Russia is increasingly exploiting former territorial disputes between European states as a basis for information operations aimed at fuelling mutual distrust and political tensions. Central European countries are particularly vulnerable to such manipulation due to the complex history of border changes over the past century, the presence of national minorities, and long-standing historical claims that may retain their relevance decades later and serve as potential triggers for renewed tensions.
Poland and the Czech Republic are particularly illustrative in this regard. Despite their allied relations within the EU and NATO, the two countries have had a number of historical disputes, which Russian political technologists have sought to artificially amplify in an attempt to provoke an inter-ethnic conflict.
Although this Russian intelligence operation ultimately failed because Polish authorities promptly identified the interference and took measures to mitigate its potential consequences, the exploitation of such sensitive issues provides the Kremlin with an opportunity not only to exacerbate tensions between neighbouring states, but also to fuel revanchist sentiments and undermine public trust in the media and state institutions.
On 16 August 2026, Russian hackers carried out a cyberattack against the website of Radio PiK, a local radio station in Bydgoszcz. The attackers published a fabricated article under the headline: “Czech Media: Poland Plans to Occupy Czech Territory – Document Obtained by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, claiming that Poland was allegedly planning to occupy part of Czech territory. The station’s editor-in-chief, Cezary Wojtczak, told the Polish Press Agency (PAP) that the attackers had gained access to the website by stealing the login password of one of the employees. He also stated that the station promptly removed the fabricated material and informed the public and relevant authorities about the incident.
Poland’s National Research Institute (NASK) assessed the attack as part of a broader disinformation operation, noting that fake reports and documents concerning a possible revision of the Polish-Czech border had been circulating on Facebook even before the radio station’s website was compromised. According to CyberDefence24, a fake account impersonating the Czech Ambassador to Poland, Břetislav Dančák, published an AI-generated image allegedly depicting a Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs document demanding the annexation of territory, as well as a fabricated audio recording intended to enhance its credibility.
The document’s fraudulent nature was indicated, among other things, by the mixing of Czech and Polish languages. Subsequently, other accounts impersonating Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Artur Harazim allegedly “corrected” the information contained in the fabricated material, disputing the area of the allegedly disputed territory (368.44 hectares versus 638.44 hectares). This simulated fact-checking was designed to create an artificial appearance of credibility.
In the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, the operation exploited a genuine historical issue related to the post-war demarcation of the Polish-Czechoslovak border. In 1958, following a territorial exchange, Czechoslovakia received approximately 368 hectares more territory than it was formally entitled to.
Another similar hacking attack, with clear indications of Russian involvement, took place during the night of 14 August 2026. Attackers gained unauthorized access to the website of the Polish Pilecki Institute and its branches in Berlin and Augustów. The perpetrators published falsified materials targeting Polish historical memory and containing anti-Ukrainian narratives. The disinformation content was intended to discredit Polish-Ukrainian historical cooperation, undermine the work of the Lemkin Centre, which operates within the Institute and documents Russian war crimes committed in Ukraine, and distort complex aspects of the two countries’ shared past in order to provoke public outrage and further complicate the already challenging relations between Warsaw and Kyiv. Thanks to the timely activation of IT security protocols, the affected resources were promptly blocked and taken offline. The Institute stressed that its digital archives had been preserved and that such provocations would not deter its experts from continuing their work to expose and document Russian war crimes.
The Pilecki Institute researches totalitarian regimes of the 20th century and cooperates with Ukrainian archives and academic institutions. Its compromise would therefore have enabled not only the dissemination of anti-Ukrainian content, but also the creation of a false impression that such content originated from a reputable Polish academic institution. In the broader context, this corresponds to the logic of Russian influence operations aimed at transferring historical disputes into contemporary political discourse.
Russian cyberattacks have become one of the principal instruments of hybrid warfare aimed at undermining security and destabilising state institutions across European countries. On 13 July 2026, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stated that Russia’s FSB Centre 16 controls a number of cyber groups, including Turla. A statement by the Council of the EU noted that operations linked to this structure had, over the years, included intrusions into government networks and acts of sabotage targeting critical infrastructure.
According to European experts, the activities of this centre extend far beyond traditional cyber espionage and include penetration of government networks and defence-sector systems, as well as attempts to destabilise critical and energy infrastructure. The exposure of the coordinating role of Russian intelligence services demonstrates that cyberattacks against European countries are not isolated incidents, but part of a deliberate Kremlin strategy aimed at weakening Euro-Atlantic unity and undermining support for Ukraine.
The Kremlin is constantly seeking new pretexts and potential vulnerabilities in interstate relations to provoke conflicts and weaken trust among allies in Central and Eastern Europe. It is therefore critically important to identify and neutralise such information interference at an early stage and to demonstrate maximum cohesion. The absence of significant public resonance and strong political reactions to such provocations would provide the clearest indication that European societies and political institutions possess resilience against Russian hybrid influence.