After the introduction of the EU embargo and the G7 “price ceiling” mechanism on Russian oil exports, the international community expected a rapid reduction in foreign exchange revenues to the Russian budget, but Moscow managed to adapt to the new conditions. One of the main tools for this was the Greek tanker fleet, which is historically the largest in the world, and it was the shipowners from this country who ensured uninterrupted oil supplies from the Russian Federation in conditions when traditional logistics chains were disrupted.
The historical roots of this cooperation go back to the Cold War, when the USSR, due to the lack of its own fleet, attracted Greek vessels for oil exports. Greek families learned to work under “flags of convenience” and interact with both Western and Eastern markets. After the collapse of the Union, these ties only strengthened through integration into global banking and trade structures, and although there is no public evidence of the ideological commitment of Greek shipowners to Moscow, commercial continuity has created the conditions for current cooperation for decades.
Not surprisingly, after the imposition of sanctions against the Russian Federation, the Greek maritime sector demonstrated high flexibility, operating simultaneously in two legal segments, which allowed the Kremlin to buy time to build autonomous supply chains outside Western control. On the one hand, large companies continued to officially transport raw materials, the price of which corresponded to the established limits, which allowed them to maintain access to Western insurance and banking services. On the other hand, Greek operators became the main source of replenishment of the so-called “shadow fleet” of the Russian Federation, selling obsolete vessels to newly created companies in closed jurisdictions, which allowed shipowners to receive excess profits from the sale of assets at prices that significantly exceeded market prices.
A key role in these processes is played by Dynacom Tankers Management Ltd, registered under IMO number 1527598. Founded in 1991, it controls at least 74 tankers and employs over 5,000 seafarers. It is significant that the crews of the company’s vessels are often recruited through Crimean crewing agencies, in particular Sydyma, which indicates close Greek-Russian cooperation despite sanctions. Dynacom’s activities are directly linked to the figure of George Prokopiou, whose fortune in 2024 was estimated at $3.7 billion. His business empire also includes Dynagas Ltd and Sea Traders S.A., which gives him influence over the crude oil, liquefied gas and bulk cargo markets. Prokopiou actively invests the profits in real estate, in particular by acquiring the Astir Palace Vouliagmenis hotel group. At the same time, he publicly opposes strict environmental regulations of the EU and IMO, protecting the interests of the traditional tanker business.
Another powerful player in assisting Russia in sanctions evasion schemes is Minerva Marine Inc, founded in 1996 and registered in the Marshall Islands (IMO 1774869), which operates a fleet of over 70 vessels. Having started its activities under the auspices of Andreas J. Martinos, the company is now controlled by his son, Andreas A. Martinos, whose capital is estimated at 2 billion euros. Minerva Marine’s connections reach the international level through cooperation with the oil trader Alkagesta Ltd, which is controlled by Azerbaijani businessmen Adnan Ahmedzadeh and Kamran Agayev. In addition, the Martinos’ activities are connected with the Liberian structure Rourke Services Ltd. The company’s CEO, Athanasios Martinos, simultaneously manages Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Limited, a corporation that has another 74 tankers at its disposal.
Polembros Shipping Ltd, founded in Athens in 1974 and long-time chairman of the International Chamber of Shipping, has also been implicated in helping Russia evade sanctions. The company worked closely with trader Gunvor, which historically had close ties to Russian energy networks. Following the death of Spiros Polemis in 2024, control of the assets passed to Leonidas Polemis. The list of operators that moved significant volumes of Russian oil in 2025 also includes Stealth Maritime Corp SA, Marine Trust Ltd-Mai, Star Marine Management Inc, Eurotankers Inc and SR Navigation SA. These companies form a broader cluster of Greek carriers that use complex ownership structures to circumvent traditional sanctions tools that focus only on individual vessels or cargoes.
It would seem that the violation of the sanctions regime is obvious and that EU regulators should solve this issue quite simply, but in recent years this has not happened. The fact is that, unlike the disposable shell companies created by the Russians, Greek shipping conglomerates have deep roots in politics, global finance and crewing networks. This allows them to easily circumvent sanctions against individual vessels by transferring assets between relatives or affiliated structures. Expert assessments indicate that personal sanctions against the ultimate beneficiaries, who are the real owners of the fleets, could change the risk calculation more effectively than technical restrictions against tankers, but at present they are not only not introduced, but are not even discussed.
As a result, in early 2026, EU-controlled vessels continued to provide a significant share of Russian oil shipments, even despite the expansion of the autonomous Russian “shadow fleet,” and the “Greek factor” continues to remain a stabilizing element for the aggressor’s budget. That is, a paradoxical situation has arisen where the EU imposes sanctions and, at the same time, the stability of Russia’s oil revenues directly depends on the operational activities of Greek maritime elites, while the use of complex corporate structures and political influence allows these groups to remain outside the scope of effective sanctions control.
Until the mechanisms of restrictions are directed at the real owners and their extensive networks, Greek tankers will continue to serve as a financial “lifeline” for the Russian state treasury. The lack of personal responsibility of the final beneficiaries creates a situation where the risk of obtaining super-profits from servicing the aggressor significantly exceeds the hypothetical losses from the technical blocking of individual vessels by the EU, and without a radical transition to sanctioning the “capital” and the specific individuals behind it, these shadowy schemes will remain intact, nullifying efforts to economically isolate Russia.