After leaving the European Union, it was important for the United Kingdom to prove that it could be self-sufficient outside its borders, including due to the loss of the ability to directly influence political decisions in Brussels. Events in recent years have demonstrated one interesting trend: London is increasingly becoming the initiator and catalyst of the West’s sanctions policy towards Russia. With political differences on many issues persisting within the European Union, the British position often serves as a benchmark for other countries. In 2026, its model proved its effectiveness thanks to the speed of decision-making and the professional work of MI6. Unlike the EU, where sanctions packages go through months of formal and bureaucratic procedures, where they can ultimately be vetoed by Hungary and Slovakia, London operates on a different principle and has far fewer formal restrictions.
One notable example was the fight against Russia’s ‘shadow’ fleet of tankers, which Russia uses to circumvent oil sanctions. In January–February 2026, the United Kingdom was the first to expand its sanctions list, adding 15 new tankers involved in the transport of Russian oil. Three weeks later, the European Union imposed similar restrictions, making full use of London’s evidence base.
British financial control and intelligence agencies collect information about ship owners, their financing schemes and study transport routes. The government then imposes national sanctions that restrict insurance, access to British ports and other financial instruments under its jurisdiction. Since a significant portion of the world’s leading marine insurance companies are based in London, the UK’s national sanctions alone are sufficient to paralyse or significantly impede the activities of this fleet.
A similar approach is being applied in the energy sector. In 2025, the British government initiated personal sanctions against the management of Hungarian energy companies that have joint projects with the Russian state corporation Rosatom. It was the British restrictions that gave impetus to the formation of the 19th package of European Union sanctions in October 2025, which included restrictions against 69 individuals and a series of economic measures targeting sectors that support armed aggression, in particular energy, finance and the military-industrial complex. They also set a political and legal precedent that was subsequently used in European legislation.
London’s activity on this track is explained not only by its desire to increase sanctions pressure on Russia, but also by its desire to limit the Kremlin’s political influence within NATO itself. In this context, the openly pro-Russian position of the Hungarian government, which sometimes goes beyond common sense, attracts particular attention. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has repeatedly criticised the EU’s sanctions policy and tried to use Europe’s energy dependence on Russian resources as a tool for political bargaining.
This was particularly evident in early March 2026, when Orbán threatened to ‘restore oil supplies by force’ via the Druzhba pipeline. This statement provoked a sharp reaction from official London, and the Foreign Office issued an official statement calling such threats ‘an unacceptable undermining of Ukraine’s sovereignty.’ The British side also stressed that any attempts to circumvent sanctions through political pressure pose a threat to European security. When V. Orbán blocks EU decisions, it creates problems for collective consensus and the security of allies. If the Hungarian leader’s influence weakens, European bureaucracy will work faster and with fewer obstacles, allowing Britain to better coordinate its sanctions policy, not to mention reducing the Kremlin’s influence.
Analytical centres in the United Kingdom confirm these estimates with economic calculations. According to researchers at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), the resumption of full-scale Russian oil transit through Druzhba on the terms proposed by Budapest could bring an additional $2.4 billion to the Russian budget by the end of 2026. These funds would almost certainly be used to finance Russian aggression in Ukraine and conduct hybrid operations against the West, making energy compromises with Moscow not only an economic issue, but also a security one.
That is why British diplomacy is increasingly trying to influence European sanctions policy even outside the EU. London is working closely with the Baltic states, Poland and other Scandinavian countries to form an informal coalition of states that advocate a tougher sanctions regime against Russia. In many cases, it is these countries that initiate restrictive proposals in Brussels, based on analytical materials and investigations prepared by British government agencies and think tanks.
The United Kingdom plays a significant role in the global financial system. London remains one of the world’s key centres for the provision of these services, insurance and legal support for international agreements. This gives the British authorities the tools to control financial flows related to Russian capital. Restricting access to these tools is proving to be no less effective than imposing direct trade sanctions.
As a result, the British sanctions policy is becoming a kind of ‘pilot site’ for future decisions by the European Union. At a time when internal political disputes sometimes slow down decision-making in Brussels, the speed and consistency of London’s actions are helping to shape the direction of pressure on Russia.
Events in recent years have shown that the UK’s role in Europe’s sanctions policy goes far beyond its formal status outside the EU. London’s consistent position not only increases international pressure on Russia, but also influences internal political processes in Europe, in particular the ability of individual governments to use energy dependence as a tool for political blackmail. In this context, British strategy is increasingly determining certain areas of Western policy, both in relation to the Kremlin and to those political forces in Europe that are trying to weaken the sanctions regime.