In the spring of 2026, Hungary once again found itself at the center of an energy and political crisis that, at first glance, appeared to be just another episode in the confrontation over Russian energy supplies to Europe. However, a closer look at the events surrounding the Druzhba and TurkStream pipelines reveals a persistent pattern in which the current Hungarian authorities use energy security as a tool for pre-election mobilization. This interpretation is consistent with reporting that Hungary’s election campaign has centered heavily on energy policy and that Orbán has framed low utility prices as dependent on Russian oil and gas.
A key role in this strategy is played by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who in recent years has consistently pursued a political line based on a combination of dependence on Russian energy and confrontation with the structures of the European Union. At the center of this model are two pieces of infrastructure: the Druzhba oil pipeline and the TurkStream gas pipeline. Through Druzhba, Hungary receives at least 5 million tons of Russian oil annually, which supports a significant share of refining at MOL’s refineries. TurkStream, in turn, supplies the country with about 4.5 billion cubic meters of gas per year, nearly half of domestic consumption. As Russian gas exports to Europe fell by more than 40% by 2025, this route became one of the last stable supply channels, sharply increasing its political significance. Reporting on Hungary also notes that the country relies on TurkStream for roughly five to eight billion cubic meters of Russian gas annually.
Between 2022 and 2025, the Druzhba infrastructure repeatedly became a source of crises. Leaks, pumping stoppages, transit tariff increases to about €21 per ton, and disruptions linked to fighting in Ukraine were accompanied by harsh rhetoric from Budapest. Hungarian officials repeatedly accused Kyiv of “politicizing energy,” especially when repairs were delayed or deliveries were restricted. These statements came alongside Orbán’s criticism of EU sanctions policy. At the same time, tension grew around TurkStream. In early 2026, the Russian side reported a series of attacks on objects connected to this route. Gazprom claimed there had been more than ten incidents in a short period. This created an atmosphere of constant threat that the Hungarian leadership actively projected into public discourse.
The climax came in early April 2026. One week before Hungary’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for April 12, about 4 kilograms of explosives were found in Serbia on a section of TurkStream. The incident immediately received maximum political attention. Orbán convened the Defense Council and declared a “direct threat to national security,” while Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó described it as a potential attack on the country’s energy sovereignty. BBC reporting confirms that the discovery took place near the pipeline route and that Hungarian officials treated it as a major security issue.
At the same time, statements by Hungarian officials hinted at possible Ukrainian involvement, which Kyiv categorically denied. President Volodymyr Zelensky had previously said he did not want to help maintain infrastructure that enables the export of Russian energy resources, but the Ukrainian side stressed that it had nothing to do with the incident in Serbia. The situation became more complicated when accusations of staging surfaced inside Hungary. Opposition leader Péter Magyar said information about a possible incident had been circulating in advance, which may indicate that it was being used for political purposes. Such claims reinforced suspicions that the energy crisis may have been not only an external factor but also part of an internal political strategy, especially given the approaching election and the unstable ratings of Orbán’s Fidesz party.
An analysis of these developments reveals a consistent сценарий: first comes an incident or a warning of a potential threat, whether a leak on Druzhba or the discovery of explosives on TurkStream; then rapid politicization follows, with the authorities declaring sabotage and a threat to sovereignty and public safety. The next stage is the search for an external culprit, most often Ukraine or “Brussels bureaucrats.” After that, the rhetoric escalates into talk of an “energy war,” and finally the situation is used domestically to mobilize voters. Coverage of Hungary’s campaign likewise shows energy security being used as a central electoral theme.
In the 2026 election period, this pattern became especially clear. Against the backdrop of declining support for the ruling party, energy security moved to the center of the public agenda. The government portrayed the country as facing external interference, where disruptions in gas or oil supplies could trigger a socio-economic catastrophe. In that context, the current leadership presented itself as the only force capable of ensuring stability. The energy issue proved especially effective because it is directly tied to everyday life, from heating bills to fuel prices. At the same time, the technical complexity of the issue and the limited availability of information allow the Hungarian authorities to frame events in a favorable way and intensify the emotional response.
These precedents also reflect the intersection of interests among several international actors. Russia seeks to preserve its influence on the European market through energy exports and to support politically friendly regimes. Hungary, in turn, uses this dependence as leverage in negotiations with the EU, seeking exemptions from sanctions regimes. Ukraine is trying to limit Russia’s revenue from energy exports, while the European Union, despite efforts at diversification, remains vulnerable because of differences among member states. As a result, Druzhba and TurkStream have become not merely economic infrastructure but instruments of political influence. Their vulnerability, both physical and informational, creates conditions for crisis situations that, as Hungary’s leadership has shown, can be used for electoral purposes. For Europe, this precedent is highly significant because it once again demonstrates that energy dependence can turn into political vulnerability not only at the level of individual states but also across broader EU processes, deepening internal divisions in the Union.
The events surrounding Druzhba and TurkStream ahead of Hungary’s parliamentary elections show that energy security is no longer purely an economic category. It has become part of a political technology in which crisis, real or presumed, is used as an instrument for holding on to power.