The victory of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) bloc in the early elections on 23 February 2025 was a reaction to the stagnation of the German economy, the collapse of the previous governing coalition, and a widespread sense that the country had lost its ability to govern itself. On 6 May of that year, Friedrich Merz formed a government of the CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). During the election campaign he promised to restore the competitiveness of German industry, tighten control over migration, reduce bureaucracy, and return Germany to a leading role in Europe.
One of the main foreign policy challenges facing the chancellor has been the need to counter Russian aggression against Ukraine, which has undermined the European security system and set Germany the task of strengthening its defence capabilities, supporting allies, and defending the international rules-based order.Even before the government was formed, Merz agreed with his future coalition partners to loosen the constitutional debt brake for defence spending and to create a special off-budget infrastructure investment fund of €500 billion, which was established by law in the autumn of 2025. Acknowledging the need for large-scale investment in the country’s infrastructure and defence, Merz moved away from the traditional conservative policy of strict limits on government borrowing.
In July 2025, Merz’s government introduced tax incentives for companies investing in the modernisation of production and the purchase of new equipment, aiming to stimulate economic growth and improve the competitiveness of German industry. On 13 October 2026, the chancellor declared his readiness to sacrifice his own popularity for the sake of reforms to the social security system intended to secure better prospects for younger generations. At the same time, he faces a difficult choice: large-scale public investment requires increased borrowing, while plans to cut social spending and reform the welfare system are already generating public controversy before any tangible economic results have appeared.Public dissatisfaction with economic difficulties, migration policy, and unpopular reforms is being exploited by the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which presents itself as an alternative to the traditional political forces and advocates the restoration of relations with Russia. The AfD’s position runs counter to the CDU/CSU course, as the party demands an end to aid for Ukraine and closer ties with Moscow. Merz, by contrast, links the country’s economic security to stronger defence capabilities, investment, and closer coordination of common security policy within the EU.
Against this background, the AfD’s proposals to lift sanctions against Russia and restore pre-war economic relations with the Kremlin ignore the threat of further Russian aggression and hybrid activities by Moscow against NATO and EU countries. Such an approach would weaken international pressure on the Russian Federation without credible guarantees that its aggressive policy would change, thereby creating additional risks to European security.Russia is waging a war of attrition against Ukraine and testing the resilience of NATO and the EU, while simultaneously carrying out cyberattacks, sabotage, and espionage in Europe. In particular, on 1 October 2026, German and European media reported Merz’s warning about the need to prepare Germany for new, even more serious and destructive hybrid attacks. Energy, transport, defence enterprises, and democratic institutions are under threat. This assessment of the dangers explains why support for Ukraine is, for Berlin, a matter of its own security rather than merely a demonstration of foreign policy solidarity.A practical continuation of the chancellor’s course of strengthening Germany’s defence capabilities has been the rearmament of the Bundeswehr, the easing of financial restrictions on defence reforms, and improvements to the system of army recruitment.
A law that entered into force in January 2026 retained the voluntary nature of military service, introduced mandatory questionnaires for young men, and provided for compulsory medical examinations from July 2027. The increase in defence spending and the modernisation of the army should be seen as a long-term investment that will form the basis for the further deterrence of Russia. At the same time, Berlin is intensifying cooperation with its allies in countering sabotage and cyberattacks, regarding international coordination as a necessary condition for the effective deterrence of Russian hybrid threats.German leadership and the chancellor’s principled stance were demonstrated most clearly on 4 October 2026 during Friedrich Merz’s visit to Ukraine. As Reuters and the Associated Press reported that day, the German chancellor announced the allocation of €1 billion in military aid and an additional €350 million for the restoration of energy infrastructure. Joint production of weapons and drones with Ukraine was also discussed.
This assistance is aimed simultaneously at protecting the Ukrainian population from Russian missile and drone attacks and at strengthening Ukraine’s defence potential. In this way, Merz’s government continues the policy of support for Kyiv initiated by previous German governments, while expanding its technological dimension through joint arms production and the development of unmanned systems.No less important is the chancellor’s position on maintaining sanctions pressure on Russia, particularly against the background of decisions by the US administration to ease certain restrictions on the Russian Federation and to postpone the application of new sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions depends above all on controlling circumvention, joint EU decisions, and the willingness of partners not to abandon pressure for the sake of short-term economic gain.
It is precisely on this issue that Merz’s stance is of particular significance and demonstrates Germany’s leading role in shaping the EU’s common security policy.For the European Union, this issue extends far beyond Germany’s domestic politics. Under these circumstances, Merz’s government seeks to preserve Germany’s role as one of the principal guarantors of European stability, combining support for Ukraine, the strengthening of the defence capabilities of the EU and NATO, and sanctions pressure on Russia. At the same time, the rise of right-wing radical and Eurosceptic forces creates additional obstacles to the implementation of this course and calls into question the ability of European states to maintain unity in the face of long-term threats from the Kremlin.
