The rise in popularity of far-right parties in Europe has always been accompanied by questions about the transparency of their funding sources and the extent of their dependence on foreign influence. One of the least transparent and most difficult to trace methods of financing is cryptocurrency, as it allows entities to bypass financial monitoring and conceal the origins of funds.
By 2026, the use of cryptocurrencies by European far-right and extremist groups had become systematic, supplementing traditional and legal funding sources such as state financing, membership fees, and private donations. According to data from the analytics firm Chainalysis, the volume of cryptocurrency transfers to wallets associated with far-right and left-wing political parties and movements in Europe grew by nearly 50% during the period 2022–2025. Among the countries most actively using this method to finance their proxies are primarily Russia and Iran. Despite effective financial control mechanisms in the EU — including oversight of major crypto exchanges — tracking all transactions remains a significant challenge.
The most popular mechanism for circumventing limits on anonymous donations is well known: smurfing. The laws of most European countries allow donors to remain unidentified if the amount falls below a certain threshold (for example, €500). A large sum (say, €1 million) is broken up algorithmically into thousands of small transfers of €50–€450, which are then sent to “dummy wallets” or forwarded to actual members of far-right parties, who can contribute the funds as personal donations. Classic methods involving transfers through intermediaries are also used.
Last year in Germany, the “Austrian Patron” case attracted widespread attention, in which €2.35 million flowed into AfD accounts from former Austrian politician Gerhard Dingler, who is connected to the Austrian radical party FPÖ. A joint investigation by Der Spiegel and Der Standard found that Dingler was likely acting only as an intermediary. The money had come to him as a “gift” from German billionaire property developer Henning Konle, who resided in Switzerland. German law prohibits anonymous donations from third parties and strictly regulates contributions from outside the EU — particularly from non-German citizens. Investigations by the Austrian prosecutor’s office and the Bundestag are still ongoing. As a result, AfD faces a fine three times the amount received — approximately €7 million.
Notably, in Germany the AfD has repeatedly found itself at the center of investigations into opaque financing. Some of the schemes involved the use of intermediaries and indirect donors, which complicated efforts to establish the origins of the funds.
Journalistic investigations have shown that Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête have evolved from classic bank loans from Russian banks to the use of complex cryptocurrency schemes. The use of cryptocurrency makes it possible to conceal the ultimate beneficiary and bypass the verification systems of traditional banks.
An investigation by blockchain analytics firm TRM Labs found that European political forces and movements promoting anti-establishment and anti-NATO narratives in European countries were being financed through Iranian crypto platforms — particularly in the lead-up to presidential election cycles. Tellingly, far-right forces are often the primary lobbyists for easing sanctions pressure on Tehran and Moscow.
Western sanctions cut Moscow off from the global financial system. The SWIFT transfer system, correspondent accounts, central bank reserves, and major Russian banks all came under severe restrictions. The economic pressure lever appeared to have worked — yet to circumvent the restrictions, Russia created the Russian stablecoin A7A5, a digital token pegged to the Russian ruble. The EU’s 20th sanctions package includes provisions to strengthen oversight of cryptocurrency operations as well as restrictions targeting 20 Russian regional banks.
In September 2025 and January 2026, the firm Elliptic and the Financial Times published a series of reports noting that by early 2026, the total transaction volume of the Russian stablecoin had exceeded $100 billion. A portion of the payments went to administrators of websites and bot farms that ran infrastructure using domains involved in Russian disinformation campaigns. The funds were channeled through a network of brokers in Europe who accepted A7A5 and handed out cash euros to the relevant individuals. This allowed European far-right groups to receive financing that formally never passed through bank financial monitoring systems. It is also known that transfers in the Russian stablecoin were directed toward far-right media outlets in Germany, France, and Austria, and were used to interfere in Moldovan elections. Moldovan police proved in 2025 that through this system, the Kremlin financed political campaigns, voter bribery, and protests aimed at destabilizing the country during the presidential election.
External financing — even if to a somewhat lesser degree — is not exclusive to the “old guard” of the far right, such as Le Pen’s National Front or Alternative for Germany; it also affects younger political movements of the same ideological orientation. When funding falls short, radical forces seek support from Russia, which has a vested interest in the long-term destabilization and dissolution of the EU. This is precisely why monitoring the financing of far-right movements has today become an important element of national security. If left unchecked, within ten years the political landscape of Europe may change beyond recognition — and not necessarily for the better.