Alternative for Germany (AfD) emerged in 2013 as a response by conservative German elites to the eurozone crisis, uniting citizens who opposed financial bailouts for weak Southern European economies and demanded fundamental EU reforms. The party’s ideological affinity for Russia became apparent almost immediately after its founding, when one of its leaders and co-founders, Alexander Gauland, wrote a programmatic article calling for relations with Russia to be “carefully cultivated,” invoking Bismarck’s legacy. Russia began actively supporting the party almost from its inception, with that support evolving from ideological sympathy in the early days to active promotion through political technology. Today, Moscow sees AfD as an instrument for destabilizing European unity from within.
The rise in AfD’s popularity over the past decade was driven by its ability to exploit various crises to boost its electoral ratings. The party filled a political niche on the right flank, becoming the primary voice for voters who felt “unheard” by the ruling elites. This domestic discontent provided ideal fertile ground for external interference, as Moscow quickly recognized AfD as a vehicle for expanding its influence. The party’s growing potential and popularity received an additional boost in the form of coordinated Russian assistance.
The Kremlin’s support for AfD represents a kind of investment in destabilizing the European Union’s leading economic and political power. For Moscow, AfD is not merely an ideological ally but an instrument of hybrid warfare and a means of undermining European unity from within. The Kremlin’s goal at this stage is, if not to bring AfD to power, then to maximize polarization of German society. The Kremlin has never been stingy with resources — media or financial — when it comes to supporting favorable European political forces. The task of strengthening AfD’s position in Germany was assigned to the Social Design Agency (SDA), operating under the patronage of the Russian presidential administration, which already has experience interfering in electoral processes in the United States, the European Parliament, Moldova, and Germany itself. The agency’s activities are overseen by Sergei Kiriyenko — the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian presidential administration, responsible for the information and ideological agenda.
Further light was shed on this organization’s activities by a leak of its working and confidential internal files in September 2024, which journalists dubbed the “SDA Files.” They were able to review and study thousands of documents, including reports and plans for spreading disinformation, narratives, and methods of influencing target audiences. The leak was the result of a joint effort by an international consortium of investigative journalists and, most likely, European intelligence services. The data and files were published by the Estonian outlet Delfi, German publications Süddeutsche Zeitung, NDR, and WDR, as well as the Ukrainian project Schemes (Radio Free Europe).
Interference in Germany’s information and political discourse was preceded by a study of social sentiments and the preparation of a technological infrastructure for spreading narratives through social media and internet platforms using bot farms. Russian political technologists skillfully exploited German fears over high energy prices and manipulated the migration issue, transforming AfD from merely an opposition force into an entire project aimed at dismantling European unity and polarizing German society. Tellingly, Germany was identified in SDA documents as a priority target for influence within the EU. The agency was tasked with “destabilizing” German society and discrediting a government that had consistently advocated for tightening sanctions and provided political and military support to Ukraine.
Particular attention from investigative journalists was drawn to a document titled “KPI” (Key Performance Indicators) for the German operation. It stated that the project would be considered successful when AfD reached 20% in nationwide polls. Reaching this threshold was regarded as a “point of no return,” after which Germany’s traditional parties (CDU/CSU, SPD) would no longer be able to ignore AfD — leading to paralysis in Bundestag decision-making and destabilization of the entire EU.
By early 2026, the far-right party had not only reached but exceeded this benchmark. In 2024–2025, the party’s rating fluctuated between 18–23%, and in certain eastern German states (Thuringia, Saxony) it reached 30–35%.
The SDA documents shed light on the tactics that helped achieve these figures. Chief among them was the “Doppelgänger” project, which involved creating clones of prominent German media outlets (Spiegel, Bild, FAZ) where fake news about the “collapse of German industry” due to support for Ukraine was published and “migration chaos” was amplified. To illustrate the scale of reach and distribution, in just the first four months of 2024, the SDA used bots to generate over 33.9 million comments on social media and nearly 40,000 pieces of content (memes, videos, articles) designed to promote AfD narratives. The target audience was identified as voters concerned about inflation and the energy crisis. A tendentious narrative was spread that “the US is destroying the German economy through Scholz, and only AfD can save the country by bringing back cheap Russian gas.” Such messages, in various forms, were generated by the hundreds of thousands.
Using bot farm networks, the SDA deployed the tactic of mass-commenting news feeds to create the illusion of “popular support.” When 80% of comments under any news item about the German government are criticizing the authorities and praising AfD, readers experience a social proof effect. People begin to believe that “everyone around thinks this way” and subconsciously align themselves with this artificially manufactured “majority.” This is most likely what allowed the party to break through the psychological barrier of 20% support.
Cloning the websites of leading German media outlets such as Spiegel, Welt, and Bild allowed Russian operatives to lend legitimacy to AfD talking points. When a potential voter sees an article about “the inevitable collapse of German industry without Russian gas” on a page that looks like a credible publication, they perceive it as objective fact. This tactic helped AfD shed the label of “radicals” and made their platform more acceptable to the moderate middle class.
By exploiting platform algorithms, the operatives ensured that AfD politicians’ videos reached millions of views through artificially inflated metrics. This turned the party into a trendy phenomenon among young people: complex political issues were reduced to aggressive and overtly simplistic memes that spread virally, crowding out constructive and critical narratives.
Today, Alternative for Germany has definitively transformed into the Kremlin’s ideological and political battering ram for destroying European unity and splitting German society. Every parliamentary inquiry by its Bundestag members, or every pseudo-peace protest moderated by Russian operatives, serves to create “managed chaos.” Were it not for Russian interference, AfD would most likely have remained a semi-marginal party of radicals with no meaningful influence in politics.