The spy scandal that erupted in Italy in June–July 2026 confirmed that Russian military intelligence has not ceased its active operations in the country, focusing on its military secrets, defense-industrial complex, and military supplies to Ukraine.
On 7 July 2026, carabinieri in Rome arrested two former employees of the Italian Internal Information and Security Agency (AISI) — 59-year-old Gavino Raul Piras and Vincenzo Di Pasquale. The Italian prosecutor’s office charges the suspects with the unauthorized acquisition and transmission, for monetary reward, of information related to state security, military technologies, armaments, as well as the operations and personnel of Italian counterintelligence to Russian intelligence. At least five other individuals involved in the spy network are also under investigation.
As a result, on 9 July 2026, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani announced the expulsion from the country of two military attachés of the Russian Embassy who supervised the activities of the Italian informants — Ivan Gorbachev and Mikhail Astakhov.
According to investigation materials and data from the ANSA agency, the agent network operated on the principle of using the arrested Italians as intermediaries. Direct contact with the Russian military intelligence officer was maintained by Gavino Piras, who received assignments and approached acquaintances and his old contacts in military and intelligence structures who had access to secret databases, and then passed the information obtained from them to the Russians. The information was transferred during personal meetings within Rome and its suburbs on SD cards and in paper form.
The main motive for the recruited Italians’ cooperation with the Russian special service was money. During searches of the main suspect’s home, €25,000 in cash was seized. In audio interception materials published by leading Italian media outlets, Gavino Piras asked his Russian handler: “Who pays? I can do whatever you want, but who will pay?” In the same conversation, he boasted that he had been working for Russian intelligence for more than 12 years. G. Piras received €4,000 for each information package transmitted, yet during conversations with his Russian contact he complained that he sometimes spent his own money to obtain the information and did not always receive compensation in a timely manner.
Italian media outlets ANSA, Il Fatto Quotidiano, and Sky TG24, citing investigation materials, reported on 20 July 2026 that the handlers from the Main Directorate of Russian Military Intelligence were most interested in the Ukrainian track and Western defense technologies. Russian intelligence officers demanded from their Italian sources information about the Italian-French SAMP/T air and missile defense systems and Aster interceptor missiles. The Russians sought data on the results of these systems’ combat use in Ukraine, their effectiveness against Russian aeroballistic missiles, identified vulnerabilities, and operating algorithms. In addition, Russian intelligence tried to learn from the Italians the locations of Ukrainian Armed Forces air defense positions that used SAMP/T, as well as NATO’s satellite reconnaissance methods and technologies.
Russian military intelligence was also interested in the Italian defense-industrial complex, as evidenced by the attempts of the arrested Italians to obtain classified documentation on Italy’s rearmament plans, the procurement of long-range missiles, and other analysis regarding EU military-industrial enterprises. According to experts, Russia’s interest in these systems is explained by its desire to assess technical capabilities, missile production rates, ammunition stocks, repair and supply chains, as well as the ability of Italy and France to transfer additional batteries and missiles for air defense to Ukraine.
According to Corriere della Sera, the expelled Russian attaché M. Astakhov asked G. Piras to collect personal data on certain Italian counterintelligence officers, as well as character information about the Italian’s own sources. These people could have been considered by the Russians as potential recruitment candidates for creating new and alternative channels for obtaining information. The investigation established that G. Piras passed to the Russians the names of at least two AISI employees, information about AISE foreign intelligence personnel, and details of certain Italian counterintelligence measures in Eastern Europe and in Italy itself directed against Russia.
This case has exposed critical gaps in the system of counterintelligence protection and the security of military information. The most resonant fact was that the main figure in the case, Gavino Piras, had already come to the attention of the prosecutor’s office and internal security in 2023 on suspicion of spying for Russia. However, for unknown reasons, the investigation was then shelved, the case was closed and archived, limited only to the expulsion of his Russian handler. Having gained freedom of action, G. Piras continued working for Russia with a newly arrived Russian diplomat. The inability to neutralize the informant in a timely manner and the lack of control over the activities and contacts of special services veterans who have access to serving AISE and AISI officers created a real threat both to Italy itself and to the security of its NATO allies.
Today, Italy remains one of the priority targets for the Kremlin’s hybrid influence measures and intelligence operations in Europe. Seeking to undermine the unity of the alliance and obtain military secrets, Russia continues to actively use its systemic levers of influence and agent networks in Italian security structures, as well as to strengthen its political and informational influence there. This case should serve as a signal for all of Europe that a lack of counteraction to hybrid threats from the Russian Federation can prove far too costly amid the growing confrontation with the Kremlin.