On 30 November 2024, the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) officially terminated its agreements with residents of the Russian Federation in the field of fundamental scientific cooperation. Approximately 500 Russian specialists were denied access to the infrastructure of the Large Hadron Collider and leading European laboratories. This decision became one of Europe’s toughest steps aimed at preventing the use of scientific ties for military purposes. Yet reality shows that the formal freeze on projects is merely the tip of the iceberg. Amid a full-scale war with Ukraine and severe sanctions pressure, Russian state structures and intelligence services have adapted the academic sphere, turning it into an effective instrument of both “soft” and “hard” power. Scientific cooperation, built over decades on principles of openness and mutual trust, has been transformed into a “Trojan horse” for circumventing export controls, obtaining dual-use technologies, and conducting intelligence in the interests of Russia’s military-industrial complex (MIC).
Russia’s integration into the European research landscape took shape over many years. Beginning in the Soviet era and intensifying in the 2000s–2010s, Russian “science diplomacy” was actively funded through specialized foundations, state grants, and international programmes. Russian physicists, materials scientists, and programmers became key participants in flagship European initiatives such as Horizon 2020/Horizon Europe — large-scale European grant programmes in which Russian institutions consistently ranked among the top partners from non-EU countries. Russian scientists also took part in so-called “megascience projects,” conducting research at major international facilities including CERN (Switzerland/France), the ITER thermonuclear reactor (France), the European XFEL X-ray free-electron laser, and the FAIR ion research centre (Germany). Until February 2022, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, such interaction was viewed in the West as classic “soft power” — a tool of humanitarian rapprochement and democratisation. In the new reality, however, the concept has changed radically: what once served as a bridge between scientists has been transformed into channels for the covert acquisition of critical data and technological solutions for Russian defence enterprises.
Analysis of the post-sanctions landscape shows that Russia’s mechanisms of access to the European technological and research base have not disappeared; they have become significantly more sophisticated. When direct official cooperation between EU and Russian institutions was prohibited, the main flows of interaction immediately shifted into a “grey” zone, forming what is known as academic re-routing. Several key levers are employed in this sanctions-circumvention scheme. First is the practice of dual affiliations: Russian researchers continue to publish in leading international journals and submit applications for international grant funding while formally listing partner universities in third countries — from Kazakhstan, Armenia and Serbia to the UAE and China — as their place of work. Second, personal contacts and internships are actively used: scientists maintain individual co-authorship and travel to Western venues on third-country passports or through neutral scientific hubs.
The scale of this phenomenon extends far beyond purely “academic” boundaries. According to economic studies, including those by the Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII), after the introduction of sanctions the import of dual-use goods into Russia via third countries rose by an average of 39% in value terms, offsetting up to 90% of volumes in certain critical categories of microelectronics and navigation equipment. In these supply chains, Russian scientific institutes often act as a “legitimate curtain”: they either become the end recipients of restricted equipment or issue expert opinions justifying the supposedly purely civilian purpose of the purchased technology.
The logic of this hidden network clearly illustrates how international academic infrastructure is turned into a direct bridge for the needs of the defence industry. At the core of the scheme lies a cyclical process in which sanctioned Russian institutes and individual researchers use their contacts to engage with scientific centres in third countries. Through these centres, international applications are filed, grants obtained, and access to advanced European and global research preserved. The knowledge, data and critical dual-use technologies acquired in this way are then freely redirected within Russia to enterprises of the military-industrial complex. As a result, the open scientific environment created for global progress is effectively converted into a tool supporting Russia’s closed defence sector. The principal risk to European security lies in the rapid and direct conversion of fundamental research into the interests of the Russian MIC, since research in fundamental physics, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, materials science and Arctic exploration has direct dual-use applications.
In practice, this technology transfer falls into three key areas. Western laboratory advances in materials science and nanotechnology are used by Russia to create ultra-strong composites for armour protection, heat-resistant coatings for rocket engines, and lightweight drone airframes. Advanced Western semiconductor solutions, cryogenics and quantum sensing directly feed the production of electronic warfare (EW) systems, radar and high-precision missile guidance. Image-recognition algorithms and neural networks are adapted for automated decision-making in autonomous combat systems and strike UAVs.
A special place in this structure is occupied by the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna. Possessing the status of an international intergovernmental organisation, JINR has not fallen under the strict spectrum of European sanctions applied to ordinary Russian state institutions. As a result, Dubna continues to serve as a convenient international hub that maintains contacts with foreign specialists and remains a potential channel for the continuous transfer of critical competencies into Russia.
The link between the academic community and Russian state security services is systemic. The leading role in coordinating scientific and technical intelligence is played by Directorate “X” of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) of the Russian Federation, as well as structures of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). Spy scandals involving scientists have not been absent.
In January 2024, the Estonian Security Police arrested political science professor Vyacheslav Morozov on charges of passing intelligence data to the SVR. For years Morozov had used his status as a recognised European researcher, participation in international conferences and access to academic networks to collect information on the socio-political situation and European integration processes.
International investigations by Le Monde, Der Spiegel and the media platform VSquare, which analysed a leak of more than 2,000 internal documents from the Bauman Moscow State Technical University (BMSTU), revealed the large-scale integration of Russia’s leading technical university into the structure of military intelligence. At the centre of this system was the specialised “4th Department,” where, under the leadership of GRU electronic intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Kirill Stupakov, the targeted training of “academic hackers” takes place. Instead of standard information protection, students are taught offensive cyber operations, methods of electronic espionage and the covert installation of bugs in household appliances. Every year between 10 and 15 of the best graduates are directly assigned to secret cyber units, including military unit 45807 in Moscow and military unit 62174 in annexed Sevastopol.
The leaked materials also exposed the university’s financial and research dependence on the defence ministry. An internal letter from Bauman leadership to the Minister of Defence shows that the university carries out a record volume of classified research and development (R&D) work, accounting for more than 40% of its entire research budget. Inside academic laboratories, under the guise of civilian projects, secret programmes are conducted to create EW systems, automated control systems and specialised software for military needs. These data clearly demonstrated to the international community that Russia’s leading technical universities do not merely retain academic autonomy but are deeply integrated into the structure of military intelligence, where lecturers are simultaneously serving GRU officers and student laboratories serve as testing grounds for the development of cyber-warfare tools.
Diplomatic cover and intelligence under an “academic label” have become a systematic threat increasingly highlighted by European security services. Annual reports of the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Supo) and Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) detail the mechanisms by which Russian scientific and technical intelligence uses the status of “academic visitors” and officers under diplomatic immunity. SVR and GRU operatives are embedded in joint research groups, focusing on critical EU infrastructure — from microelectronics centres and quantum laboratories to biotechnology institutes. Mass expulsions of Russian diplomatic mission staff from Stockholm, Helsinki and Berlin in 2022–2024 substantially weakened this network; however, security services note that Moscow has adapted by shifting emphasis to the recruitment of researchers in neutral countries and the use of intermediaries to collect classified data.
In parallel with the human factor, a large-scale cyber campaign has been unleashed against the European academic sector. Hacker groups controlled by Russian intelligence services, such as APT28/Fancy Bear and Sandworm, regularly conduct targeted phishing operations and breaches of databases at European universities and research institutes. The aim of these attacks is not only the theft of intellectual property and dual-use patent developments but also access to personnel files, lists of international grant recipients and internal correspondence. The collected data are then used by intelligence services to compromise specialists, assess vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and plan hybrid operations in the EU’s digital space.
The European Union’s response to academic and technological threats from Russia has taken the form of a series of strict restrictions; yet the control system created still retains significant vulnerabilities.
At the pan-European institutional level, Brussels officials rapidly suspended Russia’s participation in the flagship Horizon Europe programme and froze funding for all joint scientific projects. Within the largest megascience initiatives, such as CERN and the DESY research centre in Germany, observer statuses were cancelled and hundreds of Russian specialists excluded. At the same time, a key loophole remains the absence of a unified European mechanism for controlling publication activity through structures in third countries, as well as Russia’s continued participation in the ITER thermonuclear reactor project by virtue of existing international treaties that are extremely difficult to terminate legally.
In response to these risks, pressure has shifted to the national level, where EU member states have begun introducing targeted filters. In particular, institutes in Switzerland and Germany are implementing mandatory comprehensive screening and security-vetting procedures for students and researchers from Russia applying to programmes related to dual-use technologies. Practical manifestations of this policy have included high-profile cases at ETH Zurich and the University of Bonn, where researchers and master’s students from high-security-risk countries have been removed from programmes in cybersecurity, quantum physics and cryptography. Nevertheless, experts and critics rightly note that this protective system still has gaps: possession of a second citizenship or a long-term EU residence permit often allows researchers to bypass automatic checks, while drawing a precise line between sincerely “politically loyal” scientists and prepared agents of influence remains an extremely difficult task for European administrators.
Science by its nature strives for openness and cross-border exchange of knowledge. Yet the exploitation of these principles by the authoritarian Kremlin regime creates a fundamental challenge to Europe’s technological superiority and security. Russia’s strategy in the academic sphere is evolving from direct institutional grants to targeted hybrid operations, procurement through intermediaries and work through affiliated structures in Asia and the Middle East. To prevent the leakage of dual-use technologies and protect the research environment, European institutions need not only to strengthen counter-intelligence screening and dual-use technology controls, but also to formulate a new security policy.