Despite EU sanctions, Russia continues to purchase Western laser and high-precision optical equipment used for the production of weapons, military electronics, guidance and navigation systems. In 2024 alone, the Russian Federation imported industrial laser equipment worth $250 million. About 10% of this equipment was manufactured in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Japan, the United States, and Israel, while supplies from Germany and Italy accounted for less than 1% of total imports. The main countries of shipment were China, Turkey, and Israel, indicating the persistence of indirect channels for supplying Western technologies to Russia.
Among the Western equipment purchased by Russia, journalists identified products from German manufacturers TOPTICA Photonics, Stiefelmayer Lasertechnik, Z-LASER, and SICK, as well as the Italian company Adige. These primarily include laboratory lasers, industrial metal-cutting systems, laser scanners, and high-precision measuring instruments. These technologies are widely used in the production of aircraft components, unmanned aerial vehicles, optoelectronic systems, and other military-purpose products.
One of the Russian importers of foreign equipment is JSC Leningrad Laser Systems, which purchased spectroscopic cameras from the German company Basler, high-precision adapters from SmarAct, optical components from Schäfter+Kirchhoff, scanning heads from SCANLAB, and measuring instruments from SIOS Messtechnik. According to documents from Russian arbitration courts obtained by journalists from The Insider, the company’s counterparties include enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex: the sanctioned Ramenskoye Instrument-Making Plant, the Ural Electromechanical Plant, and the optomechanical design bureau Astron, which produces drones, thermal imagers, and laser ranging systems. The Ramenskoye Plant developed laser command guidance systems for guided missiles. Another Russian importer, Special Systems. Photonics LLC, purchased Western high-precision optical equipment during 2023–2025 and cooperated with the sanctioned enterprises NPO GIPO and the Elektropribor concern, which are engaged in the development of military sighting and navigation systems.
One of the main mechanisms for continuing imports is the use of international intermediary networks, through which European equipment, after resale outside the EU, reaches Russia. One such route was uncovered by The Insider journalists in January 2025. The Serbian company Ags Teh D.O.O. exported lasers from the German manufacturer Z-LASER, intended for machine vision systems and quality control of industrial products, to Russia. The Russian buyer was JSC Firma Tvema, which develops diagnostic equipment for railway infrastructure.
In the same investigation, journalists identified another supply channel involving an intermediary from the EU. Analysis of Russian customs documents showed that Spanish resident Roberto Esteves Rodríguez was involved in the import into Russia of T-430 calibration lasers from the German company Status Pro Maschinenmesstechnik GmbH, valued at approximately $18,000 per unit. The customs documentation contained minimal information about the intermediary, and a significant portion of the fields were left blank. In February 2025, the Lithuanian public broadcaster LRT reported on an investigation into the alleged illegal supply of laser products from the company Optogama to Russian defense research institutions. One of the company’s employees was suspected of organizing such deliveries. The broader investigation by Lithuanian law enforcement involved ten suspects, and investigative actions covered Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. At the same time, the Russian company Leningrad Laser Systems had previously positioned itself as Optogama’s representative on the Russian market.
These cases demonstrate various mechanisms by which European technologies reach Russia—through foreign trading companies, private intermediaries, and illegal operations involving high-tech products. Intermediary chains complicate the identification of end users and create opportunities for additional profits from the resale of scarce equipment. According to The Insider, the Russian company Kristalltekhno offered the VEGA 7Z01560 laser beam analyzer from the Israeli company Ophir Optronics for $5,000—almost four times higher than its approximate price on the Western market.
Despite numerous sanctions packages, the European export control system remains vulnerable to indirect supply channels. EU Regulation No. 833/2014 restricts exports to Russia of dual-use goods and certain types of advanced technologies. Article 12g requires exporters to include in contracts a prohibition on re-export to the Russian Federation for certain categories of sensitive products, while Article 12gb establishes additional requirements for risk verification for designated high-priority goods.
The main problem remains the insufficient effectiveness of controls over the further movement of equipment through third countries. Supplies via Turkey, China, and Serbia complicate the identification of end users, especially when purchases are made by trading companies linked to Russian industrial structures. The situation is exacerbated by manufacturers’ limited ability to track the subsequent movement of their products, inadequate verification of foreign distributors, and uneven sanctions coverage of dual-use laser, optical, and measuring components. A separate problem remains insufficient coordination among EU member states, whose national authorities carry out export controls, verify suspicious transactions, and ensure compliance with sanctions.
The continued import of European laser and optical equipment points to systemic shortcomings in sanctions enforcement that are exploited by Russian importers and international intermediaries. Under these conditions, the effectiveness of sanctions depends not only on expanding the list of prohibited goods, but also on controlling their re-export, identifying end users, verifying intermediaries, and strengthening the accountability of participants in trade chains. Without closing these gaps, Russia will retain the ability to use European technologies to develop its own defense potential and continue the war against Ukraine.
