The return of Andrej Babiš to the position of Prime Minister of the Czech Republic in December 2025 has led to noticeable shifts in Czech policy. His coalition with the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) and the right-populist Motorists for Themselves (Motoristé sobě) formed a new configuration of power that, within its first months, demonstrated a readiness to revise virtually every track of domestic and foreign policy.
After forming the government, Babiš introduced his first changes in budgetary policy, the media sphere, and the civic sector. As early as the beginning of 2026, the government presented a budget with a total deficit of approximately 310 billion crowns (€12.8 billion). Defense spending was reduced to 1.73% of GDP — well below NATO’s standard — prompting an immediate reaction from Czech President Petr Pavel, who stated that cutting defense spending under current circumstances risks losing the trust of alliance partners.
In March 2026, the new governing coalition proposed changing the funding model for Czech Television and Czech Radio, shifting them from 2027 onward to full state budget financing and abolishing the so-called public contributions (the license fee). Critics of the reform argued that this would create a risk of political influence over editorial policy. It is worth noting that Czech Television and Czech Radio had remained the most popular Czech media outlets, with a trust rating of around 60% according to recent polls, and their public funding had given them a degree of freedom and independence.
The government’s intentions to bring non-governmental organizations (NGOs) under control sparked polarization in political and expert circles. In March, a bill on the registration of organizations receiving foreign funding was submitted to parliament. It provides for mandatory registration, fines of up to 15 million crowns (€613,000), and enhanced government oversight. The opposition called it a carbon copy of Russia’s “foreign agents” law. Following criticism, the government was forced to soften its position somewhat, but the initiative itself signaled a significant shift in approaches to reforming the civic sector.
The new Czech government has adopted the rhetoric of other European far-right movements and “Orbanists,” emphasizing strengthened national sovereignty, the need to distance itself from Brussels, and a critical stance toward EU enlargement.
In foreign policy, Babiš’s government made a sharp reversal, effectively dismantling the pro-Western consensus of the previous Fiala cabinet. “Pragmatic cooperation” with Hungary and Slovakia was declared the priority. Tellingly, Babiš made his first official visit to Robert Fico, thereby underscoring the primacy of the “Visegrád Three” over cooperation with Brussels. This decision is evidently driven by the Czech Prime Minister’s business interests in Slovakia and his Slovak origins.
Babiš openly speaks of forming a “Central European bloc” to oppose Brussels on migration, the Green Deal, and transparency in the use of EU funds. In addition, the government confirmed its refusal to adopt the euro and is preparing legislation on a nationwide referendum, which could potentially be used as a tool of blackmail against the EU on issues of sanctions or internal reforms.
The pro-Russian vector of Babiš’s government has manifested itself in systematic blocking of anti-Russian initiatives and the adoption of decisions that benefit the Kremlin — political choices that align with Kremlin interests, such as reducing defense spending, distancing from Ukraine, and attempts to curb independent media.
The Czech Republic’s position on supporting Ukraine has become more restrained: in January of this year, the government declined to participate in some of the EU’s financial initiatives and cut military aid to Kyiv. The idea of transferring L-159 aircraft to Ukraine was also rejected — an arrangement that had been agreed upon under the previous government. President Pavel supports the transfer and has entered into sharp confrontation with the government over the matter, but cannot overcome its resistance in the form of Babiš, the Foreign Minister, and the Defense Minister.
In March of this year, the Czech Foreign Ministry dissolved its department for sanctions and countering Russian influence — which had also been involved in combating disinformation — citing the “inadmissibility of an ideological monopoly of the state.”
Babiš’s pro-Russian vector has caused a rift in relations with President Pavel, who has accused the government of betraying national interests and undermining the trust of NATO allies.
On March 21, 2026, a mass protest took place in Prague in which, according to organizers’ estimates, up to 250,000 people participated. The demonstration served as an indicator not of situational discontent, but of deep societal anxiety about changes in the country’s political system. The turnout of such numbers on Prague’s Letná Plain was a response to three critical triggers. The parliamentary majority refused to lift Babiš’s immunity in the “Stork Nest” case (fraud involving €2 million in EU subsidies) — the opposition called this an example of the parliamentary majority being used to shield the Prime Minister. The plan to shift media funding to the state budget sparked outrage among the creative intelligentsia and young people, who see it as a direct threat to freedom of speech. Protest participants, under slogans such as “We don’t want to go to Russia” and “Let’s defend democracy,” expressed opposition to the rapprochement with authoritarian regimes and the scaling back of support for Ukraine. The protests united diverse social groups, with participants carrying the flags of the Czech Republic, the EU, and Ukraine, demanding the protection of democracy and a rejection of a political model resembling Hungary’s.
The direction of further development is already quite clear: Prague has taken a different path from its predecessors through an attempt to consolidate power. The fact that the government has parliamentary support plays a role here — however, the Czech Republic has an institutional system of checks and balances in the form of the president and the Constitutional Court. Civil society, which has demonstrated a high degree of mobilization readiness, also plays an important role. The mass character of the protest demonstrations showed that Czech society has a far higher threshold of resistance than Hungarian society did in 2010 when Viktor Orbán came to power.
The Czech Republic currently finds itself close to a point of no return. It has not yet clearly set out on a Hungarian or Slovak path of development, but some of its features are already becoming apparent.
Unlike Hungary, Babiš does not have a constitutional majority, which forces him to rely on the radicals of the SPD. President Pavel remains an opponent of the government, vetoing the most contentious legislation and preserving his role as guarantor of a pro-Western course. The Czech economy is integrated into the German and broader European market, which limits Babiš’s ability to make a complete break with Brussels.
The next 12 months will show whether the opposition can transform street protest into a stable political alternative — or whether the Czech Republic will definitively cement itself as the third link in the chain of Central European populism.