Mass protests in France in October 2026 were used by Russian information networks to amplify public discontent, discredit the French authorities, and reduce societal support for Ukraine. An investigation by Alliance4Europe established that Russia-linked information structures launched a coordinated campaign several weeks before the protests, disseminating manipulative messages about the economic difficulties of the French and exacerbating existing social contradictions. Researchers also identified the main mechanisms of Russian information interference, the technical means of its implementation, and the methods of spreading disinformation among different population groups.
Russian network information activity was traced at least from 1 September 2026, that is, more than six weeks before the protests of 17–18 October. Alliance4Europe experts analyzed 547,471 publications on X, Telegram, TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, and other information resources in nine languages, as well as 12,839 comments under the most popular video materials. One of the main tools of the Russian information operation was the Doppelganger network, which uses fake accounts, spoofed websites of well-known media outlets, and coordinated dissemination of propaganda messages.
From 2 September to 14 October, Doppelganger-linked accounts posted 639 messages in French, English, German, and Polish, which received approximately 7.4 million views. The messages were disseminated in 22 separate waves, indicating the organized nature of the campaign. The main topics were the economic problems of the French, primarily the rising cost of living and dissatisfaction with government policy. Russian propaganda linked the deterioration of the population’s socio-economic situation to France’s expenditures on financial and military aid to Ukraine, attempting to convince citizens that support for Kyiv is being carried out at their expense. In particular, Alliance4Europe cites one of the narratives disseminated by the Doppelganger network: “Every euro for Kyiv is a euro stolen from our common welfare.”
To amplify protest sentiments, Doppelganger used the symbolism of the “Yellow Vests” movement, which arose in France in 2018 due to dissatisfaction with rising fuel prices and government policy. By using the symbols of previous mass protests, Russian information networks sought to revive protest sentiments, increase distrust of the government, and convince the population of the authorities’ inability to solve socio-economic problems.
Russian accounts of the Doppelganger network also disseminated discrediting materials against politicians who support the European Union and Ukraine, presenting their position as contrary to the interests of French citizens. At the same time, the network positively covered certain socio-economic proposals of the leader of the French left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and favorably mentioned an unnamed “patriotic” candidate. This approach indicates the desire of Russian information structures to use representatives of different political forces to amplify criticism of the current government, regardless of their ideological differences.
After the unrest began, Russian information resources intensified the dissemination of messages about violence, threats from migrants, and the alleged loss of control over the situation by the French authorities. One of the main tools was the online network Pravda, which through 28 sites in nine languages disseminated 1,018 materials that were duplicated on other network resources within a few minutes. Researchers also established that 23 intermediary sites used a common IP address, indicating the presence of a shared technical infrastructure for disseminating information materials.
A feature of the information campaign was the preparation of different messages for French and foreign audiences. In France, the main focus was on economic problems and distrust of the government, while abroad the protests were more often linked to migration, interethnic conflicts, and threats to public safety. According to Alliance4Europe, approximately 3% of French-language and 18.7% of English-language publications in the studied sample linked the unrest to migrants or the spread of Islamism. In particular, a false claim was circulated that immigrants allegedly set fire to the town hall of the city of Limoges. In English, this message was disseminated 3.6 times more actively than in French, and in the studied sample, English-language mentions appeared approximately six hours earlier. This indicates the use of French protests not only to influence the domestic situation in the country, but also to shape among foreign audiences the perception of growing instability and the exacerbation of migration problems in Europe.
Alliance4Europe researchers also discovered the use of the LLM grooming method—the mass posting of manipulative materials on the internet, designed for their subsequent use by artificial intelligence systems when generating responses to user queries. A notable case was when a chatbot used a French-language site of the Pravda network as a source and reproduced the Kremlin narratives disseminated by it. Preliminary tests of ten artificial intelligence tools showed that in approximately one-third of cases they included materials from the Russian propaganda resource in their search results. This creates additional opportunities for the spread of Russian disinformation through services that users may perceive as independent sources of information.
The Russian information operation surrounding the French protests indicates the Kremlin’s attempt to use the internal economic and social problems of European states to intensify political contradictions, reduce trust in the authorities, and discredit politicians who support Ukraine. The detected activity of the Doppelganger and Pravda networks shows that Russian propaganda is not limited to the dissemination of false messages, but seeks to influence the perception of real events both inside France and beyond its borders. Such activity takes on particular significance ahead of the 2027 presidential elections in France, since the amplification of anti-government sentiments and criticism of aid to Ukraine may influence political discussions and voter positions. At the same time, Russia does not necessarily need to provoke new social conflicts: by using the existing discontent of the population, the Kremlin seeks to deepen social contradictions, weaken France’s political stability, and undermine the unity of European states on the issue of support for Ukraine.
