On April 9, 2026, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) published a report on the scale of the black market for refrigerants (hydrofluorocarbon HFC gases) in Europe, stating that the volumes seized in the EU grew from 250 tonnes in 2023 to over 670 tonnes in 2024–2025. According to its findings, the largest hub of illegal operations is the Italian company Puglia Oxygen, which is identified as one of the central nodes for smuggling distribution in Southern Europe.
The rapid growth of the refrigerant black market in Europe resulted from EU climate policy, which banned certain older categories of hydrochlorocarbon-based gases that deplete the ozone layer and contribute to global warming. The introduction of strict quotas on HFC gases used as refrigerants created an artificial shortage and a price spike, turning this industrial gas into a high-margin commodity. The restrictions also created favorable conditions for European smugglers who exploit gaps in customs controls, allowing the import of “non-climate” gas into the EU. High demand from the European agricultural sector and retail industry drives complex illegal supply chains, with Romania and Bulgaria, as coastal states, becoming the primary entry points for these shipments.
Although Russia does not appear in the EIA report as a direct supplier, detailed analysis points to its involvement in these schemes, as evidenced by the significant production volumes of fluorine-containing gases at plants in Perm, Volgograd, and Kirovo-Chepetsk, which far exceed the country’s domestic needs. The report notes that the volumes of “reclaimed” gas arriving from the eastern direction physically exceed the capacity of all legitimate processing facilities in Eastern Europe. This indicates that new Russian gas is being imported into the EU under the guise of recycled gas, with surpluses subsequently “disappearing” into complex export chains where Russia’s role is carefully concealed through forged customs certificates and invoices.
Concealment of the Russian origin of the gas also occurs through breaking the documentary link to the manufacturer. As early as the shipping stage from the Russian factory, consignments are processed as domestic deliveries or products destined for Central Asian countries. To bypass inspections and sensors, Russian suppliers have begun using more sophisticated methods of technological concealment. For example, Russian gas is passed off as reclaimed through forged certificates, since Europe has restrictions on virgin gas. Russian suppliers alter the labeling of HFC gas so that gas of the HFC-134a type is declared as HFO (hydrofluoroolefin), a next-generation refrigerant with low global warming potential that falls outside the restrictions.
The gas then travels by sea to Turkey, where it is blended with Chinese and Turkish gas. If the share of Russian gas in the mixture is, say, 49% and foreign gas 51%, under Turkish regulations such a product can receive a “Made in Turkey” certificate of origin. As a result, the gas arrives at Bulgarian and Romanian customs checkpoints already with a “new history,” where instead of the Russian manufacturer, other intermediaries appear, making it practically impossible for European regulators to identify the real source of supply. To finally cover the tracks of the gas’s Russian origin, at warehouses in Bulgarian and Romanian ports it may additionally be transferred from Turkish tanks into smaller cylinders bearing European labeling.
Through local corruption, operatives in Romania and Bulgaria ensure unimpeded passage of gas trucks through customs controls, thereby legalizing the cargo. It then moves along the “Balkan Route” to the Adriatic coast, from where it is delivered by sea to Italian ports. The EIA report identifies the Italian company Puglia Oxygen as one of the central hubs for the distribution of smuggled refrigerant in Europe, noting that it holds contracts with legitimate refrigerant suppliers. Its facilities are used to substitute and blend illegal gas with consignments from legal suppliers, followed by the application of European labeling. This scheme allows smuggled refrigerant to be freely distributed throughout the European Union. Its clients include large agro-industrial complexes in Italy, retail chains, and companies servicing air conditioning systems in government institutions and private residences.
The shadow market for refrigerants in Europe is sustained by an extensive network of interested parties — from unscrupulous logistics operators and service centers to organized criminal groups specializing in smuggling. Russia is an active player in this scheme, skillfully exploiting gaps in EU legislation and corruption mechanisms to supply banned gas. Such activity not only causes losses of hundreds of millions of euros annually to legitimate European producers through unpaid taxes, but also drives an increase in harmful emissions. The absence of effective controls and in-depth inspections only contributes to the scaling of this environmental and economic threat.