Hungary and Slovakia are of significant interest to the Kremlin because of their EU and NATO membership. The long tenure of political forces that built close ties with Moscow created favorable conditions for expanding Russian influence. Through loyal political elites, economic links, information platforms and agent networks, the Kremlin gained ways to affect not only the domestic politics of these states but also, indirectly, decisions taken in the EU and NATO. Viktor Orbán’s defeat in the April 2026 parliamentary elections dealt a serious blow to Russian interests in Hungary and to the influence networks built there, which Péter Magyar’s government is now trying to weaken.
Journalistic investigations citing intelligence data show that Moscow assembled a wide circle of contacts in Hungary and systematically looked for people who already had, or might later obtain, access to state decision-making, foreign policy, the energy sector, and EU and NATO information.
On 8 May 2026, VSquare reported that Hungarian counterintelligence identified Artur Sushkov, third secretary at the Russian embassy in Budapest, as an officer of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. He showed interest in the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Mathias Corvinus Collegium, the John Lukacs Institute at Ludovika University, domestic political processes, Hungary’s relations with Ukraine, and the Paks II nuclear project. According to the outlet, he tried to recruit at least three people. Sushkov left Hungary on 4 May, even though counterintelligence had recommended his expulsion as early as February. Orbán’s government blocked that decision and allowed the Russian intelligence officer to keep working in the country.
Russian intelligence was not interested only in senior officials or experts. On 27 July 2026, Telex published an investigation into Russian services’ work with young and ambitious Hungarians who might later enter Hungarian or European institutions. The outlet described a student who attended a youth festival in Sochi in March 2024 and came to the attention of Russian intelligence there. After he returned to Hungary, a diplomat identified as Oleksandr V. helped him with studies and career plans. In early 2025 the diplomat urged him to apply for a post in a state body linked to national security, where a security vetting was mandatory, while insisting that their contacts be concealed. This approach shows an orientation not only toward obtaining information immediately but also toward preparing potential sources who may become useful years later.
Under Orbán, Budapest did not create serious obstacles to Russian intelligence activity. On 8 September Reuters reported the expulsion of ten members of the Russian diplomatic mission for activity incompatible with diplomatic status.
In Slovakia, Russian intelligence prioritized the state apparatus, security services, the defense and energy sectors, and people with access to EU and NATO information. These lines of work were recorded by the Slovak Information Service (SIS). A notable case was that of Colonel Pavel Bučka, a former vice-rector of the Armed Forces Academy and an official in the defense ministry system. On 25 March 2022, Denník N, citing a ruling by the Specialized Criminal Court, reported that in 2013–2016 alone Bučka held 13 meetings with Russian handlers and received a total of €46,000 from them.
Another case showed the link between Russian intelligence and the pro-Russian information space. On 15 March 2022, Denník N published video recorded by Slovak services in which Sergei Solomasov, a Russian military intelligence officer under diplomatic cover, handed money to Bohuš Harbar, who was connected to the conspiratorial and pro-Russian site Hlavné správy, and discussed his further work. Harbar was supposed to collect sensitive and classified information on Slovak security and intelligence structures, NATO, the EU, and cooperation with Ukraine. In February 2023 the Specialized Criminal Court approved a plea agreement and convicted him of espionage and accepting a bribe. In 2022 Slovakia expelled three Russian intelligence officers who, according to official SIS information, had operated under diplomatic cover.
In July 2026, STVR also reported a trip to St. Petersburg by Ján Grof, director of the security and crisis management department at Železnice Slovenskej republiky (ŽSR), the state company that manages the country’s railway infrastructure. Through his post he has access to sensitive information about the condition and vulnerabilities of Slovak rail infrastructure. Given Slovakia’s role as one of the logistics routes for military and material aid to Ukraine, such information may be of interest to Russian services. During a private visit Grof attended the International Nevsky Forum and contacted representatives of Russia’s LDPR, which raised questions in Slovakia about possible national security risks.
Against this background, particular attention was also drawn to the 2026 appointment of Sergei Andreev as Russian ambassador to Slovakia. He had previously headed the Russian embassy in Poland. Denník N wrote that his time in Warsaw coincided with a period when Polish counterintelligence was exposing large-scale Russian espionage and sabotage activity. Former Slovak ambassador to NATO Peter Bátor called Andreev an “intelligence cadre” and said that in Poland he helped build Russian intelligence networks and covered for agents.
The Hungarian and Slovak cases show that Russia’s goal is not only to build an agent network but also to cultivate a wide circle of potentially useful contacts in the state apparatus, security services, expert community and information space. Expelling Russian diplomats does not solve the problem completely. Moscow can replace handlers, while the ties they established and the potential sources, they cultivated can persist for years. People whom Russian services begin cultivating early in their careers pose a particular danger, because they may later obtain high state posts, access to sensitive information and the ability to influence decisions. Such networks can supply Russia with intelligence, create opportunities to sabotage common EU and NATO policy, and deepen internal divisions. Their systematic detection and neutralization should therefore remain one of the key tasks of European intelligence services.
