Amid Russia’s ongoing hybrid escalation, Moscow has begun rapidly developing and upgrading infrastructure in the European part of the Russian Federation to support the large-scale deployment of long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). On 16 August 2026, The Telegraph reported that satellite imagery had identified at least 10 newly established or upgraded bases and 59 mechanical launch rails near Russia’s borders with Ukraine and Belarus.
Mike Monnik, founder of DroneSec, confirmed that the Kremlin had significantly expanded its drone infrastructure network. In particular, approximately 20 launch rails have been extended and, according to analysts, may be adapted for the deployment of new jet-powered and long-range UAVs. Part of this launch network is already being used against Ukraine, as seven of the ten identified facilities were reportedly involved in recent Russian strikes.
At the same time, the emergence of such infrastructure has broader strategic implications, as it provides Moscow not only with the capacity to intensify aerial attacks against Ukraine but also with the ability to gradually build up a strike reserve capable of posing a threat to NATO.
The immediate objective of the new network is to increase the frequency of aerial attacks against Ukrainian territory. The dispersal of launch systems enables Russian forces to deploy UAVs simultaneously from different directions, significantly complicating the prediction of their flight paths. As mechanical rail launchers do not require a runway, such positions can be established not only at military and civilian airfields but also on virtually any suitable open terrain.
DroneSec analysts have linked the use of extended launch rails to the deployment of newer variants of Russian strike drones, including the jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5. These systems are significantly faster than conventional kamikaze drones, reducing reaction times and complicating air-defence operations.
The estimated range of the Geran-5 is approximately 950–1,000 km, while its warhead may weigh up to around 90 kg. Combined with mass deployment, these characteristics substantially increase the potential destructive capability of such attacks.
The expansion of launch positions across western Russia indicates that, based on their technical characteristics, the new drones could potentially reach the territory of Poland and the Baltic states. Should the military and political situation change and the Kremlin decide to conduct a hybrid operation against one or more NATO members, the existing strike infrastructure could be used to support attacks in the western direction. In addition to direct aerial attacks, one of the most likely scenarios could involve provocations conducted under a false flag.
On 21 July 2026, Defense News reported statements by Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, who said that Russia had captured a significant number of Ukrainian drones and could use them against NATO member states as part of a false-flag operation.
The Polish minister highlighted Russia’s broad range of hybrid instruments, including GPS interference, sabotage, and the organisation of protests and mass unrest. The publication noted that Poland, Lithuania and Latvia had warned of the possibility of such a provocation, with some of these assessments reportedly based on allied intelligence, including information from the United States.
On 6 August 2026, Reuters reported that, according to Lithuanian Defence Minister Robertas Kaunas, Lithuanian intelligence assessed that Russia was considering the use of captured Ukrainian drones for provocations in the Baltic region and could already possess a considerable number of such UAVs.
Kaunas stated that one possible objective could be to induce hesitation within NATO and weaken support for Ukraine, while also creating strategic uncertainty, as forensic examination of the wreckage of the drones used in an attack would require time.
Against this backdrop, Reuters reported on 10 August 2026 that Poland and the Baltic states had strengthened protection of critical infrastructure. Lithuania deployed military personnel to protect its LNG terminal, oil terminal, energy links with Poland and the Kruonis Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant.
Latvia, according to Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs, increased security around critical infrastructure, including the Daugava dam and the underground gas storage facility at Inčukalns.
The greatest concern among experts and security officials in the Baltic states is not necessarily the potential physical consequences of a drone attack, but rather the risk of political and operational uncertainty within NATO during the first hours following an incident, while European allies and the United States determine who carried out the attack and whether it warrants a collective response.
The Kremlin is seeking to create strategic uncertainty by maintaining tensions below the threshold of direct military aggression. If a scenario of hybrid escalation were implemented, Russia could be expected to launch an information campaign denying its involvement and placing blame on Ukraine. In such circumstances, the speed of NATO’s response would become a decisive factor. Wojciech Konończuk, Director of the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), said in comments to Reuters on 10 August 2026 that Moscow’s calculations could be based on the assumption that Europe would be reluctant to respond to such an operation with proportionate and forceful measures because of concerns about further escalation.
Western countries therefore need to strengthen air-defence capabilities, counter-UAV systems and the protection of critical infrastructure, while developing mechanisms for the rapid detection, containment and neutralisation of attacks. This is necessary to prevent Moscow from exploiting the “grey zone” and uncertainty to test the limits of what it considers permissible.
NATO must be prepared for the possibility of a substantially broader escalation in order to demonstrate that any attack against an ally, regardless of its form or scale, will trigger a rapid and unequivocal collective response. This would also increase the costs for the Kremlin of pursuing further hybrid escalation.