The parliamentary elections of March 22 were the tenth since Slovenia declared independence on June 25, 1991. They took place amid an unprecedented level of social polarization, and never before had the future of this small European country depended so heavily on the outcome of a vote. Slovenians were electing 90 members of parliament for a four-year term — 88 through a proportional system, and two representing the Italian and Hungarian national minorities through a majoritarian system. Seventeen movements, blocs, and parties of varying political orientations — right, centrist, and left — competed in the race.
The main confrontation unfolded between the liberal Freedom Movement of incumbent Prime Minister Robert Golob and the right-conservative Slovenian Democratic Party led by three-time former Prime Minister Janez Janša, between whom a certain parity in electoral support had formed. Golob built his campaign on social-liberal values, deeper European integration, and the “green transition,” positioning himself as a defender of democratic institutions and an opponent of authoritarianism. His rival Janša is known for hardline rhetoric and his alliance with Viktor Orbán; he appeals to national conservatism, promising stricter control over migration, protection of traditional values, and radical business deregulation to stimulate economic growth.
According to final results, Golob’s Freedom Movement (GS) won with 28.62% (29 seats), while Janša’s Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) received 27.95% (28 seats). Neither party has enough seats to form a government independently, as 46 out of 90 mandates are required.
Prime Minister Robert Golob and his Freedom Movement came to power four years ago with a record result, promising “freedom” from Janez Janša’s somewhat authoritarian style of governance. However, public support eroded in subsequent years due to voter frustration over slow reforms in healthcare and public utilities. Janez Janša has maintained his “iron” electorate and consistently leads in polls (around 28–30%), scoring points on the migration issue and criticism of “Brussels bureaucracy.”
Robert Golob adheres to the official Brussels line of politically isolating Moscow, though his stance is often perceived as purely functional. As the former head of the national energy company GEN-Energija, he spent years working within a system dependent on Russian energy supplies, which helped him craft an image as an official who “knows how to negotiate.” Between 2024 and 2026, his government was criticized for an insufficiently firm response to spy scandals involving Russians — which the opposition interpreted as the prime minister’s reluctance to burn all bridges with Russian elites entirely. For Golob, Russia is primarily a lost market and a source of hybrid threats, which he attempts to counter through bureaucratic means while avoiding unnecessary theatrics.
His tenure was also marked by several corruption scandals, the most notable being the “Ljubljana Building Affair” (2024), which led to the resignation of Justice Minister Dominika Švarc Pipan. The Ministry of Justice had purchased a dilapidated office building in Ljubljana for €7.7 million, even though just four years earlier a private buyer had acquired it at auction for €1.7 million. It emerged that the property valuation had been falsified, and the four-page contract contained no protective clauses for the state. Before her resignation, the minister accused her own party — the Social Democrats — of organized criminal activity.
Janez Janša is a veteran of Slovenian politics whose path began with dissidence before the country gained independence in 1991. As leader of the center-right Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), he has served as prime minister three times, earning a reputation as a proponent of firm governance, radical anti-communism, and close cooperation with NATO. He is noted for a high level of personal charisma and is sometimes criticized by liberal circles for management methods often associated with Viktor Orbán’s policies. With this in mind, Janša is considered the region’s leading “hawk,” whose political background is inseparably linked to the idea of strong national sovereignty and uncompromising resistance to Russian influence. Despite this stance, he remains a close ideological ally of Orbán, frequently criticizing Brussels for “interference in the internal affairs of sovereign European states” and advocating for tighter migration policies — positions that have earned him the label of a “soft Eurosceptic.”
Janša has undergone an evolution from a “pragmatic” sympathizer with Russia — who in the past facilitated Russian investment entering Slovenia — to a committed anti-Putinist. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, he began actively and systematically combating Russian influence, viewing Moscow’s aggression as an existential threat to Central European countries. He openly accuses Moscow of financing Slovenian left-wing parties and interfering in the country’s internal affairs through a network of agents and media outlets he considers indirectly controlled by Russia. In his speeches and publications, he frequently draws parallels between Yugoslav communism and Putinism, calling for the “total de-occupation” of Slovenia from Russian money and influence — a stance that makes him an unacceptable figure in the Kremlin’s eyes.
For Slovenia, maintaining harmonious relations with Brussels is not merely a matter of diplomatic etiquette but of strategic survival. As a small, export-oriented economy, the country is critically dependent on the stability of the single market and access to EU funds, which constitute a substantial share of investment in its national infrastructure — funds that are essential in the context of the “green transition.” Any serious confrontation with Brussels along the lines of the “Hungarian scenario” would threaten Ljubljana not only with financial sanctions but also with the loss of political weight in a region where Slovenia traditionally aspires to play the role of a “bridge” between Western Europe and the Balkans. Amid the global turbulence of 2026, Brussels remains the country’s primary guarantor of security and economic protection from external pressure.
Under Golob, Slovenia will remain a more predictable partner for Brussels — a pro-European line, a liberal domestic agenda, fewer conflicts with civil society and the media. He has consistently championed a liberal, pro-European course. A return of Janša would signal a noticeable shift to the right: greater pressure on NGOs and media, a hard national-conservative style of governance, and ideological closeness to Orbán and Trump. For the EU, he would not pose a problem on the scale of Hungary, but could become a potential source of ideological friction.
The close results between the Freedom Movement and the Slovenian Democratic Party mean that coalition negotiations will begin shortly, and the smaller parties — as widely anticipated — will become the decisive “golden share” in the formation of a new government. The country’s future will be determined by coalitions, and what lies ahead is bargaining, instability, and a protracted process of government formation.