The European Union plans to completely phase out Russian natural gas by the end of 2027. While eurozone countries are working to establish alternative supply channels, several European capitals are openly defying this directive. Slovakia is one of them: on April 17, Prime Minister Robert Fico announced that his government would file a lawsuit with the EU Court of Justice against the decision to gradually ban Russian gas.
Bratislava claims that the EU, by approving the phase-out of Russian energy with a qualified majority rather than unanimously, allegedly circumvented the fundamental principles of the treaties. Fico called this approach a “violation of the EU’s foundational principles” and, in addition to the lawsuit, announced a request for a temporary suspension of the regulation — an attempt to create a legal loophole to continue energy cooperation with the aggressor.
Fico argues that the ban would inflict significant economic damage on Slovakia because Russian gas is cheaper than alternatives. Despite resistance from Slovakia and Hungary, the EU has already approved the phase-out plan. Bratislava’s goal, therefore, is to preserve the existing supply system and long-term contracts with Gazprom — which run until 2034 — for as long as possible. This has led many analysts to ask: why does the Slovak government insist on maintaining Russian supplies when the country has all the technical means to diversify?
Slovakia’s main gas supplier is the state-owned company Slovenský plynárenský priemysel (SPP), which handles everything from purchasing gas on international markets to delivering it to consumers. According to the company’s report, Gazprom Export remained SPP’s largest supplier in 2024, though BP, ExxonMobil, Shell, ENI, and RWE have already been engaged for diversification. Between 2022 and 2024, SPP signed flexible agreements with these companies as a safeguard against disruptions to the eastern route. These contracts allow the company to cover up to 70% of the country’s needs through alternative routes, including LNG terminals and Norwegian gas.
Slovakia’s Minister of Economy D. Sakova stated in November 2025 that only 33% of SPP’s supplies came from Russia, with the rest sourced from alternatives. Nevertheless, the government and SPP sought to purchase as much as possible from Gazprom, justifying this on the grounds that Russian gas was more cost-effective, since the Russian monopoly covered transit costs. After Ukraine halted the transit of Russian gas on January 1, 2025, SPP restructured its supplies through Hungary and TurkStream. In March of that year, SPP CEO Vojtech Ferenc announced that Gazprom would increase deliveries via this route.
Another key market player is pipeline operator Eustream, which lost its hub status following the end of Ukrainian transit. It now uses interconnectors with Hungary to receive Russian gas from the south, seeking to keep its infrastructure loaded at any cost. Meanwhile, Slovakia has the option to receive gas from Norway (via Germany and the Baltic Pipe), from Azerbaijan via Turkey and Bulgaria, and through reverse flow from the Austrian hub at Baumgarten. The European market has demonstrated that it can function without Russian resources — yet Slovakia remains unwilling to relinquish its existing contracts and achieve energy independence.
This position aligns perfectly with the Kremlin’s interests, which uses corrupt lobbying to maintain its influence in Europe. Direct contracts with Gazprom are frequently accompanied by opaque intermediary firms and hidden benefits granted to business groups close to the ruling authorities. For the Kremlin, gas serves as a tool of “energy bribery” of political elites: through artificially low prices or favorable transit schemes, shadow capital is generated and later channeled into funding anti-European propaganda and supporting loyalist political projects.
This is precisely what is happening in Slovakia. The persistence with which official Bratislava clings to Russian gas supplies, despite the availability of alternatives, points to the integration of local officials into such corrupt networks. For them, abandoning Russian resources means not just changing suppliers, but losing the established mechanisms of personal enrichment and kickbacks embedded in long-term contracts. This is why Fico’s rhetoric about “protecting the economic interests of the people” serves merely as a cover for preserving the corruption revenue that allows the Kremlin to maintain its political influence in Slovakia.