The return to power of Prime Minister Robert Fico in October 2023 marked a turning point in Slovakia’s foreign policy. A country long regarded as part of Central Europe’s pro-European consensus began showing signs of a strategic shift toward an “eastern,” pragmatically pro-Russian line. This process is unfolding against the backdrop of a deepening rift within the EU and reinforces trends already visible in the policies of certain states, most notably Viktor Orbán’s Hungary.
The key element of the new policy was Slovakia’s changed stance on the Ukrainian question. As early as 2023–2024, Fico’s government halted state military assistance to Ukraine and began consistently promoting the thesis that “peace negotiations” were needed instead of support for Kyiv. Fico openly criticized the West for “prolonging the conflict,” constructing an alternative narrative within the EU.
Of particular significance was Fico’s visit to Moscow on 22 December 2024, where he held talks with Vladimir Putin — one of the rare visits by an EU leader to Russia since 2022. The discussions focused on gas supplies and the future of transit through Ukraine, which ceased on 1 January 2025. Russia subsequently promised alternative delivery routes, including use of the “southern corridor,” while Slovakia entrenched its dependence on Russian resources despite the pan-European strategy to reduce them. Slovakia’s energy policy thus became the primary source of tension with Brussels. In 2025–2026, Fico’s government repeatedly declared its readiness to block sanctions against Russia if they conflicted with national interests. Moreover, on 17 April 2026, Slovakia announced its intention to file a lawsuit against the EU over the ban on Russian gas imports set to take effect by 2027. Fico argued that decisions of this magnitude should require unanimity rather than a qualified majority — a position aligned with Orbán’s Hungary in its opposition to strict sanctions policy.
Notably, both Slovakia and Hungary continue to import Russian energy, arguing that alternatives are either too costly or technically unavailable. This deepens their dependence on Moscow while simultaneously undermining the pan-European energy diversification strategy.
Fico also participates in Kremlin propaganda events. In May 2025, for instance, he traveled to Moscow to attend Victory Day celebrations despite EU pressure, publicly declaring the need for “pragmatic relations with Russia.” Such rhetoric is aimed at both a domestic audience — where he appeals to historical memory — and a European one, signaling Slovakia’s readiness for an independent foreign policy. Fico has also repeatedly described abandoning Russian energy resources as “economic suicide.”
Slovakia’s “eastern turn” has provoked a powerful domestic backlash. Social tensions escalated to the point where an assassination attempt was made on the prime minister in May 2024. From December 2024, mass protests erupted in response to Fico’s Moscow visit. On 24 January 2025, approximately 60,000 people took to the streets in Bratislava, with up to 100,000 protesters across the country. In subsequent weeks, protests spread to dozens of cities, drawing up to 110,000 participants across 41 localities. The protesters’ slogans — “Slovakia is Europe” and “Enough of Fico” — reflect the sharp polarization of Slovak society toward Fico’s policies. The opposition accuses the government of departing from democratic standards and drawing closer to Russia, while Fico himself claims the protests are externally orchestrated and aimed at destabilizing the country.
Slovakia is not the only EU state to hold such an “eastern-pragmatic” position, but against the backdrop of recent political shifts across Europe its role is acquiring particular significance. While Hungary under Viktor Orbán long served as the primary vehicle for a “sovereigntist” and pro-Russian line, the situation became more complex following the parliamentary elections of 12 April 2026, in which Péter Magyar secured a constitutional majority (141 of 199 seats, with turnout of approximately 79%).
In these circumstances, it is Slovakia under Fico that is beginning to play the role of the leading and consistent driver of the “eastern course” within the EU. Unlike Hungary, where a partial policy correction is underway, Slovakia maintains a firm line — from threats to block sanctions to active dialogue with Moscow.
Beyond Slovakia, several other actors can be counted among those oriented toward a more “pragmatic” or Russia-accommodating course. In Bulgaria, a notable role is played by Rumen Radev, who consistently advocates restoring dialogue with Moscow and criticizes EU sanctions policy as economically harmful. Outside the EU but in its immediate vicinity, Serbia under Aleksandar Vučić remains an important element of this configuration, maintaining close political and energy ties with Moscow.
As a result, Slovakia’s “eastern turn” transcends national policy and is becoming a systemic factor of pan-European instability. A political precedent is taking shape in which Slovakia demonstrates that an EU member state can simultaneously remain within the Union while pursuing a course that contradicts its core principles — one that deepens the ideological divide between “liberal” and “sovereigntist” Europe. The populist rhetoric of Slovak leaders, the manipulation of energy interests, and their geopolitical calculations are forming a new reality in which European unity is called into question.