfer of large military units across Europe requires the modernisation of railways, bridges, ports and storage infrastructure, without which it is impossible to ensure a stable supply of troops.
Equally serious conclusions were drawn in the field of medical care. As part of the Quadriga 2026 exercises, the German armed forces conducted the largest medical service manoeuvres in recent years, Medic Quadriga, whose task was to test the entire chain of evacuation of the wounded: from first aid on the battlefield to the transport of patients to civilian medical facilities in Germany. Military medics, rescue services and civilian health care organisations, including the German Red Cross, took part in the exercises.
The main conclusion was that in the event of a large-scale conflict, the capabilities of military medicine would inevitably have to be supplemented by the civilian healthcare system, as military medical resources alone would be insufficient for a prolonged war. In the summer of 2025, the French healthcare system began preparing for a possible mass influx of wounded in the event of a major armed conflict in Europe. In July 2025, the French Ministry of Health sent special instructions to regional health agencies (ARS) on the readiness of hospitals for a scenario of ‘major military engagement’ (engagement majeur) by March 2026. In these plans, France is seen as a potential ‘rear base’ for treating wounded soldiers, both French and those from NATO and EU allies. According to estimates in the documents, the healthcare system must be ready to receive between 10,000 and 50,000 wounded over a period of 10 to 180 days, and during peak periods, up to 100-250 patients per day for several months. As part of the preparations, medical centres are to be set up near major airports, ports and transport hubs for the subsequent evacuation of foreign military personnel to their countries. The preparations are being carried out jointly with the Ministry of Defence and the military medical service and involve adapting civilian hospitals to wartime conditions, including the possibility of repurposing wards and introducing a medical triage system.
Problems are also being identified at NATO level. The large-scale international Steadfast Dart 2026 manoeuvres, which took place from January to March 2026, were aimed at testing the alliance’s ability to rapidly deploy forces within the framework of the new Allied Reaction Force. The exercises focused primarily on strategic logistics: troop movements, coordination of transport flows and interaction between national armies. Overall, the results of these exercises showed that the key problems of European defence are not so much related to the size of the armies as to the sustainability of the entire war infrastructure: logistics, medicine, supplies and industrial production. The European defence industry has long operated in a peaceful economy and was not designed to support prolonged, high-intensity combat operations.
Finally, many European armies continue to experience personnel shortages. This is why several countries are once again discussing expanding their reserve systems, strengthening territorial defence and even reinstating compulsory military service. Taken together, these measures indicate that Europe is gradually adapting to a new strategic reality in which preparedness for large-scale conflict is once again becoming a central element of public policy.
Despite the growing military rhetoric, European leaders emphasise that the goal of the current militarisation is not to prepare for an inevitable war, but to prevent conflict. The EU’s strategy is built around the principle of ‘deterrence through strength,’ creating a level of military power that will make potential aggression too risky. And although many experts consider the likelihood of a large-scale war on the continent to be low, the very need to discuss such scenarios suggests that the era of strategic calm in Europe is finally over.