Just a few years ago, interference in the electoral processes of states that Moscow considers to be within its geopolitical orbit was primarily associated with television propaganda, financing of loyal political forces, and the activities of openly pro-Russian organizations. However, recent events in the Republic of Moldova indicate a gradual transformation of these approaches. According to Moldovan authorities, it is no longer about preserving the old methods, but rather about adapting them to new political and technological conditions.
Today, Moldova remains one of the most sensitive points in the European space. A state located on the border with Ukraine, it holds candidate status for European Union membership, faces an unresolved Transnistrian conflict, a complex internal political structure, and a high level of political and informational fragmentation in society. It is for this reason that the processes taking place here are closely monitored not only in Chisinau, but also in Brussels, Washington, and other European capitals.
Particular attention to this topic emerged after the presidential elections and the constitutional referendum on European integration held on October 20, 2024, as well as the second round of the presidential elections on November 3, 2024. According to official data from the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Moldova, voter turnout in the referendum exceeded 51%, while the decision to enshrine the country’s European course in the Constitution was supported by a minimal margin of approximately 50.4% of votes. In the second round of the presidential elections, incumbent President Maia Sandu was re-elected with around 55% of the votes.
However, the election campaign itself took place under unprecedented attention to information security issues. Starting from spring 2024, the Intelligence and Security Service (SIS), the National Police Inspectorate, the Central Election Commission, and other state bodies regularly reported the detection of schemes for illegal financing of political activities, attempts to bribe voters, the spread of disinformation, and coordinated information campaigns. According to Moldovan authorities, a significant portion of these actions was linked to structures affiliated with the fugitive businessman Ilan Shor, who has close ties to Russia, as well as attempts at external influence on internal political processes. The European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada expressed support in joint statements for Chisinau’s efforts to protect the electoral process and condemned attempts to interfere in democratic procedures. The Russian side has consistently rejected such accusations, calling them unfounded and politically motivated.
It is in this context that the statements made in July this year by the Director of the Intelligence and Security Service, Alexandru Musteata, that Russia has already begun preparing for the next electoral campaigns, acquired particular significance. According to him, the danger lies not only in maintaining external pressure, but also in the gradual transformation of the methods used. “We must not relax, because they are not relaxing,” emphasized the head of the SIS, essentially outlining the main conclusion of Moldovan intelligence services that the nature of the alleged information influence has not disappeared, but has changed.
The SIS statements did not appear in an information vacuum. As early as 2023–2024, Moldovan authorities repeatedly reported thwarting attempts at illegal financing of political activities, organizing protest actions, and spreading disinformation. The fugitive Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor, convicted by a Moldovan court in a large-scale banking fraud case, came under the spotlight of law enforcement agencies. After his departure from the country, Chisinau repeatedly accused the political structures he created of attempting to destabilize the internal political situation. Shor himself and individuals associated with him rejected these accusations.
According to data from the National Anti-Corruption Center and the Moldovan police, dozens of searches were conducted and criminal cases were opened during the election preparation period on suspicion of illegal financing of political associations and voter bribery. Law enforcement officials reported thousands of citizens who may have received money transfers through various financial schemes. At the same time, investigations are ongoing, and final court decisions on most episodes have not yet been issued.
It is against this background that the thesis is increasingly heard that the nature of information influence has changed. While in previous years the main focus was on television and traditional mass media, today digital platforms play a significantly greater role. Telegram, TikTok, YouTube Shorts, closed groups in messengers, and numerous local pages on social networks are gradually becoming the main platforms for spreading political content.
Such a transformation corresponds to global trends. According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), modern information campaigns are increasingly built not around a single source of information, but around a large number of interconnected accounts spreading similar messages. This approach allows the creation of the impression of a natural public discussion even when information activity is coordinated.
For Moldova, this “tactic” is of particular importance. The country has a relatively small media market, a high level of social media usage, and several linguistic information spaces simultaneously. Russian-speaking, Romanian-speaking, and partially Ukrainian-speaking audiences often consume different information products, which creates additional opportunities for targeted dissemination of political messages.
Information security experts note another characteristic trend. Modern campaigns much less frequently revolve around direct calls to support a particular politician. Instead, efforts are concentrated on reducing trust in state institutions, the electoral system, European partners, or political elites in general. Such a strategy is not necessarily aimed at the victory of a specific candidate; its task may be to create an atmosphere of uncertainty, fatigue, and societal polarization. This feature has repeatedly been the subject of discussion in European Union structures. Thus, in EU reports on countering foreign information manipulation, it is emphasized that modern operations are increasingly aimed not at changing citizens’ views, but at undermining trust in democratic procedures and the state’s ability to make effective decisions.
An important element of the new information environment is the use of local opinion leaders. Unlike classical propaganda, modern campaigns can spread through bloggers, public activists, thematic communities, or regional online platforms that do not position themselves as political projects. This is precisely why detecting coordinated information activity becomes significantly more difficult.
Moldova has already faced such challenges. In 2022, after the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the country’s authorities suspended the broadcasting of a number of television channels, citing the need to ensure information security. Later, restrictions were extended to certain internet resources. These decisions then sparked a debate between supporters of strengthening national security and organizations advocating for maximum adherence to freedom of speech principles.
In parallel, Chisinau intensified cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and individual partner states in the field of cybersecurity and countering disinformation. In July 2023, the EU established the Civilian Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova), one of whose tasks was to strengthen the country’s resilience to Kremlin hybrid threats, including information operations and cyberattacks. It is worth noting that in July 2026, the EU Partnership Mission began its activities in Armenia as well.
Interestingly, in the expert community, Moldova is increasingly viewed as a kind of model for studying modern methods of information confrontation. The reason lies not only in the country’s geographical position. Almost all the elements that are now considered key factors of hybrid threats are simultaneously present here: foreign policy competition, a high level of digitalization of society, unresolved territorial issues, a multilingual media environment, and high political competition.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to view what is happening solely as a problem of one country. Similar discussions are taking place in Romania, the Baltic states, Poland, Germany, France, Slovakia, and Armenia. European institutions have repeatedly warned that modern information campaigns are highly adaptable and can quickly change dissemination methods, target audiences, and the digital platforms used.
Ultimately, the main conclusion of recent months is not so much that Russian information influence persists, but that its character is changing. If previously the main tools were considered to be television, print media, or public political agitation, today specialists’ attention is increasingly focused on less visible digital mechanisms operating through social media algorithms, online communities, and personalized content. That is why the words of the SIS director that “we should not relax” reflect a broader European context. Regardless of the assessments given to specific information campaigns and who is considered their organizers, the key task for European democracies is to increase the resilience of state structures, the transparency of political financing, citizens’ media literacy, and the ability to promptly detect coordinated information operations.